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ABSTRACT 
In a number of Western countries, imputed rental 
income on owner-occupied housing not taxed. In some 
countries, tax treatment is even more/favourable, with 
mortgage interest payments and/or local property taxes 
being deductible against the owner-occupier's other 
income. These policies provide a tax subsidy to owner-
occupied housing. The subsidy creates economic distortions; 
in particular, it encourages an inefficient allocation of 
productive resources, producing economic waste. In 
addition, it places an excess tax burden on capital employed 
in other activity, and on labour. 
The distortions created by the favourable tax treat-
ment of owner-occupied housing suggest issues of theoretical 
and emp ical interest. A generalized user cost of capital 
methodology permits straight-forward investigation of the 
subsidy to owner-occupied housing in several Western 
countries. The distortions created by the subsidy are 
revealed by the development of, and empirical application 
of, a static three-sector general equilibrium model of tax 
incidence. The three sectors are owner-occupied housing, 
rented housing, and other industry. The economic distortions 
are of different degrees in different countries, but are 
invariably quantitatively sign cant. 
Western governments are apparently persuaded by 
the dubious social arguments for owner-occupied housing. 
They are unlikely to be attracted by the "first-best" tax 
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policy which advocates an equal tax on capital in 1 uses. 
The three-sector general equilibrium model permits the 
derivation of second-best tax rates, which minimize ecomomic 
waste subject to the requirement that owner-occupied housing 
be subsidized relative to rented housing. 
The favourable tax treatment of owner-occupi 
housing has important dynamic implications. Removal of 
the subsidy would stimulate intermediate-run growth, 
assoc with improvements in resource allocation. In 
the context of long-run balanced growth it is pos to 
identify the (undiscounted) long-run utility maximizing 
subsidy to housing. These dynamic issues warrant further 
research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Housing is a consumer durable. The housing stock 
generates a flow of housing services, which are consumed 
directly. The occupier is consumer of housing 
services. There are two types of occupiers, tenants and 
owner-occupiers. In the first case, ownership of the 
housing stock is vested in a non-occupying landlord. In 
second case, ownership of the housing stock is vested 
in the occupier. Even in the second case is convenient, 
and realistic, to conceive of the economic activities of 
owners and occupiers as being quite distinct, permitting 
separate analysis of each. Accordingly, the owner-
occupier may be thought of as both landlord (owner) and 
tenant (occupier); being motivated by quite di 
incentives according to the role he is playing. For the 
most part, the economic activit s of the occupier can be 
characterised in terms of a consumption motive. Likewise, 
the economic activit s of the owner can be characterised 
in terms of an investment motive. An owner-occupier is 
both consumer and investor. Thus, the owner-occupier 
might have invested his equity in non-residential assets 
and paid rent to a landlord for tenanted accommodation, 
but instead, has perceived that he can obtain a higher 
return on his equity by investing in owner-occupied 
housing, and foregoing actual rental payments. As an 
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investor, the owner-occupier is concerned with the pro-
vision of housing services for h own enjoyment, as 
consumer. 
In the housing market, the price paid by the 
occupier for the consumption of housing services is the 
market return on the housing stock of the owner. As in 
any investment activity, the market return on the asset 
must cover the "user costs" (of depreciation, repairs and 
maintenance, casualty insurance premiums, interest payments 
on debt, the opportunity cost of equity, and taxes l .) of 
providing the housing services offered for consumption. 
This must be so whether the investor is a landlord or an 
owner-occupier. 
The notion of the user cost of housing provides a 
convenient instrument with which to analyse the implica-
tions of housing policy.2. This instrument is exploited 
in this thesis. 
Interest in the economics of housing, and housing 
policy, is easily justified: Reference need only be made 
to the quantitative significance of housing expenditures 
and housing incomes (respectively, corresponding to the 
consumption, and investment, aspects of the housing 
market) in the national accounts. Further, in terms of 
market value, the housing stock represents the most 
important set of reproducible durable goods in the national 
wealth of nearly all Western countries. This quantitative 
significance of housing is explored in Section 1.1. 
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Despite the quantitative significance of housing, 
economic analyses of housing policy have a comparatively 
short history; and while there has been quite a large 
amount of research in the U.S.A., and to a lesser extent, 
the United Kingdom, there has been very little analysis 
of housing policy in other countries. The first economic 
analys of housing policy seems to be contained in 
Haig's (1921) seminal contribution to public finance. 
Haig was concerned with the distortions created by the 
failure to tax imputed rentals 3 . on owner-occupied housing 
under United States federal tax law. The comments made 
there were reinforced by the arguments of Simons (1938), 
(1950), and Vickrey (1947). Goode (1960) is the first 
comprehensive analysis of this issue, however. These 
analyses are reviewed in Sections 1.2 and 1.4. Since 1960 
there has developed an enormous literature on housing 
and housing policy, particularly in the United States of 
America. Even so, there are a large number of areas 
deserving further research. These areas are exposed in 
Sections 1.2 to 1.6 of this Chapter. 
As in many areas of economics, an historical 
examination of the various analyses of housing policy 
reveals a "vertical" progression through analytical tech-
niques of increasing power and complexity. It is 
remarkable, however, that the literature is dominated by 
parti~l equilibrium analyses. It is argued in Section 1.4 
that partial equilibrium techniques are not well-suited to 
an analysis of housing policy. This thesis has four main 
objectives: The first is to bring together the disparate 
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partial analyses of housing policy by emphasising the 
investment motive in the demand for housing. The second 
is to employ the investment motive in the development of 
a general equilibrium model for the effective analysis of 
housing policy. The third is to extend the analysis to 
a consideration of the dynamic implications of housing 
policy. And the fourth is to explore the importance of 
housing policies in economies other than the U.S.A. and 
the United Kingdomi specifically, in Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand. 
This· Chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.1 
explores the quantitative significance of housing. Section 
1.2 examines the range of housing policies, and the issues 
which arise in connection with those policies. Section 
1.3 produces some data to illustrate the quantitative 
significance of housing policy measures. Section 1.4 
examines the partial equilibrium analyses of housing policy, 
and explores their deficiencies. Section 1.5 emphasises the 
need for a general equilibrium approach to the analysis 
of housing policy, and suggests how this approach might 
be developed. Section 1.6 examines the dynamic implications 
of housing policy. Section 1.7 briefly reviews the "social" 
arguments in housing policy. And Section 1.8 presents a 
plan of the work in this thesis. 
1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF HOUSING 
Investments in housing are a large proportion of 
total capital outlays in all Western countries. Table 
1-1-1 presents estimates of gross fixed capital expenditure 
I 
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TABLE 1-1-1: Percentage Distribution of Gross Capital 
Outlays by Form of Reproducible Tangible 
Capital; Various Western Countries; 
Current Prices. 
Country 
Australia 
Belgium 
Canada 
France 
W. Germany 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
Source: 
Notes: 
Asset-Type 
CIl~ 1 CIlZ t<:I Year i 1-3 
rt(\) rtO ~ 0 
Ii Ul Ii ::l ~ rt 
~ 1-'- ~ I 1-'- III 
no. n ~ ~ I--' rt(\) rt(\) 
~ ::l ~ Ul (\) 
Ii rt Ii 1-'- ::l I (\) 1-'- (\) 0. rt 
Ul III Ul (\) I 
I-' ::l , 
rt 
1-'-
! III I I-' I 
I (1) I (2 ) ( 3) (1)+(2)+(3) I , 
I 
! 
1978 20.19 I 
I 
36.17 43.64 100.00 
1978 34.51 35.00 30.49 100.00 
1978 25.74 40.02 34.24 100.00 
1977 30.47 28.51 41. 02 100.00 
1978 27.59 31. 66 40.75 100.00 
1978 28.63 44.37 27.00 100.00 
1977 24.32 41.50 34.18 100.00 
1978 28.00 33.04 38.96 100.00 
1978 22.64 39.06 38.30 100.00 
1978 16.47 48.19 35.35 100.00 
1978 17.93 31.14 50.93 100.00 
1978 27.59 31.88 40.53 100.00 
United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, 1979. 
1. Investment expenditure on Non-Residential 
Structures includes spending on other 
building and construction, including 
spending on land improvements, and planta-
tion and orchard development. 
2. All estimates are for the financial year 
ending in the period listed. 
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by major, asset types as a percentage of total investment 
spending on tangible reproducible assets (excluding 
inventories). Estimates are for Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the 
United States America. Data are for 1978, except 
where indicated for 1977. Investment in dwellings varies 
between 16.47 and 34.51 percent of total investment 
spending on tangible reproducible assets, depending upon 
the country. 
Housing stock figures are also of interest. Table 
1-2 presents estimates of the value of national wealth 
by major asset type as a percentage of total reproducible 
tangible assets. The derivation of these estimates 
described fully in Appendix A-I-I. Data are for all the 
countries listed above, except New Zealand. The necessary 
data are not available for this country. The estimates 
presented in Table 1-1-2 are remarkable. The percentage of 
total reproducible tangible assets made up of dwellings 
varies between 21.8 percent (for Norway) and 39.9 percent 
(for Belgium). In Belgium, France, and West Germany, the 
estimated replacement value of dwellings is larger than 
for any other asset-type. The differences in asset distri-
bution among countries are largely explicable in terms of 
two economic phenomena. The first is that different 
count~ies exhibit different patterns of tax-subsidy policies 
designed to encourage investment in some assets (at the 
expense of others). One such policy is the exemption of 
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~~ ___ 1_-_1_-_2: Percentage Distribution of Net Tangible 
Reproducible Capital Stocks by Asset Type; 
Various Western Countries; Current 
Replacement Cost. 
Asset-Type 
Country Year 00::0 ooz: t:r:j H 1-3 rt(() rtO ;.Q ::l 0 
+ i'i Ul i'i ::l C <: rt C f-'. C I f-'. (() Sll () OJ () i'i ~ ::l I--' rt(() rt(() rt 
C ::s c Ul (() 0 
i'i rt i'i f-'. ::l i'i (() f-' .• (()OJ rt f-'. 
Ul Sll Ul (() (I) 
I--' ::s Ul 
rt 
f-'. 
Sll 
I--' 
; 
I 
Australia 1978 23.6 40.6 23.9 11. 9 100.0 
Belgium ! 1978 39.9 35.8 17.6 6.7 100.0 
Canada 1978 29.2 
I 
41.2 20.0 9.6 100.0 
I 
I 
France , 1977 32.4 29.8 24.4 13.4 100.0 I 
West Germany i 1978 34.1 33.0 23.6 9.3 100.0 
I 
Japan 1978 26.4 40.5 24.1 9.0 100.0 
I 
Luxembourg , 1977 32.2 42.3 . 18.1 7.4 100.0 
Netherlands 1978 26.6 29.5 17.8 26.1 100.0 
Norway 1978 21.8 46.0 28.8 6.4 100.0 
U.K. 1978 25.7 34.7 25.8 13.8 100.0 
U.S.A. 1978 32.2 35.3 22.5 10.0 100.0 
+ Estimates for Australia are as at 30th June, 1978. 
Estimates for all other countries are as at 31st 
December of the ar indicated. 
Source: Data in the table are derived from the capital 
stock estimates developed in Appendix A-1-1. 
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imputed rentals on owner-occupied housing from taxation, 
pursued by governments in many Western countries. Favour-
able tax treatment of income earned on any asset lowers 
the effective user cost of that asset, relative to the 
user costs of other assets. It is well-known that the 
price elasticity of demand for housing exceeds unity 
(Reid (1962), Muth (1960), Laidler (1969), Lee (1964), 
for instance). Tax policies which reduce the price of 
housing can have quite substantial impacts on the demand 
for housing. These issues are examined in more detail in 
Section 1.4. The second phenomenon is that different 
countries have different aggregate income levels, and 
this implies differences in the demands for particular 
assets. Since the income-elasticity of demand for housing 
also exceeds unity,4. then, ceteris peribus, countries with 
higher incomes can be expected to devote more of their 
resources to the provision of housing. 
The explanation of differences in asset distribu-
tions among countr is complicated by the fact that the 
phenomena identified above are, to some extent, in conflict. 
Much of this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4, in particular) is 
concerned with this problem precisely. It might be noted 
here that tax-subsidy policies which distort the loca-
tion of capital (like the subsidy on owner-occupied 
housing) imply real income losses for the economy as a 
whole. It is not so surprising,then, that countr like 
Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, 
which tax imputed rentals on owner-occupied housing, 
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still devote large proportions of their total capital 
stocks to housing. Indeed, of the countries in Table 
1-1-2, Belgium, West Germany, and Luxembourg have the 
highest per capita incomes; in each of these countries, 
imputed rentals on owner-occupied housing are taxed; 
and yet these countries rank 1, 2, and 4, respectively, 
in terms of the proportion of capital devoted to housing. 
It is possible that the real income effects, due to less 
distortionary tax-subsidy systems, dominate the price 
effects, due to the taxation of owner-occupied housing. 
To the extent that this is true, government policies 
designed to encourage home ownership are actually reducing 
the importance of housing in the total capital stock. 
1.2 ISSUES IN HOUSING POLICY 
There are an enormous number of government policies 
which have implications for the housing market. The 
attitude of Western Governments to the housing market, 
and the way in which this attitude becomes policy, is 
exemplified ln the following passage from the United 
States Budget, 1981: 
"Federal housing policy continues to focus on 
the basic goal of providing a decent home in 
a suitable living environment for every American 
family. Federal housing programs carry out 
this goal by: 
Ensuring an adequate supply of mortgage 
credit; 
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Increasing the stock of housing through 
new construction and rehabilitation programs; 
and 
Providing explicit subsidies primarily for 
low-and-moderate-income households. 115. 
The particular policies embodied in the Federal housing 
programs of the United States Government have been adopted 
by nearly all Western Governments. While the degree of 
government activity differs among countries, in most 
Western countries government policy involves a mixture of: 
(1) The provision of State and Local Authority 
housing; 
(2) the supply of mortgage finance, usually at 
subsidised interest rates; 
(3) loan guarantees; 
(4) a number of tax incentive schemes for owner-
occupied housingi 
(5) rent controls; 
(6) security of tenure provisions for protected 
classes of tenants; 
(7) urban renewal and rehabilitation programs; 
(8) the provision of finance for home improvement 
projects at subsidised interest rates; 
(9) the speci cation of building and housing codes; 
(10) licensing of builders and contract workers; 
(11) legislation to specify and to protect property 
rights; 
(12) regulation of conveyancing and land transfer; 
(13) zoning regulations. 
No other market can boast such a high degree of 
government interference as exists in the housing market. 
Clearly, housing is a very important asset. 
Economic analyses of housing pol~cy are concerned 
with two broad issues: The first is whether the policy 
has worked. i.e., whether the policy has achieved its 
stated objective(s). The second is, if the policy can 
achieve (or has achieved) its objectives, whether there 
is a better policy for achieving those objectives. Every 
one of the thirteen housing policies listed above could 
be subjected to these sorts of analyses, and every policy 
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might be deemed inappropriate on the bas of some economic 
criterion. This thesis is not an attempt to do that. 
Instead, this thesis confines itself to an analysis of 
just one class of housing policies; specifically, those 
policies which are concerned with the taxation of housing 
and of housing incomes. This is the class of housing 
policies commented on by Haig, Simons, and Vickrey and 
analysed by Goode (1960). The issues raised by those 
writers (i.e., those pertaining to the exemption of 
imputed rentals on owner-occupied housing from taxation) 
have subsequently been analysed by Muth (1960), Laidler 
(1969), Aaron (1970), (1972), Ott and Ott (1973), White 
and wqite (1977), Rosen (1979), Rosen and Rosen (1980), 
and others, employing a variety of theoretical and 
empirical techniques. There is an enormous literature 
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which examines the incidence and efficiency aspects of 
property taxes and local government spending on the housing 
market: Aaron (1975), Grierson (1974), Hamilton (1976), 
Hyman and Pasour (1973), A.T. King (1973), (1977), 
Netzer (1966), Simon (1943), Wales and Wiens (1974), 
Rosen and Fullerton (1977), Orr (1968), Oates (1969), 
(1973), Church (1974), Meadows (1976), Bickerdike (1902) I 
Dusansky et al (1979), for instance. Othe~ issues in housing 
policy analysed by economists include: The optimal 
supply of housing capital (Reid (1958), Winnick (1956), 
Dusansky and Kalman (1979»; and the economic fects of 
rent controls (Lindbeck (1967), Gelting (1967». 
Before identifying the issues which arise in 
connection with the taxation of housing and housing 
incomes, it would seem appropriate to define the concept 
of housing income. The most widely accepted economic 
interpretation of income is the Haig-Simons-Hicks 6 • defi-
nition of this concept as being " ... the algebraic sum 
of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption 
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property 
rights between the beginning and end of the period in 
question" 7 ,; or " ... the money value of the net accretion 
to one's economic power between two points of time" 8 .; or 
11 the maximum value which [the income-earner] can con-
sume during a week, and still expect to be as well off at 
th d f th k h h b . . 11 9 • e en 0 e wee as e was at t e eglnnlng. 
For the landlord, housing income might be calculated 
by subtracting from gross rent the sum of depreciation, 
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repairs and maintenance expenses, casualty insurance 
premiums, mortgage interest payments, and taxes, and 
adding to this the value of accrued capital gains on the 
house during the period. For the owner-occupier it might 
be simpler to first calculate the value of his housing 
consumption during the period, subtracting from this 
the sum of the costs incurred as a home-owner (i.e., 
depreciation, repairs and maintenance, etc.), and then 
adding accrued capital gains. The market value of 
housing consumption is the gross rental payments that the 
house would earn (or does earn) let in the private 
rental market. Accordingly, whether the house is tenant-
occupied (i.e., owned by a landlord) or owner-occupied, 
the housing income of the asset-owner is the net rental 
value of his asset, plus the accretion in value of that 
asset over the period in question. The only difference 
between the housing income in each case is that in the case 
of a house owned by a landlord the income is calculated 
on the basis of actual gross rental receipts, whereas in 
the case of owner-occupied housing the income must be cal-
culated on the basis of the imputed value of housing 
services consumed by the owner-occupier, as occupier. It 
is for this reason that the income on owner-occupied 
housing is referred to as an "imputed" income. 
The third component of housing income is mortgage 
inter~st payments. While these payments are an expense 
from the point of view of the mortgagor (landlord or owner-
occupier), they represent an income to the mortgagee. 
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Net rental payments and accrued capital gains are the 
return to equity capital; mortgage interest payments are 
the return to debt capital. 
According to tax legislation in all Western 
countries, the net income of landlords is taxable; though 
in most countries accrued capital gains are not. The 
return to debt capital is also taxable. But in many 
Western countries (including Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America) the imputed return to equity invested in oWner-
. d h . . t d 10. occup1e ous1ng 1S no taxe . 
There are four important issues which arise in 
connection with the failure to tax imputed rentals on 
owner-occupied housing. The first relates to the concept 
of vertical equity, the idea that tax liability as a pro-
portion of income should exhibit the "rightll degree of 
progressivity (whereby higher income earners face higher 
average tax rates). Section lA illustrates that the 
failure to tax imputed rentals reduces the progressivity of 
the income tax. The second issue relates to the concept 
of horizontal equity, the idea that individuals of similar 
economic circumstance should face similar average rates 
of income tax. Here, it is argued that the failure to tax 
imputed rentals discriminates against renters relative to 
owner-occupiers. The third relates to the efficiency of 
the tax. The idea here is that the favourable tax treat-
ment of owner-occupied housing distorts the allocation of 
productive assets among uses; inducing a flow of assets 
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from high-yield uses to a use with a relatively low rate 
of return, reducing aggregate levels of welfare. The 
fourth relates to the incidence of the tax. i.e., what 
are the implications of the subsidy for private and social 
rates of return on owner-occupied and rented housing, 
for the net rates of return on other assets, on other 
factors, and for output prices. 
Central to the questions of efficiency and incidence 
is the distinction between social and private rates of 
return. The social rate of return pretends to measure 
the market value of productive services utilized in the 
period, after deductions for depreciation and depletion. ll . 
The social return differs from the private return by inclu-
ding taxes as part of income. Taxes levied on housing 
income can be thought as the housing income of govern-
ment. This is the fourth component of housing income. It 
is clear that those sectors in the economy which face the 
smallest tax rates will also have the smallest separation 
of social, from private, rates of return. 
Simons' arguments against the exemption of imputed 
income from taxation in the United States are as pertinent 
now as they were in 1938. Then, he argued that " ... [w]hen 
property is employed directly in consumption uses, there 
is the strongest case for recognising an addition to 
taxable income. This is widely recognised in criticisms 
of our federal tax for its egregious discrimination between 
renters and homeowners",12. and: "Income from consumers' 
capital is often a large part of total income for 
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individuals in the upper brackets. To exclude it is to 
introduce a bias inconsistent with the system of progres-
sion and to differentiate flagrantly among persons of 
11 .. 1 f' . 1 . " 13. rea y Slml ar lnanCla clrcumstances . These argu-
ments pertain to the criteria of horizontal and vertical 
equity described above. 
Despite the arguments of Simons, and many who came 
after him, imputed rentals have never been taxed in the 
united States of America, Canada, or New 
Zealand. But the same is not true for some other coun-
tries. In particular, the United Kingdom income tax base 
once included imputed rentals on owner-occupied housing. 
The tax was removed in 1963, after more than 100 years' 
operation. The mechanics of the tax in the United Kingdom, 
and its history, are of interest because of the arguments 
often heard in the United States, and elsewhere, that 
~he tax would be impossible to administer. 14 • In the 
United Kingdom, the tax was levied on the estimated annual 
value of land (including houses and other buildings) , 
whether the property was let at full rent, at less than 
full rent, or was owner-occupied. The estimated annual 
value was revalued periodically. It purported to reflect 
the full rent the property commanded, or could command, 
if let. There were "normal" deductions for repairs and 
maintenance. Interestingly, the tax was charged to the 
occupier, whether owner or tenant. If the occupier was a 
tenant, he was entitled to deduct the tax payment from 
his periodic rent payments, thus sharing the burden of 
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the tax with the landlord. \vhere the actual rent was less 
than the estimated net annual value (i.e., annual value 
less "normal" deductions) the occupier bore the whole of 
the tax on the difference - referred to as his "bene cial 
occupation". The owner-occupier, with no actual rent to 
pay, bore a tax on the whole of the net annual value of 
his property. 
The Radcliffe Committee in the United Kingdorn lS . 
received a number of representations which argued that the 
tax on the owner-occupier should be abolished. The 
principal arguments advanced were that: 
(1) it is wrong in principle to tax notional (imputed), 
as distinct from actual, income; and 
(2) it is inequitable to single out the notional income 
from owner-occupied housing when the notional income 
which might be imputed to other consumer durables 
is not taxed. 
The Committee dismissed these arguments, concluding that 
the tax on the owner-occupier was right in principle and 
ought to be maintained. Never-the-less, the question 
abolition became a regular subject of debate On the Finance 
Bill. When it was finally abolished in 1963 all parties 
in Parliament accepted that the abolition would introduce 
a discrimination in tax treatment in favour of a particular 
class ·of tax payer, but the Government was impressed by 
the social arguments for exemption. The overriding consi-
deration was the encouragement of the owner-occupation of 
housing. 
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The Irish Republ followed the United Kingdom in 
abolishing the tax on owner-occupied housing in 1969. 
France has since abolished the tax as well. But Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and Denmark, 
all retain the tax. Japan, too, has a tax of this sort. 
The favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied 
housing in many Western countries arises primarily because 
of the failure to tax imputed rentals. But in some 
countries the extent of the subsidy to owner-occupied 
housing is even larger than what is implied by this exemp-
tion. In the United States, for instance, owner-occupiers 
are permitted to deduct mortgage interest payments and 
local property taxes against other income in assessing 
taxable income. Tax policies of this sort are considered 
ln some det 1 in Chapter 2. Section 1.3 of this Chapter 
sents some estimates of the size of the "tax expendi-
tures n16 . implied by the United States tax treatment of 
owner-occupied housing. The issues which arise in connec-
tion with housing policy have both static and dynamic 
implications. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 are concerned with the 
static implications of these issues, while Section 1.6 
examines the dynamic aspects. 
1.3 QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF HOUSING POLICY. 
One of the objectives of this thes is to quantify 
the various issues which arise in connection with the tax 
treatment of housing. In this Section we present official 
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estimates of the size of the "tax expenditures" on 
housing in the United States, and present estimates of the 
size of some the direct forms of government interference 
in the housing market in other countries. The motivation 
for this exercise is simply to illustrate that government 
programs in the housing market are quantitatively signifi-
cant. In the United States, the Congressional Budget Act 
requires that all "tax expenditures" be officially estimated 
and presented each year in the Budget. Table 1-3-1 presents 
some estimates prepared by the United States office of 
Management and Budget for the years 1979, 1980, 1981. 
Separate data for tax expenditures on owner-occupied 
houses and the corporate investment tax credit, only, are 
presented. The Table also presents these tax expenditures 
as a percentage of total budget receipts in the appropriate 
fiscal year. Estimates of the tax revenue losses due to 
the deductibility of mortgage interest payments on owner-
occupied housing against other income are almost as large 
as the revenue loss due to the corporate investment tax 
credit, which has assumed such importance in the literature 
on investment tax incentives (see Hall and Jorgenson (1971), 
and Coen (1971), for instance). Tax expenditures due to 
the deductibility of property taxes are about half the 
size of the corporate investment tax credit. These gures 
are quite large, even as a percentage of total tax receipts. 
Becau~e owner-occupied housing has never been taxed in the 
United States, this policy is not considered a tax expen-
diture in that country. For this reason, the loss of tax 
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TABLE 1-3-1: Tax Expenditures Due to Federal Tax Laws, 
United States, 1979, 1980, 1981. 
Tax Item Tax Expenditure 
1979 1980 1981 
-(f} 1-3 0\0 -(f} I-3dP -(f} 1-3 o'P 
III III III ~ X 0 ~ X 0 ~ X 0 
1-" I-h 1-" I-h 1-" I-h 
I-' ::0 t-' ::0 t-' :;0 
I-' (j) t-' (j) t-' (j) 
1-" Cl 1-" Cl 1-" Cl 
0 (j) 0 (j) 0 (j) 
tJ 1-'- tJ 1-" tJ 1-" 
'0 '0 '0 
rt rt rt 
en en en 
Corporate Invest- I ment Tax Cred 13965 3.0 15825 3.0 17000 2.8 
Deductibi1ity of 
Mortgage Interest 
on Owner-occupied 
Housing 
I 
10745 2.3 12505 2.4 1 60 2.5 
Deductibi1ity of I I Property Taxes on 
Owner-occupied 
Housing 6760 1.5 7740 1.5 8975 1.5 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Source: U.S. Off of Management and Budget, United States 
Budget, 1981. Special Analysis G. Estimates are 
developed by the Treasury Department, and are 
based on tax law enacted as of December 31, 1979. 
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revenue due to this policy is not estimated by the 
united States office of Management and Budget. Of course, 
if imputed rentals or owner-occupied housing were to be 
~ taxed, the revenue losses presently due to the deducti-
bility of mortgage interest payments and property taxes 
would no longer be considered tax expenditures, since it 
would be "normal" practice to allow these as deductions 
from housing income. Estimates of the subsidy to owner-
occupied housing developed in Chapter 4 of this thesis 
indicate that the revenue loss due to the exemption from 
taxation of the net income earned by owner-occupied 
housing is approximately twice as large as the sum of 
the tax expenditures presented in Table 1-3-1. 
Willis and Hardwick (1978) estimate that if the 
tax on owner-occupied housing were re-introduced in the 
United Kingdom, and if rateable values current in 1974-75 
were adopted as the measure of imputed income, the addi-
tional tax yield in that year would have been about £930m., 
approximately 10 percent of income tax revenue actually 
received. 
In some cases, data on the magnitude of direct 
government activity in housing are easier to find. In 
Australia, a survey of housing occupancy conducted by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics in August 198017 . 
revealed that an estimated 4,771,100 households occupied 
private dwellings (i.e., dwellings other than hotels, 
motels, and the like). Of these, 1,190,700 occupied 
rented accommodation; and of the renters, 227,700 (19.1 
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percent) made rental payments to government landlords 
(generally a State Housing Department, or Commission). 
In addition, the average weekly rent for government 
tenants was only 55 percent as large as that paid by 
. t t 18. prlva e tenan s. In Australia, much residential 
investment, too, is done by government author 
Table 1-3-2 presents estimates of the percentage distri-
bution gross capital outlays by public and private 
sectors in Australia in the 1977-78 financial year. 
4.3 percent of all public capital outlays were dwell-
ings. 29.7 percent of all private capital outlays were 
for the same asset. 
Other countries exhibit similar pictures of direct 
government activity in housing. Data presented in the 
(U.K.) Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1975 (Central Statis-
tical Office) indicate that, on average, more than 35 
percent of all dwellings in the United Kingdom were 
owned by public authorities over the period 1964-74. The 
Stat tical Abstract of the united States, 197719 • reveals 
that in 1975, 4.32 percent of total government ( 
state, and local) capital outlay was for housing and urban 
renewal. This is much the same as for Austral It is 
significantly more than U.S, government capi outlays on 
health and hospitals, space research, parks and recreation 
facilities, and water and air transport. 
Government provision of mortgage credit is of very 
large magnitudes in many Western countries. In Canada, for 
instance, approximately one-third of all houses built 
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TABLE 1-3-2: Percentage Distribution of Gross Capital 
Outlays, Public and Private Sector, 
Australia, 1977-78. 
I 
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of 
Asset Type Grand Total Total Public Total Private 
Private: . 62.56 100.00 
Dwellings 18.58 29.70 
Other Building 
10.87 17.38 & Construction 
All Other 33.11 52.92 
Public: 37.44 100.00 
Dwellings 1. 61 4.30 
Other Building 25.30 67.57 & Construction 
All Other 10.53 28.13 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian 
National Accounts, National Income and 
Expenditure, 1977-78. 
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between 1935 and 1968 were financed by a government body 
d th H . A 20. un er e ous1ng cts. In the united States, 7.7 
percent of all outstanding mortgage debt on private dwell-
. h Id b . . 1975 2l. 1ngs was e y government agenc1es 1n . 
1.4 PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSES: 
Partial equilibrium models are employed in all 
economic analyses of housing policy. The partial equili-
brium technique implies the analysis of equilibrium in 
one market, o:r one particular set of markets , without 
reference to the pattern of equilibrium in other markets. 
The application of this technique is logically valid, either 
when the markets being analysed are very small (relative 
to the rest of the economy), or separable, so that dis-
turbances in these markets have no perceptible impact on 
the other markets. Sectionl.ldemonstrates that the 
housing market does not satisfy the first of these cri-
teria: In terms of the value of productive resources 
devoted to that sector, the housing market is one of the 
largest markets in the economy_ The second criteria 
not satisfied either: For example, the income elasticity 
of demand for housing is quite large (approximately 1.5). 
Goode (1960) emphasises the discriminatory implications of 
the United States taxation provisions for horizontal equity 
as between renters and owner-occupiers, and estimates the 
revenue loss due to those provisions. Goode estimates 
that in 1958 United States federal income tax revenue 
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would have been approximately $3.2 billion greater than 
actual level of $59.1 billion; $1.2 billion of th 
being due to the taxation of imputed net rent (gross rent 
minus interest on mortgage debt, property taxes, deprec 
tion, repairs and maintenance, and casualty insurance 
premiums), and the other $2.0 billion from eliminating the 
sonal deductions for mortgage interest and property taxes 
on owner-occupied dwellings. This total tax saving 
sents 12.6 percent of the gross imputed rent of owner-
occupied dwellings, and 8.7 percent of the gross rent 
all dwellings. 
Rosen (1979a), (1979b), and Rosen and Rosen (1980) 
use econometric techniques to estimate the impact of the 
united States income tax provisions on the demand for 
housing. Rosen and Rosen (1980) calculate that about one-
quarter of the increase in home ownership in the U.S. 
since 1945 can be attributed to the distortion of tax 
liability in favour of owner-occupied housing. King and 
Atkinson (1980) explore the implications of U.K. tax 
legislation the differential costs of housing by 
tenure group; in particular, their analysis differs from 
other simi analyses by comparing the costs of owner-
occupiers with rentals paid by public authority tenants 
(these are the two largest tenure groups in the United 
Kingdom), rather than with the situation of private 
tenants. They find that while the rate of return on 
public authority housing is approximately one-half of the 
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rates of return in commercial and industrial sectors, 
the average costs of owner-occupiers are even lower than 
public authority rentals. King (1981) analyses the 
implications of the tax treatment of housing for tenure 
choice. 
The impact of taxation policies on tenure-choice 
relates to the extent to which those policies discriminate 
between owner-occupiers and tenants. Aaron (1970) 
presents an illustration of the horizontal inequity as 
between owner-occupiers and tenants due to United States 
tax law: We compare tax liability of two individuals. 
Each individual has the same labour income ($10,000), and 
receives the same amount of investment income ($1,000). 
One individual is a renter, and the other, an owner-
occupier. In the case of the renter, the whole of the 
$1,000 investment income is derived from non-residential 
assets; in the case of the owner-occupier, however, $600 
is derived from non-residential assets, while the other 
$400 is derived from equity invested in owner-occupied 
housing. Each individual pays the same gross rental price 
for housing. The tax liabilities of the renter and owner-
occupier are illustrated in Table 1-4-1. If tax laws treated 
income from all sources alike, the renter and owner-occupier 
would have the same tax liability, and would have the same 
disposable income. Under 1970 tax law, the differences in 
tax liabilities and disposable incomes are quite large. 
In addition to the issue of horizontal equity, much 
of the literature, in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, has emphasised the implications of housing 
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TABLE 1-4-1: Tax Treatment of Renters and Owner-Occupiers 
under 1970 United States Tax Law; An 
Illustration. 
Labour Earnings 
Investment Income at 4% 
(i) On non-residential assets 
(a) $25,000 at 4%: 
(b) $15,000 at 4%: 
(ii) On equity in home 
(a) $10,000 at 4%: 
Money Income 
Rent Payments 
Housing Expenses 
Residual Money Income 
Tax Liabi1ity+ 
Source: Adapted from Aaron (1970) 
* 2100 + 400 = 2,500. 
Renter ($) 
10,000 
1,000 
11,000 
2,500 
8,500 
1,304 
, 
Owner ($) 
10,000 
600 
400 
10 / 600 
2,100* 
8 / 500 
962 
+ Assumptions: a) Housing costs are 25% of earnings for 
both renter and owner-occupier. 
Mortgage interest is $900 (6% of 
$15,000 mortgage); property taxes are 
$500. 
[ 
! 
b) Renter and owner-occupier have 4-person 
households. 
c) Renter claims standard deduction. 
d) Owner-occupier itemizes deductions: 
$1,400 in mortgage interest and 
property taxes; $1,000 in other 
deductions. 
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taxation policies for vertical equity in the individual 
income tax. Thus, Goode (1960), Aaron (1970), (1972), 
and King and Atkinson (1980) all consider the size of the 
subsidy to owner-occupied housing in different income 
groups. As might be expected, the favourable tax treat-
ment of owner-occupied housing is usually found to reduce 
the progressivity the income tax. There are two main 
reasons for this: Firstly, since the income-elasticity 
of demand for housing exceeds unit (or, put another way, 
the marginal propensity to consume housing exceeds the 
average propensity to consume) higher income earners derive 
a larger share of their income from untaxed (imputec) 
rentals on housing than lower income earners. And, 
secondly, the subsidy to owner-occupied housing varies 
proportionately with the individual's marginal tax rate; 
so that indiv,iduals on higher incomes, facing higher 
marginal tax rates, derive larger subsidies on housing 
than individuals on lower incomes. These two reasons are 
illustrated in Table 1-4-2. 
The illustrations in Table 1-4-2 use a very simple 
tax-scale: The first $10,000 of assessed income is taxed 
at a rate of 20 percent; all assessed income above $10,000 
is taxed at a rate of 30 percent. One individual earns 
$9,000 labour income, the other $10,000. The individual 
earning $9,000 receives $1,000 in imputed net rent on 
owner-occupied housing. If the income-elasticity of demand 
for housing is 1.5, then the individual earning $10,000 
I 
, 
I 
I 
, 
, 
I 
, 
, 
I 
I 
TABLE 1-4-2: Tax Treatment of Owner-occupiers of 
Different Income Levels; An Illustration 
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Individual 1 ($) Individual 2 ($) 
Lab'our Earnings 9,000 10,000 
Net Housing Income: 
. (i) n~ = 1,5* 1,000 1,166.6 
(ii) M nH = 0 1,000 
Present Tax 
Liability:+ 1,800 
Average Tax Rate 
on Labour Earnings: .20 
Average Tax Rate 
on Total Income: 
(i) M 1.5 .18 nH = 
( .. ) M II nH = 0 .18 
, 
Tax Liability when I 
all Income is 
Taxed 
(i) M 1.5 2,000 nH = 
(ii) M: 0 2,000 nH = 
Average Tax Rate 
on Total Income: 
(i) M 1.5 
.20 nH = 
(' .) M II nH = 0 .20 
+ The tax-scale is: $(0-10,000): .20 
$(10,000+) .30. 
There is no mortgage interest or property tax 
deductibility. 
1,000 
2,000 
.20 
.179 
.182 
2,350 
2,300 
.210 
.209 
* n~ is the income-elasticity of demand for housing. 
, 
I 
I 
32 
receives $1,166.67 in imputed net rent on owner-occupied 
housing. If all income (labour earnings plus imputed 
net rent) were taxed, the income-elasticity of demand for 
housing would have a small impact on average tax rates: 
Whether the .income-elasticity is 1.5 or 0 the average tax 
rate is .20 for the first individual, and varies from 
.210 to .209 for the second. The interesting result is 
that if rentals on owner-occupied housing are not taxed, 
and if the income-elasticity of demand for housing is 1.5, 
then the individual on the higher income faces the lower 
average tax rate; the income tax is regressive in this 
illustration. The second result of interest is that the 
differences between average tax rates are smaller when 
imputed rentals are not taxed; and this is independent 
of the income-elasticity of demand. 
The implications of housing policy for horizontal 
and vertical equity are examined in some detail in Chapter 
2 of this thesis. 
A number of partial equilibrium analyses of housing 
policy have concentrated on the efficiency aspects of the 
tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing. Aaron (1972) and 
Laidler (1969) assume that the supply of housing is per-
fectly elastic; put another way, that the net rate of 
return on housing capital is determined outside of the 
housing market, and is constant. The effect of the 
subsidy on owner-occupied housing-is to cause a flow of 
benefits from the government to owner-occupiers, without 
any effect on housing stock prices or rental prices. 
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Laid1er estimates, on the basis of 1960 United States data, 
that there was over $60 billion invested in owner-occupied 
housing that would not have been invested there if the 
subsidy did not exist; and this was found to imply an 
annual (Marsha11ian) welfare loss of over $500 million. 
Laid1er uses a price-elasticity of demand of -1.5 in his 
calculations. The Laid1er (1969) analysis is examined in 
some detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
One of the nice features of the Laid1er partial 
equilibrium analysis is its simplicity: There is only one 
market to worry about; all substitution effects between 
tenures are ignored. Using this sort of analysis it is 
possible to derive order-of-magnitude estimates of the 
efficiency effects of a large number of housing policies. 
One policy, of some recent interest, is the policy pub-
1icised in the 1981 New Zealand Budget Speech, which 
provides for a tax rebate of 50 percent of mortgage interest 
payments on owner-occupied houses, for the first five years 
of home ownership. The total value of the tax saving is 
not to exceed $1,000 for anyone home owner. Estimates 
developed in Chapter 4 of this thesis reveal that in the 
financial year 1977-78, there were 1723.5 million units of 
capital employed in owner-occupied housing, where one unit 
is the quantity of capital needed to generate one dollar of 
net income. The effect of the new policy measure will be 
to reduce the user costs of owning a first home by 
.5{r ~) dollars per unit,22. 
m 
r 
c 
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where: r is the mortgage interest rate. 
m 
<P is the proportion of the house value that 
would be convered by mortgage debt. 
r is the net rate of return, or opportunity 
c 
cost, of investing equity in housing. 
According to the estimates presented in Chapter 4, the 
user costs of owner-occupied housing were $0.90 per unit 
in 1977-78. If we assume that r 
m 
r I and that 70 percent 
c 
of the finance for a first home is raised by mortgage 
finance, for the average first home purchaser, we have 
that the percentage change in the user cost of capital due 
to the policy announced in the 1981 Budget is approximately 
-38.89 percent. If the price-elasticity of demand for new 
housing is .5, then the demand for (new) housing will 
increase by 58.33 percent. The annual (Marshallian) 
deadweight loss associated with the policy in 1977-78 
would have been: 
23. 
* where: PKl is the gross rental price on owner-occupied 
housing (equals user cost). 
Kl is the physical quantity of capital employed 
in owner-occupied housing. 
The deadweight loss evaluates at $175.6 million per annum 
(approximately $.60 per capita, per annum). 
The Laidler (1969) analysis has been criticised 
for its lack of realism, of course. Some criticisms have 
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been even more gnificant: M.J., and L.J. White (1977) 
attack the infinite supply elasticity assumption of Aaron 
(1970), (1972), and Laidler. They permit the supply 
schedule for housing to have any positive elasticity. In 
addition, it is supposed that there is complete supply 
substitutability of owner-occupied and rented housing. 
It is shown that Laidler's estimate of the deadweight 
welfare loss is biased upwards, and that the most important 
implications of the owner-occupier subsidy are of a distri-
butional nature: For instance, if the ticity of 
supply of housing is unitary, deadweight losses due to 
the subsidy are $680m. per annum (based on 1970 data. 
Compare with $1.04b. per annum, which would be Laidler's 
estimate on the same data), while the transfer of benefits 
from renters to landlords as a result of the subsidy is 
$1.74b. per annum. 
The most remarkable feature of the White and White 
(1977) analysis is the implicit assumption that the demands 
for owner-occupied housing and rented housing are indepen-
dent. i.e., the results of the white and White paper 
depend upon an absence of substitution between tenures. 
Hence, the estimates of the effects of the owner-occupier 
subsidy assume that if the subsidy were eliminated there 
would be no change the number of renters (although each 
renter would consume more units of housing services as 
the rental price 11) .24. In fact, the interdependence 
of renter and owner-occupier demands for housing is one of 
the most important descriptive features of the housing 
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market; a feature which has been exploited analytically, 
and empirically, by King (1980), and Rosen and Rosen 
(1980) • 
The papers by Aaron, Laidler, and vfuite and White 
are concerned with some of the same issues that are 
explored in this thesis, but they are all partial equili-
brium analyses: Only Aaron (1972) of s some comment on 
the general equilibrium implications of the owner-occupier 
subsidy. The partial equilibrium technique suffers from 
the (usually implicit) restrictive assumptions which 
support it. An honest application of partial equilibrium 
tools precludes analysis of many of the interesting issues 
arising in connection with housing policy, and taxation 
policy in general. These issues are examined in the next 
Section. 
1.5 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM CONSIDERATIONS. 
The e iency costs of the favourable tax treat-
ment of owner-occupied housing arise because of the dis-
torted allocation of resources induced by that tax policy. 
In the Laidler (1969)-type partial equilibrium analyses of 
the efficiency issue, the effects of the distortions are 
explained in the following terms: The marginal unit of 
productive capital currently employed in owner-occupied 
housing would yield more utility if employed in the provi-
sion of other commodities. The additional amount of utility 
is equal to the unit subsidy on owner-occupied housing. 
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The total welfare cost of the subsidy is the sum of the 
utility losses on each of the units of housing that would 
not be employed in this sector if the subsidy were removed. 
As was noted in Section 1.4, measurement of the 
welfare cost of the owner-occupier subsidy by partial 
equilibium techniques requires assuming an exogenous net 
rate of return on housing capital. Given the quantitative 
significance of housing, however, this assumption is 
remarkably unrealistic: Even a very small percentage 
increase in the quantity of capital employed in owner-
occupied housing implies that a large quantity of capital 
is removed from other sectors in the economy, and this 
must have an impact on the net rate of return on capital. 
Any measure of "overinvestment,,25. in owner-
occupied housing arising from the subsidy will be associated 
with a corresponding " underinvestment" in other sectors. 
The assumption usually made in stud of the incidence 
and efficiency effects of capital taxes is that private 
net rates of return are equalized among sectors both 
before and after a tax disturbance. To the extent that 
this is true, social rates of return on various assets 
will differ according to the tax differentials among 
sectors. A marginal reallocation of resources from a 
lightly taxed to a heavily taxed sector will increase 
social income (gross domestic product, for instance) 
because of this. Considerations of this sort can be ana-
lysed properly only with general equilibrium techniques. 
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In particular, it seems futile to attempt to measure the 
incidence of the subsidy on owner-occupied housing unless 
it is admitted that the subsidy will affect rates of 
return on all assets. 
Despite its shortcomings, however, the importance 
of the partial equilibrium technique in public finance is 
indicated by the suggestion of McLure (1975) that prior 
to the pUblication of Harberger's seminal paper on the 
incidence of the corporation income tax (1962), the theory 
of tax incidence had not advanced much beyond what is 
contained in Marshall's Principles of Economics. Harberger's 
general equilibrium technique (1962), (1966), represents 
the most prominent contemporary approach to the analysis 
of tax incidence. The power of this approach lies in its 
ability to analyse the responses to a policy disturbance 
in product and factor markets simultaneously, as well 
as emphasising the relationships among individual markets 
for factors and products. The approach is able to describe 
the supply response in a particular product, or factor, 
market to changes in relative product, and/or factor, 
prices, incorporating the effects of interractions in 
markets for other products, and factors. In contrast, 
partial equilibrium analyses of tax incidence are unable 
to explicitly analyse a number of important issues, like 
the effects of tax disturbances on factor rewards in 
untaxed industries, or on those who purchase untaxed pro-
ducts. Thus, for instance, Laidler's (1969) study assumes 
a constant after-tax net rate of return on capital, so 
avoiding the incidence question completely. 
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The paper by Ott and Ott (1973) appears to be the 
only general equilibrium analysis which relates to the 
housing market. They divide the total United States 
capital stock among corporate, agricultural, and housing 
sectors (owner-occupied housing and rented housing are 
grouped together). Their conclusion is that most of 
the "underallocation" of capital to the corporate sector 
has benefited the housing sector. This result, which the 
authors find surprising, is in fact an implicit assumption 
made in all the partial equilibrium analyses of housing 
policy: Any difference between the rates of tax on housing 
and other capital is interpreted as a subsidy on housing, 
so encouraging "overinvestment" in housing. Given the 
other assumptions embodied in the Laidler (1969) and White 
and White (1977) papers, it says nothing much more than 
that the demand curve for housing is downward sloping. 
Never-the-less, it would be comforting to know that the 
assumptions are correct. 
The disturbing feature of the Ott and Ott (1973) 
paper is its claim to be a three-sector general equilibrium 
analysis of tax incidence, when it is noti or, if it is, it 
assumes away most of the important issues which general 
equilibrium models are usually designed to analyse. In 
fact, the questions of the incidence of capital taxes on 
net factor prices, and on output prices, are brushed aside 
by the (implicit) assumption that all taxes on capital are 
not "shifted": i.e., an increase in the tax rate levied 
on capital income in one sector will increase the gross 
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rental price of capital in that sector by the full amount 
of the unit tax increase, with no ef on the after-tax 
unit income. Hence, suppose that a unit tax of TK is 
imposed on capital in all uses, and that there were no pre-
existing distortions. Then, the gross rental price of 
capital would rise by TK in all sectors. But since this 
tax policy is neutral,26. and since the total capital 
stock is assumed fixed, the allocation capital among 
sectors must be the same after the tax as before. Under 
competition (where the demand curve capital in each 
sector is its value marginal product schedule) this result 
can only emerge under the Ott and Ott assumptions if 
output prices (equal marginal costs) for all commodities 
i increase by TK/MPKi (where MPKi is the marginal physical 
product of capital employed in sector i). In fact, as 
Harberger (1962) and many others have demonstrated, if the 
total capital stock is fixed, the imposition of a neutral 
tax on capital causes the after-tax unit net income to fall 
by the amount of the tax, with no affect on output prices. 
This is prec ly the opposite set of results to those 
implied by the Ott and Ott (1973) assumption. 
Consequently, despite the debt of gratitude Ott 
and Ott express to Harberger in the leading footnote of 
their paper, the model they employ is inconsistent with 
general equilibrium models of tax incidence; in particular, 
it bears no relationship to the Harberger (1962) model. 27 • 
Mc Lure (1975) suggests that the most significant 
new improvement on the Harberger (1962) model would be to 
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extend the model to cover three sectors, rather than two. 
The reason offered is that this would permit the analy s 
of tax incidence when there is complementarity among 
sectors. But there is another reason: If the three-
sector model had been available to ott and Ott (1973) their 
paper might have represented a fundamental contribution to 
the tax incidence literature. In addition, the three-
sector model could be used to analyse a host of interesting 
tax incidence questions which cannot be handled by the 
two-sector model. One such question is the general equili-
brium implications of the favourable tax treatment given 
owner-occupied housing: A three-sector model would permit 
the examination of the misallocation of capital, not merely 
as between housing and "other industry", but as between 
housing tenures. Given the importance of the owner-occupied 
subsidy in the analysis of housing policy, particularly in 
that it favours owner-occupiers over renters, this would 
seem to be an important study. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis develops the three-sector 
general equilibrium model of tax incidence. Chapter 4 
applies the model to an examination of the general equili-
brium implications of the favourable tax treatment of 
owner-occupied housing. We identify three sectors: Owner-
occupied housing; rented housing; and "other industry". 
The model is applied to data for Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 
the United Kingdom case, the rented housing sector 
comprises local authority housing. 
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1.6 DYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Harberger (1964b) argues that it "is likely that 
the feature which best distinguishes the economic thinking 
(both professional and popular) of the postwar period from 
earlier decades is the emphasis placed upon economic 
growth - as a phenomenon to be explained, as a criterion 
of economic performance, and as an objective of pOlicy.n 2S . 
Almost without exception, major analyses of the 
inefficiencies arising from the non-neutral taxation of 
income-producing assets emphasise that such inefficiencies 
are inimical to growth. While Musgrave (1963) can justify 
his interest in the impact of United States tax policy on 
private capital formation by the implications of aggregate 
levels of investment for the rate of growth of output, 
what is just as important is the effects of tax policy on the 
composition of investment. Thus, it is often argued, any 
government policy which implies non-neutral taxation of 
capital can be expected to have adverse implications for 
economic growth. 
The investigation of the implications of housing 
taxation policies for rates of economic growth has, 
previously, received little better than passing reference. 
A remarkable example is provided by Denison (1967, p.156): 
"It is likely that every country considered would 
have obtained a higher growth rate of measured 
national income (though not necessarily of 
economic welfare) by diverting investment from 
housing to nonresidential business investment 
if it could have done so. In Europe this 
generally was politically impossible, while 
in the United States the demand nonresi-
dential investment was insufficient in much 
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of the period to have taken up any slack that 
would have been created by reducing residential 
construction." 
The way in which a reallocation of investment from resi-
dential to nonresidential uses increases the rate of 
growth is quite simple: Because housing is taxed favour-
ably, relative to capital employed in other sectors, the 
social rate of return on housing capital ss than 
that on other capital. Hence, a reallocation of the 
share of total investment going to each sector, from resi-
dential to nonresidential uses, increases the measured 
rate of growth of national (social) income. Denison's 
reasons for avoiding an explicit analysis of the impact 
of housing on growth are, however, unacceptable. What is 
and what is not an "acceptable" allocation resources 
depends upon the set of prices facing consumers and pro-
ducers. These prices are, to an extent, both the reasons 
for, and the results of, government activity. If it can 
be demonstrated that an alternative set of prices produces 
a superior outcome, some of the reasons for political 
support of existing policies are removed. The second argu-
ment, that there is an "insufficient demand" for non-
residential capital is even less acceptable. The demand 
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for nonresidential capital depends upon the price of non-
residential capital (and on other prices). As Chapter 4 
illustrates, the removal of the present non-neutral tax 
provisions would reduce the price of nonresidential capital, 
and increase the price of residential capital, with a 
consequent flow of capital from housing to nonresidential 
business. 
Given the interest in economic growth, and the 
suggestion of Denison, and others, that the rate of economic 
growth is dependent upon the allocation of investment 
among residential and nonresidential uses, it is surprising 
that there has been no attempt to explore the statistical 
relationship between growth rates of output and the distri-
bution of capital among housing and other sectors. A brief 
statistical investigation of. this relationship is presented 
here. Table 1-6-1 presents estimates of the percentages of 
total reproducible tangible assets made up of dwellings, 
growth rates of real G.D.P., and per capita income levels, 
for a number of countries. There are two sets of estimates 
for the percentage of capital invested in dwellings. The 
first set is taken from the current-price estimates 
presented in Table 1-1-1. The second set is taken from 
the constant-price estimates presented in Table A-12. 
Figure 1-6-1 plots scratter diagrams for each of the four 
combinations of growth rates, output levels, and dwellings 
. 29. f' ratlos, 0 lnterest. There appears to be very little 
statistical correlation between growth rates and dwellings 
ratios, whether in 1977-78 or 1956 prices. However, there 
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appears to be a weak positive correlation between per 
capital incomes and dwellings ratios. To test for the 
strengths of the correlations in each case, the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient was calculated. The coeffi-
cients for the relationship between growth rates and 
dwellings ratios are negative, but are insignificant at 
even the 10% level. The correlation coefficient for the 
relationship between per capita incomes and dwe ings 
ratios in current prices is .677, and the correlation 
coefficient for the relationship between per capita incomes 
and dwellings ratios in 1956 prices is .527. first 
of these is significant at the 5% level; the second is 
significant at the 10% level. It is reasonable to conclude 
that there is a positive linear relationship between 
dwellings ratios and per capita income levels. 
It is interesting that there is no statistical 
relationship between growth rates of output, and the pro-
portion of reproducible capital employed in housing. Of 
course, this does not mean that government policies which 
encourage investment in housing have no affect on growth. 
Neither does it mean that any country could not achieve 
more rapid growth by investing less in housing. 
The positive correlation between per capita income 
levels and dwellings ratios is not surprising: Since the 
income-elasticity of demand for housing exceeds unity, 
countries with higher per capita incomes might be expected 
to have larger proportions of their capital stocks devoted 
to this asset. 
TABLE 1-6 
Country 
Australia 
Belgium 
Canada 
France 
West Germany 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
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Net replacement value of total dwellings 
as a percentage of total replacement value 
of net reproducible tangible wealth, 1977-
1978; Current and Constant Prices; Growth 
Rates of Real G.D.P., 1977-78: Levels of 
Per Capita Income, 1977-78. 
Dwellings Ratio l • GJ 
Ii 
0 Per Capita ~ 
2. rt ::r Incomes Current Constant 
Prices Prices ;:u Pl 
rt 
ID 
ill 
clP ;:u 0\0 ::u 0\0 ::u <Il: ::u 
Pl Pl Pl c: Pl 
l:l l:l l:l (f) l:l 
~ ~ 7'i' ~ 
23.6 10 23.4 7 .3.93 . 4 7467 9 
39.9 1 30.7 1 2.5 10 9025 3 
29.2 6 23.2 8 3.6 6 7572 8 
32.4 3 27.8 3 3.8 5 7918 7 
34.1 2 25.5 5 3.2 8 9278 2 
26.4 8 15.8 11 5.9 1 7153 10 
32.2 4 25.9 4 4.3 3 ill 040 1 
26.6 7 18.1 9 2.4 11 8509 5 
21.8 11 17.0 10 3.5 7 7949 6 
25.7 9 24.4 6 3.1 9 4955 11 
32.2 4 28.8 2 4.4 2 8612 4 
1. Value of dwellings as a percentage of total net repro-
ducible tangible wealth. 
2. Base year 1956. 
3. 1975-76 figure 
Source: Tables 1-1 , A-12; and United Nations, Yearbook 
of National Accounts Statistics, 1979. 
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The implications of housing policy for rates of 
economic growth are confined to short-run (macroeconomic) 
and intermediate-run (adjustments to balanced growth) 
growth. In long-run balanced growth, the rate of growth 
of output is dependent upon exogenous parameters. In the 
Swan-Solow neoclassical growth model, for instance, the 
long-run rate of growth of output is the sum of the exo-
genous rates of population growth and labour augmenting 
technical progress. Taxation policies can have no effect 
on long-run growth rates. Never-the-less, there are some 
interesting issues which arise in connection with housing 
policy in long-run growth. The most interesting is the 
analys of the dynamic incidence of the subsidy on owner-
occupied housing. The long-run framework also provides an 
opportunity to examine the optimal taxation of housing 
capital. 
1.7 THE SOCIAL ARGUMENTS FOR HOUSING. 
There is a substantial literature which argues that 
quality housing and home ownership generate positive exter-
nalities which contribute to the welfare of society, and 
that slums generate negative externalities; so that large 
public investments, and tax incentives for private invest-
ment, in residential capital are justified, even if this is 
at the expense of economic growth and efficiency.30. As 
Aaron (1970, p.803) has noted, however, the problem with 
these arguments is their imputation of causation: It is 
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n6t clear that the beneficial effects associated with 
good housing are due to housing rather than to the level 
of income and the level of consumption in general. 
Observed positive correlations between "desirable" social 
behaviour and home ownership do not make it clear which 
way the causation (if any) should run. Since the income-
elasticity of demand for housing exceeds unity, higher 
income groups \vi11 normally be "better housed ", and these 
groups also have the financial stability associated with 
"desirable" social behaviour. The cause of each of these 
ef s (i.e., good housing and desirable social behaviour) 
a high level of income. Yet, as was argued in Section 
2, non-neutral tax policies designed to encourage home-
ownership actually reduce income levels. Clearly, there 
a need to examine the effects of housing po1ic s on 
the sources, as well as the uses, side of income. 
An important point made in nearly all analyses of 
the economics of housing policy is that even if it can be 
shown that good housing does generate positive external i-
ties, is certain that there are more efficient ways of 
encouraging home ownership. The present exemption of 
imputed s on owner-occupied housing from taxation 
introduces a regressive component into the individual 
income tax structure: Very low income earners with a 
zero, or low, marginal tax rate derive little or no benefit 
from the exemption. The higher the marginal tax rate, the 
higher the value of the exemption on any particular 
dwelling. There is an artificial incentive created for 
investment in luxury housing, an asset with a very low 
. 1 f 31 . SOCla rate 0 return. 
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1.8 PLAN OF THE WORK 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are concerned with static 
analyses of housing policy. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the 
dynamic implications. Chapter 2 examines the investment 
motive in the demand for housing, and analyses the 
various taxation provisions relating to housing in a 
number of countries. Estimates of the subsidy to owner-
occupied housing are then examined. Chapter 3 develops 
a general equilibrium model to analyse the distortions in 
resource allocation, and the loss of output, due to the 
favourable tax treatment of residential capital. A 
second-best tax policy is analysed, in terms of its 
implications for improvements in resource allocation. 
The model developed here identifies three sectors: 
Owner-occupied housing, rented housing, and "other 
industry". Chapter 4 applies the model to an empirical 
estimation of the welfare costs of the non-neutral tax 
treatment of income from capital, and to a re-examination 
of the subsidy to owner-occupied housing. The excess 
burden this subsidy places on other sectors is also 
estimated. Estimates are derived for Australia, Canada 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Chapter 5 explores the dynamic implications of the 
removal of the subsidy to owner-occupied housing, in the 
intermediate-run. This analysis departs from the compara-
tive static analysis of Chapters 3 and 4, by permitting 
sluggish adjustments of capital stocks to optimal levels. 
A flexible accelerator model of investment provides the 
formal link between the comparative statics and the 
dynamics. 
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Chapter 6 examines the question of the incidence 
of the owner-occupier subsidy in a long-run growth model. 
In addition, the optimal taxation of housing is explored. 
In this dynamic context, the optimal set of capital taxes 
is that which induces the pattern of saving consistent 
with "Golden Rule ll growth. 
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Footnotes to Chapter One: 
1. This concept of user cost is, of course, the concept 
exploited in the neoclassical investment literature: 
See Jorgenson (1965), (1967), and Hall and Jorgenson 
(1967). It differs from the concept of the same 
name found in Keynes', The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (1936). The several 
components of the user cost measure are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2. 
2. Section 1.2 lists the range of government policies 
which might reasonably be included in the set of 
"housing policies". 
3. This concept is explained in Section 1.2. 
4. Lee (1964) reviews the studies of the income-elasticity 
of demand for housing. 
5. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
1981, p.180. 
6. Haig (1921), Simons (1938), Hicks (1946). 
7. Simons (1938, p.50). 
8. Haig (1921, p.590. 
9 . Hick s ( 19 46, p. 172) . 
10. The same is true for all other consumer durables. 
11. This is the interpretation offered by Simons (1938, 
pp. 44-46) . 
12. Simons (1938, p.112). 
13. ibid., p.113. 
14. An excellent discussion of the mechanics of the 
United Kingdom tax appears in Willis and Hardwick (1978). 
Imputed rentals were taxed, briefly, in Australia, 
between 1915 and 1923. Reece(1975) discusses this tax. 
15. Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and 
Income, 1955. 
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16. Willis and Hardwick (1978) note that the term "tax 
expenditure" was coined by Professor Stanley S. 
Surrey of the Harvard Law School. The criteria he 
established for identifying "tax expenditures" were 
adopted by the International Fiscal Association for 
its 1976 Congress. In essence, a "tax expenditure" 
is a loss of the tax revenue attributable to a 
special exemption, exclusion, or deduction, a special 
tax credit, or a special tax rate. According to 
Surrey, what is special is determined by reference 
to either the concept of taxation of all (Haig-Simons-
Hicks type) income, or to the structure of the income 
tax that would exist in the absence of the tax 
expenditure, whichever is the weaker criterion. 
17. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Survey of Housing 
Occupancy and Costs, Australia, August 1980 (Cat. 
No. 8724.0). 
18. Of course, the commodity being consumed (the bundle 
of housing services) may also differj being of 
different quantity (more or less bedrooms, for 
instance) or of different quality. 
19. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census. Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1977. 
p.282. 
20. This is reported in the Canada Yearbook 1968. No 
more recent figure is 
21. United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau the 
Census. Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1977. 
p.530. 
22. In this simple treatment it is supposed that the 
$1000 limit is not a binding constraint on the 
average individual. 
23. This is the familiar area of the triangle above 
the demand curve. 
24. Given the structure of the White & Hhite model, 
the price paid by renters will fall provided the 
supply schedule for housing is less than infinitely 
elastic. 
25. This is Laidler's (1969) term. 
26. i.e., it does not discriminate among sectors. 
Chapter 3 examines the concept of "tax neutrality" 
in considerable detail. 
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27. The authors do use some of the results of Harberger's 
(1964a) "The measurement of waste", but those results 
do not relate to the general equilibrium model 
developed by Harberger (1962). 
28. Harberger (1964b, p. 
29. Defined as the percentage of total reproducible 
tangible assets made up of dwellings. 
30. See, for example, the references in Rothenberg 
(1967, p.58). 
31. This last point is made by Harberger (1965). 
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APPENDIX A-I-I: CAPITAL STOCK ESTIMATES 
This appendix details the estimation of capital stock 
data referred to in the text. Methodology, data sources, 
and estimation techniques are fully described. 
Methodology 
Estimates are derived by application of a particular 
form of the perpetual . h' I ~nventory tec n~que: Suppose 
estimates of the net 2 replacement value of capital stocks 
are available for some base year t. Estimates for period 
3 might be obtained by application of the following 
stock-flow relationship: 
where: q. t ~, 
K. t ~, 
~q i I t+lj q. t ~, 
is the replacement cost of one unit of 
capital of type i in end-of-period t 
prices. 
is the physical quantity (number of units 
of) capital of type i existing at the end 
of period t. 
is the physical quantity of gross invest-
ments in capital of type i during period 
t+l 
is the physical decay (depreciation) of 
capi tal of type i during period t+l. 
is a price index used to convert period t 
values to prices ruling at the end of 
period t+l. 
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The expression q, lI. t 1 values gross investment in 1, t+ 1, + 
capital of type i during period t+l at prices ruling at the 
end of period t+l. It is, of course, impossible to obtain 
data on this basis. In practice, the expression is 
approximated by 
(A-2) -qi,t+l1i,t+l.-
TI=t+l 
J q, I. dTI, 
TI=t 1,TI 1,TI 
where: dTI is an arbitrarily small time increment. 
The term qi,t+lDi,t+l is the value of depreciation 
in period t+l. Data on depreciation are difficult to 
obtain. For this reason, it is usual to specify, a priori, 
a particular form of depreciation, so that estimates of 
actual depreciation might be obtained from other data. Here, 
we follow Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), and many others, 
in specifying an exponential pattern of depreciation, i.e., 
we assume that the proportion of an asset replaced during a 
particular period declines at a constant rate over time. 4 
As is well-known, this assumption implies that 
where: C, is the exponential decay factor. 
1 
Alternatively, we can write 
(A-4) 
(A-4) in (A-I) produces 
(A-5) ql',t+lKl',t+l= [qi,t+l]q. K. (I-c.) +q. lI. 1 qi,t] 1,t 1,t 1 1,t+ 1,t+ 
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The pattern of depreciation implicit in (A-3) implies 
that assets have infinite lifetimes. This is clearly 
unreasonable. Because of this, applications of the 
perpetual inventory model sometimes specify asset lifetimes 
and the percentage of the physical quantity of each asset 
which can be supposed to be still in existence at the end 
of the asset's life. Once these figures have been specified, 
there is a unique o. which satisfies (A-3) for asset i. 
1 
(A-5) might then be modified by subtracting from the right-
hand-side the value of the remaining balance of assets 
which reach the end of their ascribed lifetimes in period 
t+ 1. Failure to .subtract remaining balances over-states 
the estimates of capital stock values. These arguments are 
illustrated in Figure A-I. The schedule shows the balance 
remaining at time n on an asset of type i created at time 
n=to' n=tl is the ascribed time at which the asset is to 
be scrapped. The remaining balance to write off at that 
.. -(l)t -to t1me 1S K. t - -0. 1 K. t . 1, 1 1 1, 0 Unfortunately, this 
exercise requires gross investment data by asset type for 
at least as many periods as the asset's ascribed lifetime. 
In the case of housing, this might be seventy years. 
Because of the difficulties encountered in obtaining a 
suitable data series, the exercise has not been performed 
here. In consequence, the capital stock series estimated 
here over-state true values, though the error is not likely 
to be very large. 
After some manipulation, (A-5) can be generalised 
to produce: 
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FIGURE A-I: Remaining Balances Under Exponential Decay_ 
Physical 
Quantity 
(Ki 1f) 
I 
K. t l, 
o 
K. t 
l, 1 
t 
o Time (1f) 
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(A-6) = -qi,t+Xjq. K. (1-8.)x q. t ~,t ~,t ~ 
- ~, 
+ ~ (1-8. )x- j I-qi,t+xl q . .r. . j=l ~ Lqi,t+~ ~,t+J ~,t+J 
q. t K. is an estimate of the net replacement ~, +x ~,t+x 
value of capital of type i in period t+x. The term 
[qi,t+xjq. tK. t(l-8.)x is the net replacement value, in q. t ~,~, ~ ~, 
period t+x, of the stock of capital of type i in existence 
in period t. And the last term in (A-6) is the net 
replacement value, in period t+x, of the gross additions to 
the capital stock of type i between periods t and t+x. 
Application of (A-6) requires selecting values for 
each of the 8 .. In addition, it requires estimates of 
~ 
gross investment in capital of each type for each of the 
periods t+l to t+Xi and it requires price indexes of the 
formE q i, t+x/ q i ,t+j] for each per iod j=O, ... , x. 
Although the point is well known, it should be 
noted that the price indexes used in estimation procedures 
like that developed here implicitly ignore changes in 
asset quality. Accordingly, while the actual increase in 
the money value of gross investment in a particular asset 
between one year and the next reflects a mixture of, 
changes in the physical quantity of investment, changes in 
the quality of the investment goods, and changes in the 
price of the investment goods, the price indexes typically 
fail to distinguish between quantity and quality changes. 
However, models like that developed here revalue historical 
data using the ratios of current asset prices to original 
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(historical) purchase prices. Hence, to the extent that the 
current prices reflect improvements in asset quality, 
historical quantity data are over-valued in current year 
prices. The price indexes used in the estimation below are 
obtained implicitly by comparing current-price, and constant-
price, investment data reported in the United Nations, 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. It is unlikely 
that the constant-price estimates reported there have been 
adjusted adequately for changes in asset quality.5 
Estimation: 
Capital stock estimates derived here are for each of 
the following four categories of tangible, reproducible, 
6 investment goods: (l) Residential Structures; (2) Non-
Residential Structures; (3) Equipment; (4) Inventories. 
Generally, estimates are the sum of assets owned by public 
and private enterprises. Any exceptions to this rule are 
noted below. The eleven countries for which estimates are 
obtained are, by geographical region: 
Europe: Belgium 
France 
West Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
United Kingdom 
North America: Canada 
United States of America 
Oceania: Australia 
Asia: Japan 
62 
Base period estimates are for years between 1950 and 
1956, and have been derived from estimates presented in 
Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp.a-ll). Investment data 
are obtained from various issues of the united Nations 
publication; Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. The 
data presented there have in many cases been subjected to 
major revisions over time. Some revisions have been made to 
bring historical data in line with frequent revisions in the 
united Nations System of National Accounts. Other revisions 
are not explained. The data employed here reflect the most 
recent estimates for each year that are available in the 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. Even so, it 
cannot be claimed that the data employed here exhibit 
perfect historical consistency. We can claim only that the 
errors due to such inconsistency are likely to be quite 
small. 
The price indexes required in this exercise have been 
obtained by comparing current-price, and constant-price, 
estimates for gross investments in each type of capital, 
and for each year from the base year to the most recent for 
which investment data are available. The exception is for 
inventories, where, because of the techniques employed to 
obtain current and constant price estimates, the procedure 
.. . t 7 lS lnapproprla e. The price indexes used for inventories 
are the same as those used for the equipment series. 
Tables A-l to A-ll present estimates of: (1) The 
base year values obtained from Goldsmith and Saunders (1959); 
(2 ) A. -1 
(3 ) B. -1 
and (4) 
1- ] x (i=1,2,3,4); Iqi t+x/qi t (1-6.) q. t K. t' 
-' , 
1 1, 1, 
X . 
l: (1-6. )x-J [qi,t+x/qi,t+j] q. t+' I. t+" ( 
. 1 1 1, J 1, J J= 
A.+B. 
1 1 = qi,t+xKi,t+x (i=l,2,3,4). 
63 
,2,3,4); 
For each country, the exponential depreciation rates 
chosen are the same as those employed in the Australian 
study of Garland and Goldsmith (1959). Th~se are 
( 1) Residential Structures: 
°1 = .04 
(2) Non-Residential Structures: 
°2 .055 
(3 ) Equipment: 
°3 = .115 
(4 ) Inventories: 
°4 = 0 
8. 
Apart from Australia, all periods close on 31st 
December. The Australian closing date is 30th June. Unless 
otherwise noted in the tables, investment data for non-
residential structures include investments in land improve-
ment, and plantation and orchard development. Estimates for 
stocks of equipment include passenger cars, unless otherwise 
noted. 
A comparison of the base-year estimates and the A. 
1 
estimates reveals that for each country the net replacement 
value of residential structures in existence in the base year has 
increased between the base year and the final year. This 
reflects two significant properties of housing capitali 
(I) it has a low rate of depreciation, and (2) there has 
typically been a relatively (i.e., relative to other asset-
types) high rate of inflation of housing construction 
prices. The equipment data have moved in the opposite 
direction, for the opposite reasonSi a high rate of 
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TABLE: A-l Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; Australia. 
(Billion Australian dollars} 4 
Asset Type iBase Year 
I
Estimates l 
Year: 1956 5 
Prices: 1956 
I 2 
Ai Bi ri+Bi 
Final Year: 19785
1
, 
Current Prices 3 
I I 
(l) Residential 
Structures 11.47 49.94 
I 
! 
61.41 
(2) Non-Residential 
Structures 18.13 87.47 9 ,11 1105.60 
60.81 10 ,12,62.26 (3) Equipment 1. 45 
(4) Inventories 6.46 17.31 13.81 31.12 
TOTAL '260.39 
I 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders ( 19 5 9, pp . 8 -11) • 
2. qi,t+xj x A. - (1- 6 .) q. t K . t 1 q. t 1 1, 1, 
_ 1, 
i==1,2,3,4. 
x lq· j B = 2:: 1,t+X 
i - j=l qi,t+j 
x-j (1-6 . ) q. t+' I. t+' . 1 2 3 4 1 1, J 1, J 1= , , , . 
A.+B. == q. K. 1 1 1,t+X 1,t+X 1,2,3,4. 
3. Source: See Text. 
4. Base year estimates have been converted from 
pounds to dollars. The conversion is El = $2.40. 
5. Estimates are for 30th June. 
6. Excludes dweLlings owned by government enter-
prises and public corporations. 
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7. Includes government equipment. 
8. Excludes government equipment. 
9 . Investment data excludes land improvement and 
plantation and orchard development. 
10. Investment data includes land improvement and 
plantation and orchard development. 
11. There is an inexplicable revision of published 
estimates of investment in non-residential 
structures between the 1971 and 1972 volumes of 
the U.N., ybk of National Accounts Statistics. 
Data affected are those for 1960 to 1971. The 
most recent estimates have been used here. 
12. Data published in the U.N., Ybk of National 
Accounts Statistics are not separated between 
... 
non-residential structures and equipment for all 
years previous to 1960. In deriving the 
estimates in the table it has been assumed that 
the proportions in which investments were 
allocated in 1960 are a good approximation of 
allocations in earlier years, and the totals 
have been distributed accordingly. The price 
indexes developed for years previous to 1960 are 
extrapolations from more recent data. 
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TABLE: A-2 Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; Belgium. 
(Billion Belgian francs) 
IBas~ Year1 2 Asset Type A. B. iA .. +B. 1 1 1 1 EstlIUates 
Year: 1950 Final Year: 1978 
, 
Prices: 1950 Current Prices 3 
(1) Residential 400 611.20 I 2507.51 3118.71 
Structures 
(2 ) Non-Residential 
103 4 Structures 105.17 2698.09 2803.26 
(3 ) Equipment 293 4 21. 66 1359.37 1381.03 
(4 ) Inventories 75 4 184.80 336.54 521. 34 
TOTAL 871 ~824.34 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp.8-11) . 
2. 
---
A. [qi ,t+l (1-8 . ) x q.' K. = 1 q. t 1 1,t 1ft. 
_ 1, 
x q. 
B. 
1 [ j L: 1,t+X j=l qi,t+j x-j (1-8 . ) q. t+' 1. t+' 1 1, J 1, J 
A. + B. _ q. K. 1 1 l,t+X 1,t+X 
3. Source: See Text. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
1,2,3,4. 
i=l,2,3,4. 
4. Data for general government not included. 
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TABLE: A-3 Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; Canada. 
(Billion Canadian dollars) 
Asset Type Base Year A. B. r·+B2 Estimates1 1 1 1 1 
Year: 1955 Final Year: 1978 
Prices: 1955 Current Prices 3 i 
I 
(1) Residential 
Structures 12.89 19.40 149.67 169.07 
(2) Non-Residential. I 
Structures 22.32 18.39 220.25 238.64 
(3) Equipment 14.53 2.33 113.50 il15.83 
(4) Inventories 9.70 25.94 29.67 155.61 
TOTAL: 59.44 579.15 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp.8-11) 
2. A . _ lq i , t +xj (1-6 . ) x q . K . i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 . 1 q. t 1 1,t 1,t 1, 
B. -
1 
~ fq i, t+x] (1-6. ) X- j q . .1. . i=l, 2,3,4. j=lLqi,t+j] 1 1,t+] 1,t+] 
A. + B. 
1 1 
q. K. 1,t+X 1,t+X i=1,2,3,4. 
3. Source: See Text. 
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TABLE: A-4 Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; France. 
(Billion French francs)4 
Asset Type Base Year A. B. ~,+B. 2 
Estimates l 1 1 1 1 
Year: 1954 Final Year: 1977 
Prices: 1954 Current Prices 3 
I 
(1) Residential 5 I Structures 89 157.2 1420.9 11578.1 
(2) Non-Residential 
Structures 122.6 6,7 138.7 1311.3 11450.0 
( 3) Equipment 86.0 6 I 16.1 1170.8 1186.9 
(4) Inventories 57.9 6 180.2 475.1 655.3 
TOTAL: 355.5 4870.3 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp.8 1) 
2 • A. l-qi,t+X](l-O.)Xq . K' t i=l,2,3,4. 1 q. t 1 l,t 1, 
1, . 
B. -
1 
x r-q.- . 
l: l< l/t+XJ (1-0. )x-J q . ,r. . i==l,2,3,4. j=l qi,t+jj 1 l,t+J 1,t+J 
A. + B, 
1 1 q. K. t 1,t+X 1, +X 
3. Source: See Text. 
, 2 , 3 I 4 . 
4. Base year estimates have been converted from old 
to new French francs. The conversion is 
1 new F.franc == 100 old F.francs. 
5. Agricultural dwellings excluded. 
6. General government data not available. 
7. Some equipment and land included. 
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TABLE: A-5 Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; West Germany_ 
(Billion D~utsch marks) 
Asset Type Bas~ Year l Est1mates 
Year: 1955 
A. 
1 
I 
B. 6, 7 , 8 fA. + B 12 
1 . 1 
! 
(1) Residential 
Structures 
(2) Non-Residential 
Structures 
(3) Equipment 
(4) Inventories 
TOTAL: 
, Prices: 1950 
I 
100.0 
114.5 
5 91.5 
4 42.0 
348.0 5 
Final Year: 19~8i 
Current Pr1ces ! 
I 
134.3 978.0 
84.8 992.8 
6.2 764.1 
94.4 206.1 
1112.3 
1077.6 
770.3 
300.5 
3260.7 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp.8-ll). 
2. 
---
= -qi, t+xj x A. (1-8.) q. t K. t 
1 q. t 1 1, 1, 
B. 
1 
_ 1, 
- j x q. . E l,t+X (l_o.)x- J q . .I. . j=l qi,t+j 1 l,t+J l,t+J 
A. + B. -
1 1 
3. Source: See Text. 
4. General government data not available. 
5. Excludes passenger cars. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
,2,3,4. 
6. Constant price data for residential and non-
residential investments are not separated in the 
U.N., Ybk. of National Accounts Statistic~, for 
years previous to 1966. The price indexes 
. ' 
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developed for each of these series for earlier 
years are not as accurate as those developed for 
later years. 
7. All series were subjected to major revisions 
between the 1976 and 1977 volumes of the U.N., 
Ybk. of National Accounts Statistics. The 
revisions are inexplicable. The procedure 
adopted here has been to use the pre-1977 estimates 
for all years previous to 1970, and then to use 
the post-1977 estimates for years 1970 to 1978. 
This procedure is ad. hoc., but the resulting 
investment series do not seem unreasonable. 
8. Investment data from 1960 include data for the 
Saan and West Berlin. These data were not 
previously included. 
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TABLE: A-6 Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; Japan 
(Thousand billion yen) 
A. B. Ai+Bl 
2 Asset Type Base Year l 1 1 Estimates 
Year: 1955 Final Year: 197t 
Prices: 1955 Current Prices 3 ,5 
I 
(1) Residential I Structures 2.77 4.76 132.45 137.21 
(2 ) Non-Residential 
205.216 Structures 6.53 4.96 210.17 
( 3 ) Equipment 3.514 .43 124.897 125.32 
(4) Inventories 3.51 7.18 39.69 46.87 
-TOTAL: 16.32 4 519.57 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp. 8-11) . 
2. A. 
1 
B. 
1 
:: lqi,t+xj 
q. t 1, 
x ( 1- cS . ) q. t K. t 1 1, 1, 
x -q. j . 
_ E l,t+X (l-cS.)x-]q. .1, , 
'-1 q. t+' 1 l,t+] l,t+] ]- _1, ] 
A. + B. - q. K. t' 1 1 l,t+X 1, +x 
i=l,2,3,4. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
i=l,2,3,4. 
3. Source: See Text. 
4. Excludes passenger cars. 
5. Investment data for non-residential structures 
and equipment are not separated in UoN., Ybk of 
National Accounts Statistics, for years previous 
to 1970. In deriving the estimates in the table 
it has been assumed that the proportions-in which 
investments were allocated in 1970 are a good 
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approximation of allocations in previous years, 
and the totals have been distributed accordingly. 
6. Price indexes are for non-residential building 
only. 
7. Price indexes are for machinery only. 
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TABLE: A-7 Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; Luxembourg 
(Billion Luxembourg francs) 
Base Year1 A, 
B,5,6 ~i +B l 
2 Asset Type 
1 1 Estimates I 
Year: 1950 Final Year: 1977 
Pr s: 1950 Current Prices 3 
( 1) Residential 
Structures 17.70 48.08 89.10 137.18 
(2 ) Non-Residential 4 Structures 20.33 35.26 144.79 180.05 
(3 ) Equipment 26.42 4 5.61 71.43 77.04 
(4) Inventories 1. 51 8.01 23.10 31.11 
TOTAL: 65.96 425.38 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp. 8-11) . 
2. 
---
-q i, t+xj x A . ~ ( 1-6 . ) q. t K . t 
1 q. t 1 1, 1, 
_ 1, 
B. _ 
1 
x q. 
Z; _1-=-__ 
j=l_q i, 
x-j (1-6 . ) q. t+' I. t+' 1 1, J 1, J 
i=l,2,3,4. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
3. Source: See Text. 
4. Some inventories included. 
5. Estimates for all components of gross fixed 
capital formation have been subjected to major, 
inexplicable revisions between the 1972 and 1973 
volumes of the U.N., Ybk of National Accounts 
Statistics. Estimates for investment by-asset-
type for the years 1950, 1951, 1961, 1962, 
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1964-67, were obtained by allocating total 
gross fixed capital formation (as reported in 
the 1972 edn. of the Ybk of National Accounts 
Statistics among assets In the same proportions 
as for the closest year for which there are 
revised (i.e. 1973) estimates. 
6. Constant price investment data are not available 
years previous to 1966. For these years, 
pr indexes have been developed using indexes 
for gross fixed capital formation by E.E.C. 
countries, which are available. 
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TABLE: A-8 Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; Netherlands 
(Billion guilders) 
Asset Type Base Year 1 A. B. Ai+Bl 
2 
1 1 Estimates 
Year: 1952 Final Year: 1978 
IPrices:1952 Current Prices':! 
(1 ) Residential 
Structures 18.3 33.8 196.5 230.3 
(2 ) Non-Residential 
14.2 4 ,5 Structures 15.5 240.2 8 255.7 
(3) Equipment 19.15 ,6 1.7 152.2 9 153.9 
(4) Inventories 9.8 5 ,7 21. 8 205.2 227.0 
TOTAL: 61.4 4 I 866.9 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp.8-ll). 
2. A. 
1 
B. _ 
1 
x ( 1-0 . ) q. t K . t 1 1, 1, 
x q. 
i: _1-,--_ 
j=l _q i, 
x-j (1-0.) q. t+·I. t+' 1 1, J 1, J 
A. + B. 
1 1 q. t K. t' 1, +x 1, +x 
3. Source: See Text. 
4. Land and harbours included. 
5. General government data not available. 
6. Forestry included. 
,2, 3 ,4. 
1,2,3,4. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
7. Sown seeds, growing crop and perennial plants 
included. 
8. Price indexes are for non-residential building only. 
9. Price indexes are for machinery only. 
.! 
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TABLE: Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; Norway. 
(Billion kroner) 
Asset Type Bas7 Year l A. B. I 2 IA.+B l 1. 1. ' 1. Est1.mates 
Year: 1953 Final Year: 1978 
Prices: 1953 Current Prices 3 
I 
I 
I 
! 
(1) Residential I 
Structures 22.01 28.51 113.88 142.39 
I 
(2 ) Non-Residential 
268.07 5 structures 34.60 32.54 300.61 
I 
( 3) Equipment 21.63 4 2.71 165.42 6 I 168.13 
I ( 4 ) Inventories 9.6 24.03 17.71 i 41.74 ! 
TOTAL: 87.84 i 652.87 ! 
I 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders(1959, pp.8-ll). 
2 • 
B. _ 1. 
x ( 1-8 . ) q. t K . t 1. 1., 1., 
A. + B. - q. K.· 1. 1. 1.,t+x 1.,t+x 
3. Source: See Text. 
i=l,2,3,4. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
i:::l,2,3,4. 
4. Excludes equipment of general government. 
5. Price indexes are for non-residential building 
only. 
6. Price indexes are for machinery only. 
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TABLE:A-lO Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; United Kingdome 
(Billion pounds) 
Asset Type Bas: Year l A. B. Ai+Bl 
2 
1 1 Est1mates 
Year: 1953 Final Year: 1978 
(Prices: 19481 Current Prices 3 
(1) Residential 
Structures 10.20 24.58 76.39 100.97 
(2 ) Non-Residential 
14.034 112.80 7 structures 23.40 136.20 
(3) Equipment .20 5 .06 101.10 8 101.16 
(4) Inventories 5.80 30.32 24.14 54.46 
TOTAL: 30.23 5 392.79 
Notes: 1. Source: Goldsmith and Saunders (1959, pp.8-ll). 
2. 
---
A. - x -qi ,t+xj 
1 q. t 
_ 1, 
(1-0. ) q. t K. t 1 1, 1, 
B. 
1 
- j x q. . E 1,t+X (l_o.)X- J q . .I. , 
'-I q. t+' 1 1,t+J 1,t+J J- _ 1, J 
A. + B. 
1 1 q. K, t' 1,t+X 1, +x 
3. Source: See Text. 
1,2,3,4. 
i=1,2,3,4. 
1,2,3,4. 
4. Some equipment included; structures of coal 
mining excluded; most general government 
structures excluded. 
5. Data for passenger cars not available. 
6. Index for 1948 prices obtained by using a 
[q1953/q 1948] index for total gross fixed capital 
formation. 
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7. Price indexes are for non-residential building 
only. 
8. Price indexes are for machinery only. 
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TABLE:A-ll Base year estimates, net replacement costs of 
base year stocks in final year, and values of 
net accumulations between base year and final 
year; United States of America. 
(Billion dollars) 
Asset Type Bas~ Year l A. B. Ai+Bl 
2 
Est1mates 1 1 
Year: 1955 Final Year: 1978 
Pr s: 1955 • Current Prices 3 
(1) Residential I 
Structures 325.9 402.2 1217.2 1619.4 
(2 ) Non-Residential 
1470.34 Structures 342.3 304.0 1774.3 
(3 ) Equipment 215.9 29.8 1101.85 1131.6 
(4) Inventories 111.3 255.7 244.5 500.2 
TOTAL: 995.4 5025.5 
Notes: 1. So -lrce: 
---
Goldsmith and Sa under s (1959, pp.8-11) . 
2. A. -qi.t+l (1-0. )x q. t K. t i=1,2,3,4. -1 q. t 1 1, 1, 
_ 1, 
x -qi.t+~ x-j B. 
-
L (1-0.) q. t+'I. t+' , 2 , 3 ,4. 1 j q, t+' 1 1, J 1, J _ 1, ] 
A. + B. 
- qi,t+x K . i=l,2,3,4. 1 1 i,t+x 
3. Source: See Text. 
4. Price indexes are for non-residential building 
only. 
5. Price indexes are for machinery only. 
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depreciation, and a low rate of asset price inflation. The 
price effects (i.e., those due to differential rates of 
asset-price inflation) have been removed in Table A-12, 
which presents estimates of A. ,B., and A.+B. for each 
1 1 1 1 
country i~ prices of 1956. The reason for presenting these 
estimates is that in comparing the percentage distributions 
of capital among asset types, for different countries, the 
prices in which those capital stocks are valued can 
significantly affect the conclusions: If one is interested 
in assessing the relative importance of different assets in 
terms of the proportion of an economy's resources devoted 
to those assets, concentration on nominal values can give 
misleading impressions. It is possible, for instance, that 
net investment in housing might be negative in physical 
terms, yet reveal a large positive investment in value 
terms, because of a rate of inflation of house prices which 
exceeds the rate of depreciation of the housing stock. 
A-12 Constant price estimates of A.,B., and 
~==~----- 1 1 
A.+B.; Various countries; Base year 1956. 
1 1 
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Country and I A. B. A.+B. 1 1 Asset-Type 1 1 
Sum % 
Australia: 1978 (Billion A. dollars) 
(1) Residential Structures 3.67 15.98 19.65 23.4 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 5.07 24.44 29.51 35.1 
(3) Equipment .54 22.70 23.24 27.7 
(4) Inventories 6.46 5.16 11.62 13.8 
TOTAL 15.74 84.02 100.0 
Belgium: 1978 (Billion B. francs) 
(1) Residential Structures 144.63 593.35 737.98 30.7 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 26.95 691. 46 718.41 29.9 
(3) Equipment 10.79 676.98 687.77 28.6 
(4) Inventories 92.03 167.60 259.63 10.8 
TOTAL 274.4 2403.79 -
Canada: 1978 (Billion C. dollars) 
(1) Residential Structures 5.21 40.22 45.43 23.2 
(2 ) Non-Residential Structures 6.35 76.00 82.35 42.0 
(3 ) Equipment .93 45.13 46.06 23.5 
(4) Inventories 10.31 11. 80 22.11 11.3 
i 
: TOTAL 22.80 195.95 100.0 
; France: 1977 (Billion F. francs) 
(I) Residential Structures 37.91 342.63 380.54 27.8 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 36.11 341. 40 377.51 27.6 
(3) Equipment 5.34 388.58 393.92 28.6 
(4) Inventories 59.81 157.68 217.49 16.0 
TOTAL 
f 
39.17 1369.46 100.0 
I 
! 
I 
I 
; 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, 
I 
TABLE A-12 (Continued) 
Country and 
Asset-Type 
West Germany: 1978 
(1) Residential Structu+es 
! 
I A. 
1 
B. 
1 
•• 
A.+B. 
1 1 
Sum 
(Billion D. marks) 
41.39 301.39 342.78 
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% 
25.5 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 31.11 364.20 395.31 29.3 
(3) Equipment 3.52 434.39 437.91 32.5 
(4) Inventories 
TOTAL 
Japan: 1978 
(1) Residential Structures 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 
(3) Equipment 
(4) Inventories 
TOTAL 
Luxembourg: 1977 
(1) Residential Structures 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 
(3) Equipment 
(4) Inventories 
TOTAL 
Netherlands: 1978 
(I) Residential Structures 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 
(3) Equipment 
(4) Inventories 
TOTAL 
53.67 117.17 170.84 12.7 
1129.69 1346.84 100.0 
(Thousand billion yen) 
1.13 31. 45 32.58 15.8 
1. 93 79.97 81.90 39.6 
.23 66.86 67.09 32.5 
3.84 21. 25 25.09 12.1 
7.13 206.66 100.0 
(Billion L. francs) 
9.53 
7.30 
1. 73 
2.46 
21.02 
17.66 
37.26 
21.96 
7.10 
27.19 
44.56 
23.69 
9.56 
25.9 
42.4 
22.6 
9.1 
105.00 100.0 
(Billion guilders) 
7.64 44.40 52.04 18.1 
3.47 53.81 57.28 19.9 
.79 71.12 71.91 25.1 
10.19 95.89 106.08 36.9 
22.09 287.31 100.0 
[ 
I 
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TABLE A-12 (Continued) 
Country and A. B. A.+B. 
Asset-Type 1 1 1 1 
Sum % 
Norway: 1978 (Billion kroner) 
(1) Residential Structures 7.42 29.65 37.07 17.0 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 9.52 78.43 87.95 40.3 
(3 ) Equipment 1.20 73.39 74.59 34.2 
(4 ) Inventories 10.66 7.86 18.52 8.5 
TOTAL 38.80 218.13 100.0 
! 
• United Kingdom: 1978 (Billion pounds) 
(I) Residential Structures 5.34 16.58 21. 92 24.4 
(2) Non-Residential Structures 4.88 23.5 28.38 31. 6 
(3 ) Equipment .02 25.68 25.70 28.6 
(4) Inventories 7.70 6.13 13.83 15.4 
TOTAL 17.94 89.83 100.0 
United States of Amer : 1978 (Billion dollars) 
(1) Residential Structures 133.36 403.58 536.94 38.8 
(2 ) Non-Residential Structures 97.37 470.95 568.32 30.4 
(3) Equipment 13.89 513.42 527.31 28.3 
(4 ) Inventories 119.15 113.93 233.08 12.5 
TOTAL ! 363. 77 1865.65 100.0 
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Footnotes t~ Appendix A-I-I: 
1. A general discussion of the perpetual inventory model 
appears in Ward (1976). 
2. Net capital stock series differ from gross capital 
stock series in excluding the value of depreciated 
capital. 
3. Here, and elsewhere, capital stock estimates for any 
period t+j are end-of-period estimates. 
4. While it is sometimes argued that this assumption is 
restrictive, Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, at p.255) 
present an enlightening justification for the use of 
the exponential pattern of depreciation. 
5. The difficulties encountered in attempts to estimate 
quality-adjusted constant price data series are 
exam~ned in United Nations, A System of National 
Accounts (1968, pp.59-60). 
6. Intangibles (including foreign assets) and non-
reproducibles (e.g. land) are excluded. 
7. For many countries annual current- and constant-price 
estimates for investments in inventories are the sums of 
quarterly data. Thus, for instance, it is not 
unusual for annual estimates of changes in inventories 
in current- and constant-prices to be of opposite sign. 
8. The following schedule (taken from Garland and 
Goldsmith (1959, p.329» of asset lifetimes and 
remaining end-of-life balances is consistent with 
the exponential depreciation rates used here: 
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Asset-Type Assumed Remaining 1 Annual Rate of 
Life end-of-life Depreciation 
(Years) Balance as (%) percentage of 
Original 
Quantity 
(1) Residential 
Structures 70 5 4 
I 
(2 ) Non-Residential I 
Structures 50 6 5.5 
(3 ) Equipment 20 9 11. 5 
! (4) Inventories (unnecessary) 
io.------ ~--.~,-. _."---_. --"-" - .. -,.-.--.---~. i 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STATIC PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF HOUSING POLICY 
This chapter develops the "user cost" of housing 
capital, and indicates how this concept might be used in 
a partial equilibrium analysis of housing policy. Chapter 
1 noted the limitations of the partial equilibrium tech-
nique, and argued that because of the quantitative 
significance of housing capital, that technique is not 
well suited to an analysis the incidence of housing 
taxation policies. However, the partial equilibrium 
technique is widely used in studies of the housing market,l. 
and the fluser cost li concept provides a useful link between 
partial and general equilibrium models. 
Almost without exception, previous analyses of 
housing policy have conceived of the demand for housing 
as being a consumption decision only_ Application of the 
general equilibrium model developed in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis requires that the demand for housing be treated as 
an investment decision. Investigation of the partial 
equilibrium implications of housing policy when the demand 
for housing is an investment decision, permits the general 
equilibrium implications of housing policy to be developed 
quite naturally. 
Section 2.1 exploits the investment aspects of the 
demand for housing, and derives the fluser cost ll concept. 
Section 2.2 examines the "user cost" of housing in six 
Western countries; Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
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united Kingdom, the United States of America and west 
Germany. This section also explores the implications of 
the taxation of housing incomes for horizontal and vertical 
equity in each country. Section 2.3 explores the impacts 
of tax policy disturbances on the "user cost" of housing, 
and presents a partial equilibrium analysis of the issues 
in housing policy which were identified in Chapter 1. 
2.1 INVESTMENT ASPECTS OF HOUSING AND THE IIUSER COST II 
OF HOUSING 
Chapter 1 identified the various types of economic 
agents operating in the housing market: Occupiers, who 
consume housing services, are either owners or renters; 
owners, who invest in housing, are either owner-occupiers 
or landlords. The notion that the economic activities of 
owner-occupiers and landlords can be analysed in terms of 
an investment motive is suggested by Debreu (1959, esp. 
p.51). This notion is central to the analysis of this 
thesis. Section 2.1 derives the lIuser cost ll expression 
for housing from an economic analysis of the investment 
decision-making of a landlord. It is then shown that (as 
Debreu suggests) the equilibrium conditions for the land-
lord are of the same form as those for the owner-occupier, 
and it is argued that changes in the user cost of housing 
will have similar qualitative impacts on both landlords 
and owner-occupiers. 
Investment is a dynamic activity. The investment 
analysis presented here considers an individual landlord 
in a competitive environment deciding on a dynamic program 
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of asset accumulations, and financing, throughout the 
foreseeable future. 2 . Asset transactions are permitted 
to occur continually (i.e., at every instant in continuous 
time). The landlord seeks to maximize the present-value 
of his private net worth 3 • over the time horizon TO ~ TIe 
At any time s E [TO,T I ] the landlord holds a stock K(s) 
units of housing capital. 4 . This stock of housing is 
rented to tenant-occupiers, and returns a rental rate of 
P~(S)K(S), where P~(s) is the value of gross rental payments 
obtained on one unit of rented housing at time s. 
The rate of gross investment in housing at time s 
(denoted I(s)) is defined as the difference between the 
rate of acquisition of new units of housing, and the 
rate of disposal of old units of housing, at time s. 
Investment in housing is reversible here. The landlord 
is able to finance the costs of gross investment by making 
h 5. b .. d b 6. h a cas payment, or y acqulrlng e t, suc as a mort-
gage, over the value of net purchases. Let ~(s) denote 
the proportion of the total value of gross investment at 
time s which is financed by the acquisition of debt. Then, 
[1-~(s)]q(s)I(s) is the cash payment made by the landlord 
at time s, in order to acquire the additional I(s) units 
of housing capital; q(s) is the purchase (and also re-sale) 
price of the housing stock. 
The total value of housing held by the landlord at 
time s is q(s)K(s). This total value can be divided into 
debt and equity capital. The value of debt capital held 
at an arbitrary time s* E [TO,TI ] is 
(2-1-1) 
where: 
s* 
Debt (s *) == f [0 ( s) q (s) I (s) - DR (s) ] ds , 
s=T o 
1. It has been assumed that no debt is held prior to 
s = TO. 
2. DR(s) is the rate of repayment of debt at time s. 
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The remainder, q{s)K(s)-Debt(s), represents the landlord's 
(owner's) equity in housing. It is convenient to define 
(2-1-2) <)J (s) Debt Cs). q(s)K(s) 
Then, the landlord's equity in housing at time s is 
(2-1-3) q(s)K(s)-Debt(s) [ l-<)J(s)]q(S)K(s) 
It is assumed that housing depreciates (physically; 
there is no obsolescence) exponentially at the rate o. 
Accordingly, the relationship between I(s) and the rate 
at which the stock of housing increases is given by 
(2-1-4) K(S)= l(s) - oK(s) I 
where a dot over a stock variable denotes the time rate 
of change of that stock. In addition, the proportion of 
housing subject to debt also changes over time: From 
(2 -2) 
(2-l-5 ) ,;: (s) == Debt ( s ) () K ( s ) cl ( s ) 
'f' q(S)K(s)-<)J s K(s) + q(s) • 
(2-1-5) can be reduced to more convenient notation on 
using (2-1-4), and on real ing that 
(2-1-6 ) Debt ( s ) == n (s) q ( s) I ( s) - DR ( s) . 
Hence, 
(2-1-7) 
where: 
prices. 
~ (s) 
8 (s) _ 
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I(s) DR(s) 
= K(S)[n(s)-<p(s)] q(S)K(S)+<P{s)[ 0-8(s)J 
g(s) 
--- is the rate of appreciation of house q (s) 
The landlord chooses values for I(s) ,n(s), for all 
(2-1-4) and (2-1-7) impose technical res-
trictions on the ability of these choices to affect the 
"state" of the asset holdings, described by K(s) ,<p(s). 
Together with the stock of housing available at time s, 
and the debt ratio <P(s), the dec ions I(s) ,n(s), generate 
a rate of addition to net worth of w[K(s) ,<P(s) ,I(s),n(s) ,s] 1 
at time s. This addition to net worth is defined as the 
difference between income receipts and payments. Hence: 
(2-1-8) w[K(s) ,<P(s) ,I(s) ,n(s) ,s]=PK(S)K(s)-(m+t)q(s)K(S) 
-IT(s)K(s)-DR(s)-r <P(s)q(s)K(s) 
m 
-[ 1-n(s)]q(s) I(s), sE[TO,T1 ]. 
where: m is expenses of repairs, maintenance and casualty 
insurance premiums as a percentage of asset value, 
q(S)K(s). 
t is rates and local property taxes as a percentage 
of asset value, q(s)K(s). 
IT(s) is the rate of income tax payments per unit 
of capital at time s. 
r is the (nominal) mortgage rate of interest on 
m 
debt. 
The unit income tax rate, IT(s) can be written 
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(2-1-9) rr(s)~auPi(s)-Surm~(s)q(s)-yumq(s)-£utq(s)-suoq(s) 
+t. A (s) uS (s) q ( s) - R ( s ) 
where: 
a 
u is the landlord's average rate of income tax. 
{: 0 if gross rental income is not taxed. 1 if gross rental income is taxed. 
S is the proportion of interest payments on debt 
which are tax deductible. 
y is the proportion of the costs of repairs, 
maintenance, casualty insurance premiums which 
are tax deductible. 
£ is the proportion of rates and local property 
taxes which are deductible against taxable 
income for income tax purposes. 
s is the proportion of the economic value of 
depreciati~n which is tax deductible. 
t. is the proportion of realised capital gains 
subject to income tax at the rate u. 
A(S) is the percentage of accrued capital gains 
actually realised at time s. 
R(s) is the value of rebates 7 . against income tax 
liability at time s. 
(2-1-9) in (2-1-8) reveals: 
0" 
92 
(2-1-10) w(s)=(l-au}Pi(s}KCS)-(l~u)rm<P (s}q(s)K(s) 
- (l-yu) mq (s) K(s} - Cl-Eu) tq (s) K(s) +su8q Cs) K Cs) 
-6 A (s) ue (s ) q Cs} K (s) + R (s) K (s) - DR (s) 
-[ l-~ (s) ] q (s) I (s) I 
The landlord's economic problem is to choose the 
entire time sequence of decisions I(s) I~(S)I between TO 
and Tl , so as to maximize the present-value (evaluated at 
time TO) of the stream of additions to net worth between 
times TO and TIe The present-value of the addition to 
net worth of time s, evaluated at time TO is defined: 
TO 
(2-1-11) w[K(s),<P(s),I(s),~(s),s] 
where: 
-(l-u)rc(s-TO) 
_ e w[ K ( s) , <P (s) , I ( s) ,~ (s) ,s] 
sE[ TO' T 1] • 
r is the before-tax rate of return that could be 
c 
obtained by investing in an alternative asset. 
(2-1-11) is easily understood by interpreting 
TO 
w(s) as the sum which, if invested in an asset yielding 
an after-tax rate of return of (l-u)r , would produce a 
c 
compounded return of w(s) after (S-TO) units of time had 
elapsed. 
The present-value of the whole stream of additions 
to net worth (denoted ~K(TO),<P(TO) ,I,~,TO]) is simply the 
T 
sum of all the w(s) 0 for all SE[TO,T l ]. i.e., 
(2-1-12) 
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Tl -(l-u)rc(s-TO) 
= Jew (s ) ds, 
s=T o 
where it is understood that I,n, are the functions, in the 
'range of which are the sequences of decisions I(s) ,n(s), 
from the initial date TO to the terminal date Tl" Writing 
the objective functional as ~K(To) ,~(TO) ,I,n,TO] empha-
sises that the present-value of net worth derived between 
TO and Tl depends upon the initial values of the "state" 
variables (i.e., K(T O) ,~(TO))' and upon the changes in 
those "state" variables due to the decisions I,n. 
The Pontryagin Maximum principle9 . has a direct 
application to the dynamic optimization problem presented 
here. With respect to the decision variables, I(s) can 
take positive, zero, or negative values (corresponding 
to gross investment, replacement investment, and gross 
disinvestment, respectively), while n(s) is (by definition) 
contained in the closed interval from 0 to 1. A value 
n(s)=o indicates that there is no debt financing of 
investment, while a value n(s)=l indicates one-hundred 
percent debt financing. Formally, for n(s) 
(2-1-13) n(s)E[o,l] 
The Hamiltonian is derived from (2-1-4), (2-1-7) f 
(2-1-8), (2-1-10): 
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-(l-u)r (s-T ) [ 
(2-1-14) H=e c 0 (l-au)P~(s)-q(S)K(S)[ (l-Su)rm<P(s) 
+(l-yu)m+(l-£u)t-~u +~A(S)Ue(s) ] 
+R(s)K(s)-DR(s)-[l-~(s)]q(s)I(s) 
+01 (s)[ I (s) -oK(s) ] 
where: 
CJl(s) is the marginal value of housing capital at 
time s. 
CJ 2 (s) is the marginal value of the debt ratio, <P(s). 
CJl(s) shows the rate at which an extra unit of housing 
available at time s would add to net worth, and CJ 2 (s) shows 
the rate at which a unit increment in <P(s) would increase 
net worth. Hence, the Hamiltonian shows the rate at which 
decisions taken by the landlord at time s contribute to 
present and future increments in present-valued (at time 
TO) net worth. It is the sum of the present-value of the 
TO 
direct increment in net worth, w(s) ,and the present-value 
of the stream of future increments due to the changes 
K(S) ,~(s), occurring at time s. It is clear that the land-
lord should maximize (2-1-14). 
In view of (2-1-13), and (2-1-14), first-order 
necessary conditions for a maximum of (2- 12) subject to 
(2-1-4) I (2- 7), include: 
8H -(l-u)rc(s-TO) (2-1-15) IT(s)=-e [l-~(s)] q(s)-CJl(s) 
-CJ (s)[ ~(s)-p(s)] = 0 
2 K (s) 
. (2-1-16) - (l-u) r (s-T ) ~ =e c 0 
a$1 (s) 
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( )I( ) irI' ( )I(S) {<: 10 1.'f qs sov 2 s K(s) >J' 
$1 (s)=O 
0<$1 (s) < 1 
- -
$1 (s)=l. 
(2-1-17) aH -(l-u)r (S-TO) [ Ol(s)J ;::-:;:--;--,=e c 0 (s) (l-u)r-~ 
1 COl's) 
(2-1-18) 
-(l-u)rc (s-T O) [ 
=e (l-au)p~(s)-q(s) [(l-Bu)rm<P (s) 
+(l-yu)m+(l-£u)t-~uo 
+6 A (s) ue (s)] + R ( s) -0 1 (s) 0 
- (l-u) r (s-T ) [ 
=-e c 0 (l-Bu)r q(s)K(s) 
. m 
+0 ( s ) - -[ 0 -8 (s) ] I(s) J 2 K(s) 
(2-1-16) can be written: 
cr 2 (s) {~ } -q (s) K ( s), if $1(s)=O 0:-:'$1 (s):5,l 
$1 (s)=l. 
Logarithmic differentiation of (2 9), with respect to 
time, produces (on using (2-1-4»: 
$1(s)=O 
- [O-8(s)-i~:~' if O<$1(s)<l 
- -
(2-1-20) 
Q(s)=l. 
But from (2-1-18), 
(2-1-21) 02 (s) (l-Su)rmq(s)K(S) [ I (S)] 
-:::--r-;:: =(l-u)r + - 8-0(s)--02 \s) c 02 (s) K (s) 
(2-1-19) in (2-1-21) reveals: 
(2 22) [ I(S)] (l-u)r -(l-Su}r - 8-0(s)--c m K(s)' 
O(s)=O 
0::0 (s)::l. 
O(s)=l. 
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Hence, on combining (2-l-20) and (2'-1-22), necessary condi 
tions for a maximum include: 
(2- 23) r > I (l-Su) r ~ = ( (l-u) r 
m l < C ,if 
O(s)=O 
0::0 (s)::l. 
O(s)=l 
Care should be exercised in interpreting (2-1-21): 
r ,S,u, and r are all exogenous in this problemj no deci-
m c 
sions taken by the landlord can affect any of these 
variables. This impl s that, in general, (2-l-2l) cannot 
be used to determine the optimal O(s). But (2-1-21) does 
provide the landlord with information. Suppose, for 
instance, the landlord chooses O(s)=O. (2- 21) reveals 
that this decision can be optimal only if (l-Su)r >(l-u}r . 
m- c 
Further, a choice of O(s) between (but not equal to either 
of) 0 and 1 can be optimal only if {l-Su}r ={l-u)r. And 
m c 
a choice of O{s)=l can he optimal only if ( u)r «l-u)r . 
m- c 
These results are easily explained: Suppose the landlord 
chooses O{s)=O, but ( Su)r <{l-u}r ; i.e., the cost of 
m c 
acquiring funds through mortgage debt is less than the 
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opportunity cost of own-funds (equity). In this case the 
landlord's decision cannot be optimal since if 
(l-Su)r «l-u)r , the landlord can reduce the costs of 
m c 
financing investment by acquiring more debt, and so freeing 
more equity for investment in other assets. Indeed, as 
(2 21) reveals, if (l-Su)r «l-u)r the landlord will 
m c 
optimally choose ~(s)=l; i.e., optimality requ s one-
hundred percent debt financing. Similar explanations 
extend to the other results. 
In everyone of the western countries examined 
below, S i.e., the landlord is permitted to deduct one-
hundred percent of mortgage interest payments against 
income tax liability. rand r are given parametrically 
m c 
to landlord. If capital markets are perfectly competi-
ve, arbitrage on the part of owners of capital will 
ensure that r =r. i.e., the rate of return must be the 
c m 
same for all assets, including mortgage instruments. But 
then (2-1-23) reveals that any value of ~(s) that satisfies 
(2- 13) is optimal. This means that the proportion of 
gross investment that should be financed by debt is indeter-
minate. This result is, in fact, the celebrated Modigliani-
Miller (1958) conclusion that optimal investment behaviour 
is independent of the type of instrument used to finance 
. t t 10. lnves men . 
The short-run equilibrium conditions which dictate 
the landlord's optimal behaviour are derived from (2-1-15), 
(2-1-17), and (2-1-19). If (2 23) holds with equality, 
then so too must (2-1-19). (2-1-19) (with equality) in 
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(2-1-15) reveals: 
(2-1-24) ° 1 (s) 1-<jl (s)] q (s ) 
i.e., optima1ity requires that the decision taken by the 
landlord equate the value of one unit of capital acquired 
at time s with the dollar value of equity in one unit of 
capital already held at time s. Comparison of (2-1-24) 
with (2-1-19) (with equality) reveals that, under opti-
ma1ity, 
(2-1-25) q ( s ) K ( s ) =0 1 (s) K ( s) -0 2 (s) 4> (s) 
Recall that 01 (s) is the ("spot") value (evaluated at time 
s) of the total additions to net worth derived from one 
unit of capital becoming available at time s. The term 
0l(S)K(S) is the ("spot") value of the total additions to 
net worth derived from K(s) units of capital being avail-
able at time s. Similarly, the term 02(s)<P(s) is the 
(" spot") value of the total addi ti.ons to net worth derived 
from the total stock of debt held at time s. In conse-
quence, (2-1-25) that along the optimal investment 
path, values of 01(s),02(s), satisfy equality between the 
stock of housing capital valued at "spot" prices (at time 
s), and the di between the "spot" values (evaluated 
at time s), of the additions to net worth due to the 
total stock of housing, and the stock of housing subject 
to debt, available at time s. 
However, while (2-1-25) is a description of invest-
ment equilibrium, it is of limited usefulness to the land-
lord. A more useful condition, which does not involve the 
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unfamiliar 01(s),02(s), can be derived in the following 
manner. Totally differentiate (2-1-24) logarithmically, 
with respect to time, to obtain: 
(2-1-26) 0- 1 (s) _ [ 1:'<jl (s)] ° 1 (s) =8 (s )+[ 1-<jl (s)] 
=8 (s) - ~ (s) /[ 1 - <jl (s)] • 
(2-1-26) can be compared with (on using (2-1-19) and 
(2- 4) in (2-1-17», 
(2- 7) 
01 (s) (l-au) p~ (s) 
-- ={l-u)r 01 (s) c [ 1-<jl (s )] q (s ) 
q(s)[ (l-su)r
m
<jl (s)+(1-yu)m+(l-Eu)t-l;;uo+8A (s)u8{s)]-R(s) 
T----------------r~~~,_~ __ -------------------------+o 
K(s) II(S)[~(s)-<jl(s)] 1 . DR s 
- [ 1-<jl (s)] I~ ( s) K (s) - K (s ) q s 1 
But from (2-1-7), 
(2-1-28) K(s) [I(S)[~(S)-<jl(S)t~. DR(s) j-
[1-<jl (s)] K(S) K(s) K(s)q(s)K(s) 
~ (s) 
[l-<jl (s)] 
<jl (s) [ 0 -8 (s) ] 
- [ 1-<jl (s) ] 
Comparing (2-1-26) with (2-1-27), on using (2-1-28), 
reveals: 
(2-1-29) PK(s)=q(s) [(l-u)r
c
[l-<jl(s)]+(l-Su)r
m
<jl(s)+( yu)m 
+(I-Eu)t+(I-~u)o-(1-8A(S)U)8(SJ -R(s) 
(l-au) 
The right-hand side of (2-1-29) can be interpreted as the 
11 t 11 f . f h' . lOll. user cos 0 one unlt 0 OUSlng caplta • Denote 
this unit user cost by C(s). It is composed of a net 
opportunity cost of equity, [(l-u)/(l-au)]r [ <jl(s) ]q(s); 
c 
an interest cost on debt, [(l-Su)/(l-au)]r <jl(s)q(s)r 
m 
IHE LlbRAlI.l 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTER-BUD 
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expenses repairs, maintenance, and ca$ualty insurance 
premiums, [(I-yu) / (l-au) ] mq (s) i the cost of rates and 
local property taxes, [(l-Eu)/(l-au)]tq(s) i the cost of 
economic depreciation, [ (l-su) / (l-au)] oq (s); and is 
diminished by the after-tax value of capital gains, 
[ (1-8.'\ (s) u) / (l-au)]G(s) q (s), and the value of tax rebates, 
R (s) / (I-au) • 
(2-1-29) states that at every instant in continuous 
time, optimality requires that the gross rental price 
PK(S! received by the landlord equals the unit user cost 
of housing. That this condition does, in fact, describe 
optimality might not be immediately obvious. It can be 
explained in the following manner: With respect to the 
investment decisions taken by an individual landlord in a 
competitive environment, every term in (2-1-29) (on both 
sides of the equation) is exogenous. 12. Suppose PK(s) 
exceeds C(s). Then, the landlord can increase net worth 
by acquiring more units of housing, and it is optimal to 
do so whilever PK(s) exceeds C(S): The landlord is 
encouraged to accumulate housing at an infinitely rapid 
rate. Clearly, the existence of a finite optimal stock of 
housing requires that PK(s) does not exceed C(s). Alter-
natively, suppose that PK(s) is less than C(s). In this 
case, landlord can increase net worth by disposing of 
all units of housing at the price q(s). Clearly, if the 
landlord holds any housing at all, PK(s) must be at least 
as large as C(s). Accordingly, the existence of a positive, 
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finite, optimal stock of housing requires that P~(s) equals 
e(s). But this is (2-l-29). 
(2-1-29) cannot be used to determine the size of 
the optimal stock of housing for the individual landlord. 
Observations like this are not uncommon in economic theory. 
Perhaps the best-known result of this kind the indeter-
minacy in the optimal scale of operations the individual 
firm (or, equivalently, the number of firms) in a perfectly 
competitive industry with constant returns to scale. There 
does not appear to be an entirely satisfactory answer to 
this problem. Of course, this indeterminacy does not prevent 
the identification of appropriate optimal conditions for 
the individual firm. 
(2- 29) is a short-run equilibrium condition for 
the investment activity of an individual landlord. An 
alternative presentation of (2-1-29) is to define the .net 
rate of return to equity invested in housing: 
(2-1-30) (l-au)p~(s)-q(s){(l-Su)rm~(s)+{l-yu)m+(l-su)t+(l-su)o 
-(1-6J\(s)U)0(s) }+R(s) 
[ l-rp (s)] q (s) 
Hence, on using (2-1-29) I optimality can be characterized 
by requiring: 
(2- 31) r =(l-u)r . 
n c 
The equilibrium conditions (2-1-29) I (2 1-31) can be used 
to demonstrate that the rules for optimal investment 
behaviour are independent of the landlord's debt-equity 
ratio. (2-1-31) can be interpreted as saying that the 
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landlord should continue to accumulate housing capital 
to the point where the net rate of return to his equity 
equals the after-tax return to equity invested in an alter-
native asset (the rate of opportunity cost). The rate of 
opportunity cost is clearly independent of ~(s). It remains 
to show that r is also independent of ~(s): Differentiate 
n 
(2-1-30) with respect to ~(s), to obtain 
Clr (l-au) PK* Cs) -q(s) { (l-Su) r ~ (s) + (l-yu)mt(l-Eu) t+ (l-1:u) 0 n _ m 
Cl ~(s)--(l-"'A{S)U)EJ(s) hR(s) 
[1-~(s)]2 
- q(s) (l-Su)r 
m 
[l-~(s)] 
which, on using (2-1-29), reveals 
Clr
n 
(l-au)r q(s) (l-Su)r q(s) 
c m ;;; -rl-~ (s)] - Tl-~ (s)] • 
But, S = I, and arbitrage on the part of owners of capital 
ensures that r =r. Hence, Clr /d~(S)=O. This result is 
c m n 
equivalent to Proposition III of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, p.288), referred to above. 
Before turning to the investment analysis of owner-
occupied housing, consider an alternative interpretation 
of (2-1-29). This is that the landlord should hold his 
equity, (1-~2)q2K213., in housing only if, after allowing 
for the costs of repairs, maintenance, casualty insurance 
premiums, mortgage interest payments, depreciation, and 
taxes, but after adding the expected value of capital gains, 
the net return on equity invested in housing is at least as 
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great as the net return the landlord could expect to earn 
if he were to invest his equity in an alternative asset. 
i.e., the landlord must regard 
A 
(2-1-32) PK2K2-{rm~2+m2+t2+o2}q2K2-rr2K2+82q2K2 
~(1-u2)rc(1-~2)q2K2 
A 
where: 8 2 is the expected value of 8 2 " 
If (2-1-32) holds with inequality, the landlord 
will be encouraged to invest more equity in housing, since 
this will increase net worth. An equilibrium requires that 
(2-1-32) hold with equality. But this is (2-1-29), provided 
A 
it is assumed that expected capital gains, 82q2K2 actually 
accrue.
14
. In a like manner, it can be demonstrated that 
(2-1-29) is also the instantaneous equilibrium condition 
for an owner-occupier. Hence, an occupier will buy an 
extra unit of housing only if the costs of home ownership 
(mortgage interest costs, costs of repairs, maintenance, 
and casualty insurance premiums, depreciation, rates and 
local property taxes, the net opportunity cost of holding 
equity in housing rather than in some other asset, and any 
income taxes charged on imputed rent, less the expected value 
of capital gains) are not greater than the cost of renting a 
unit of housing of the same psychic value in the rental 
market for housing services. The cost of renting a unit 
of housing of the same psychic value is made up of two 
parts: The first is the number of units of rented housing 
that would provide exactly the same psychic value (in terms 
of utility) as one unit of owner-occupied housing; the 
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second part the price of each unit of rented housing. 
The first part is MU 1/MU2 , the ratio of the marginal utility 
of owner-occupied housing to the marginal utility of rented 
housing (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution of owner-
occupied, for rented housing). The second part is PK . 2 
An owner-occupier must regard: 
The term PR /MU2 is the cost of obtaining an extra unit of 2 
utility from rented housing. Suppose this exogenous as 
far as the owner-occupier's investment decision-making is 
concerned. The individual will gain by investing more in 
owner-occupied housing whi1ever (2- 33) ho with inequality. 
Assuming a declining marginal utility of owner-occupied 
housing, (2-1-33) will eventually hold with equality. 
Equality in (2-1-33) characterizes investment equilibrium 
for the owner-occupier. The right-hand-side of (2-1-33) is 
an obvious measure of the implicit gross rental value of 
one unit owner-occupied housing. This is denoted by 
PR' Hence, the equilibrium form of (2- 33) is (2-1-29). 
1 
Any government policy which alters the "user costs" 
of housing for landlords or owner-occupiers will affect the 
optimal ze of the stock of housing held by these agents, 
in their investment portfolios. If user costs are reduced 
for a landlord, he will find it optimal to acquire more units 
of hous , for rental; if user costs are reduced for an 
owner-occupier, he too will find it optimal to acquire more 
units of housing, for his own consumption. (2-1-29) also 
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identifies the conditions under which an owner-occupier will 
find it optimal to become a landlord with respect to some 
or all of his housing. All that is required is that (2-l-32) 
holds with inequality, and that (2-l-33) does not hold. 
On the other hand, if (2-l-33) holds with inequality but 
(2-l-32) does not hold, for a particular landlord, the 
landlord can gain by removing a unit of housing from rental 
use to his private occupation. 
2.2 THE "USER COSTS" OF HOUSING AND THE OtmER-OCCUPIER 
SUBSIDY IN SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES 
The analys of the previous Section permits the 
following expression for the "unit user cost" of housing 
employed in Sector i (i=l denotes owner-occupied housing; 
2 denotes rented housing), in equilibrium: 
(2-2-l) C. = q. {(l-u.}r (l-cp.}+(l-(3.u.}r cp.+(l-y.u,}m. 
1 1 1 C 1 1 1 m 1 111 
+(1-£.u.}t,+(1-s,u,}8,-(1-b,A,u,}8,}-R. 
11111 1 111 1 1 
where: q. 
1 
the price of one un of housing stock in 
Sector i. 
u. is the average rate of individual income tax on 
1 
house owners in Sector i. 
rc is the gross-of-tax rate of return that could be 
obtained on an alternative investment. 
cp. is the proportion of house value subject to 
1 
debt in Sector i. 
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r is the mortgage (or other debt instrument) rate 
m 
of interest. 
m. is repairs, maintenance, and casualty insurance 
1 
premiums as a percentage of house value in 
Sector i. 
is rates and local property taxes as a proportion 
of house value in Sector i. 
o. is the (exponential) factor of depreciation of 
1 
housing in Sector i. 
r-
8. is the expected rate of capital gain on housing 
1 
in Sector i. 
R. is 
1 
tax rebates on one unit of housing in Sector 
i. 
S· is 1 the proportion of interest payments on debt 
which are tax deductible in Sector i. 
y. the proportion of the costs of repairs, 
1 
maintenance, casualty insurance premiums, which 
are tax deductible in Sector i. 
E· is the proportion of rates and local property 
1 
taxes which are deductible against taxable 
income for income tax purposes in Sector i. 
~. is the proportion of the economic value of 
1 
depreciation which is tax deductible in Sector i. 
~. is the proportion of realised capital gains 
1 
subject to income tax at the rate u .• 
1 
{
= 0 if; 
et. 
1 = 1 if 
gross rental income i.s not taxed. 
gross rental income is taxed. 
A. is the proportion of accrued caJ?ita1 gains 
1 
actually realised. 
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An examination of; (2-2-11 reveals nine tax policy 
instruments, the values of which are determined by govern-
ment. These are: U., et., S., y., £., (;., t:.. It., and R .. 
111 111 111 
In addition, governments have some measure of influence 
over r. Each of these tax policy instruments can be used 
m 
to influence the user costs of owner-occupied, and rented, 
housingi consequently, they can have important implications 
for the degrees of horizontal and vertical equity in the 
taxation of housing. Section 2.3 of this Chapter is 
concerned with the comparative partial equilibrium statics 
of tax policy with respect to housing. The present Section 
explores the implications of present tax laws in Australia, 
Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States of America, for horizontal and vertical 
equity in housing, The analysis of Section 2.2 and 2.3 
indicates how the user cost concept is affected by tax pOlicy: 
This analysis serves as an introduction to the general 
equilibrium tax incidence analysis of Chapters 3 and 4. 
(a) Australia 
Kiefer (1978) is the most sophisticated economic 
analysis of the equity implications of housing policy in 
Australia. The ana1y s is partial equilibrium. Kiefer, 
too, develops a user cost of capital approach, although his 
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model differs from the model developed here. It is of 
particular interest that Kiefer chooses to ignore capital 
gains. He asserts (1978, p.128n) that the IInontaxability 
[of capital gains under Australian tax law] in the case of 
housing investment does not amount to a differential subsidy." 
In general, this assertion is incorrect. In particular, 
the change in housing costs that would be associated with 
the application of imputed-rent taxation to owner-occupied 
housing (this policy change is considered at length by 
Kiefer (1978» depends critically upon the level of capital 
gains, even though capital gains are not taxed with or 
without imputed-rent taxation. The reason for this 
Ilsurprisingll result appears below. 
The most interesting aspect of Kiefer's (1978) paper 
is its analysis of the implications of inflation for real 
housing costs. Kiefer concludes that inflation increases 
real housing costs at all income levels, but affects high-
income homeowners more severely than low-income homeowners 
(i.e., it is a sort of "progressive tax"). In addition, 
he finds that inflation can cause the taxation of imputed 
rents to be regressive, unless mortgages are indexed. The 
treatment of capital gains in this analysis is interesting. 
Kiefer claims (1978, p.133) that his analysis of housing 
investment allows housing price increases to increase user 
costs, but does not allow for capital gains. There are 
two points that might be made about this: First, this 
treatment is at considerable variance with the widely 
accepted view that inflation encourages investment in housing 
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because the capital gains. on housing provide a "hedge" 
against inflation. Second, ironically, Kiefer's analysis 
does allow for cap1.tal gains; its limitation :is that it 
assumes house prices increase at the same rate as all other 
prices, so that there are no real capital gains. Permitting 
real capital gains considerably strengthens Kiefer's con-
clusion on the progressivity of imputed-rent taxation 
under inflation. These points are demonstrated below. 
The tax treatment of housing in Australia has a 
remarkable history. In 1915, the Australian Government 
introduced a Federal tax on the imputed income of owner-
occupied housing. Reece (1975) records the administrative 
history of this tax. It seems that the tax was levied 
primarily to assist in the finance of war expenditure, 
although its implications for equity were recognised. 
Imputed income was defined to include 5% of the capital 
value of land and improvements used for owner occupation. 
The tax was removed in 1923, however. 
t10re recently, Australian tax legislation has been 
(briefly) more favourable for owner-occupiers. Beginning 
July 1975, owner-occupiers were permitted to deduct a 
portion of mortgage interest from taxable incomes. But 
from July 1976, the deduction was allowed only to first-
home buyers, and only during the first five years of owner-
ship. Even more recently, the deduction has been withdrawn: 
Mortgage interest which accrues after 31 October, 1978, is 
not deductible, and interest payments actually made after 
1 July, 1979, are not deductible. The Australian tax law 
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contains provision for a tax rebate on rates and land tax 
paid on owner-occupied property: The maximum amount in 
respect of which a claim can be made is $30Q. This claim 
is added to the total of other expenditures "qualifying" 
for a tax rebate. rebate to which the tax payer i.s 
entitled is 32 percent of the claim, where the total of 
all "qualifying rebates" exceeds $1,590. 
There are no capital gains taxes on amounts realised 
on assets held for more than twelve months. Interest 
payments on debt are fully deductible as a business 
expense, as are rates and land tax, costs of repairs, 
maintenance, and casualty insurance premiums. There are, 
however, no depreciation allowances on residential property, 
whether ovmer-occupied or rented. 
Under present Australian tax law, 
(2-2-2) 
(2-2-3) 
where it has been assumed that the representative owner-
occupier, and landlord, avoids capital gains tax by holding 
property for more than twelve months. It has also been 
assumed that the representative owner-occupier does not 
qualify for the tax rebate on rates and land tax. 
The unit subsidy to an owner-occupier is defined 
here as (the negative of) the difference between the net 
return to equity invested in owner-occupied housing under 
present law and the net return to that equity if the owner-
III 
occupier were treated in the same manner as a landlord is 
presently treated under the income tax. 15. This is equiva-
lent to the difference between user costs of the owner-
occupier under present law, and user costs if he were 
treated as a landlord is presently treated. Hence, it 
represents the change in tax liability if imputed-rent 
taxation is introduced. Kiefer claims (1978, p.132) that 
if there is no inflation, imputed-rent taxation is neutral, 
since it does not distort the free market investment 
equilibrium criterion. Put another way, the user cost of 
housing, with imputed rent taxation, and when all markets 
are in equilibrium, is independent of the tax rate. Hence, 
Kiefer's equation (11), re-written with present notation, 
is 
(2-2-4) 
where: i is the common mortgage and opportunity rate of 
is 
(2-2-5) 
interesti i.e., i=r =r . 
c m 
C2 (1) is the user cost of owner-occupied housing, 
when owner-occupiers are treated as landlords 
under the income tax. 
In view of (2-2-3), the value of C2 (1) derived here 
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To see the relationship between (2-2-4), which is Kiefer's 
expression, and (2-2-5), note that Kiefer compresses 01 
and ml , and his interpretation of imputed-rent taxation 
permits full deductibility of depreciation. Making these 
adjustments, (2-2-5) is 
(2-2-6) 
If there are no real capital gains on housing (i.e., 
capital gains ln excess of general inflation), Kiefer's 
"-
assumption of no inflation implies 8 is zero, and there is 
no difference between (2-2-4) and (2-2-6). But in general, 
there will be real capital gains (or losses) on housing. 
A comparison of (2-2-5) and (2-2-4) reveals two 
incorrect results in Kiefer (1978): The first "result" is 
that capital gains do not matter, in general. The second 
is that if there is no inflation, imputed-rent taxation 
(i. e., the particular form used by Kiefer) is neut,ral. 
(2-2-6) reveals that the second of these results is true 
only if there are no real capital gains (or losses) on 
housing, which will not be true, in general. In fact, if 
there are real capital gains on housing, (2-2-6) indicates 
that imputed-rent taxation, with no taxation of capital 
gains, is regressive: Under a system of progressive 
income taxation, high-income homeowners receive favourable 
treatment, relative to low-income homeowners. The first 
"result" is incorrect: Kiefer's definition of the subsidy 
to owner-occupied housing compares taxation under present 
law with imputed-rent taxation. Denoting the unit subsidy 
(subsidy per unit of housing capital) by S, Kiefer's 
definition implies 
(2-2-7) 
{(l-u )r (l-~ )-0 } 1 c 1 1 
where: u l is the marginal (rather than the average) 
tax rate of the owner-occupier. 
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(The marginal tax rate ul is used because the size of a 
tax change under a progressive income tax system depends 
upon marginal, not average, tax rates). The definition 
of the subsidy to owner-occupied housing given here, 
implies 
which differs from (2-2-7) because of the nondeductibility 
of depreciation on rented housing in the Australian income 
tax. (2-2-7) and (2-2-8) reveal that the size of the 
subsidy to owner-occupied housing depends critically upon 
A 
the rate of capital gain, 8 1 - The reason for th result, 
which contradicts the assertion made by Kiefer, that 
capital gains reduce equilibrium rentals, which are taxed 
on rented housing, but which are not taxed on ovmer-
occupied housing. Capital gains favour landlords over 
owner-occupiers_ This result is returned to, below. 
Kiefer's treatment of inflation is interesting. His 
principal conclusion is that the taxation of nominal net 
rent in the presence of inflation is generally not neutral. 
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Kiefer considers the special case in which all prices 
(including house prices) increase at the same rate (denote 
-this rate by 8), so that 
= P~ ('a) e 8s 
l 
It is then argued that capital market equilibrium requires 
all asset-holders (including lenders) to maintain real 
after-tax rates of return in the presence of inflation. 
Denote this real rate of return (real discount rate) for 
m 
mortgagees by PO' and for homeowners by PO' The relation-
m 
ships between rm,rc'PO'P Q, are: 
(2-2-9 ) 
where: 
(2-2-10) 
(2-2-11) 
m Po = (l-u ) r -8 
m m 
u is the mortgagee's tax rate, 
m 
r = r i. 
m c 
Finally, define the before-tax real interest rate: 
(2-2-12 ) 
Kiefer is interested in the implications of inflation 
for real housing costs. He considers (pp.133-l34) a simple 
example in which 01=t1=ml:::O i then, he finds that 
(2-2-13) 
where: C2 (1)O (=PK(O) in equilibrium) is the real cost of 
housing, under imputed-rent taxation, in the 
presence of inflation. 
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(2-2-13) reveals that if um~ul' high bracket homeowners 
receive atively favourable treatment under a system of 
progress taxation. i.e., imputed-rent taxation is not 
neutral if there is inflation. 
Kiefer's result (2-2-13) is derived on the assumption 
that all prices appreciate at the same rate. More 
generally, there may be real capital gains (or losses) on 
housing, i.e., in general ~~§. Hence, suppose 
PK (s) 1 
A 
o s 1 ql (s) =: ql (O)e . 
Then, making all Kiefer's other assumptions, (2-2-10), 
(2-2 1), in (2-2-6) reveal 
=: q (0) [i- §l -"ji (2-2-14) C2 (1)0 1 l-ul 
=ql(O) ~~~l] -ql(O) 
On using (2-2-9) and (2-2-12), (2-2-14) reveals: 
(2-2 1 1 
[
A ~J o -0 
- ql (0) l:U
l 
. 
Hence, (2-2-15) is a generalization of (2-2-13), to permit 
real capital gains. Again, it is clear that capital gains 
do matter, in general. In fact, the possibility of real 
capital gains on housing strengthens Kie 's result, 
since then imputed-rent taxation is not neutral under 
in ation even if um=u l i it is not neutral even if home-
owners have one-hundred percent equity in their homes. 
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This last result is of considerable interest, since it 
indicates that making only real interest payments both 
deductible for borrowers and taxable for lenders is not 
generally sufficient to ensure the neutrality of imputed-
rent taxation in the presence of inflation. Yet both Swan 
(1976, p.175) and Kiefer (1978, p.134) claim that it is. 
(2-2 5) can be used to show that, in addition, there 
must be full taxation of real capital gains on an accruals 
basis. 
In rest of this Section, attention focuses on 
~ ______ , rather than real, user costs of housing. The 
~ 
real rate of interest, denoted r O(=rc -0), and the real 
rate of capital gain, (0-0), are identified, however. 
The unit subsidy on owner-occupied housing, under 
Austral income tax legislation, is shown in (2-2-8). 
The subsidy is a measure of the horizontal inequity created 
by the favourable tax treatment of investment income on 
owner-occupied housing. Since ul<l, the subsidy is positive/ 
zero/negative as 
(2-2-16 ) A ~ > 16 r -(0 -0)=r {l-(l-U" ) (1-<jJ )}-o •• o 1 < c 111 
Hence, the question of whether owner-occupied housing is 
subsidized relative to rented housing (i.e., if there is 
horizontal inequity as between housing tenures) under 
Australian tax legislation, depends (among other things) 
upon the size of the difference between real rate of 
interest (this is the real income yield the investment) 
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and the real rate of capital gain. The lower the real 
rate of interest, the less likely it is that owner-occupied 
housing is subsidized. It is possible to discover a 
critical real interest rate (denoted r) at which there is 
no subsidy. In view of (2-2-16) this critical .real 
interest rate is 
If the real rate of interest exceeds this critical value, 
the subsidy is positive; if the real interest rate is less 
than this critical value, the subsidy is negative, 
To test for vertical inequity in the Australian tax 
treatment of housing income, differentiate (2-2-8) I with 
respect to u l : 
(2-2-17) 
A ~ > 
r -(8 -8) o 1 < 
. 2 16. 
{l- (l-u) (I-</> ) }-6 1 1· 1 
where ql,rC '</>1,6 l ,e l , have all been treated (parametrically) 
as exogenous constants. Clearly, the partial derivative 
might be positive, zero, or negative, depending upon the 
A 
relationship between ul ' r c '</>1,6 l , and 8 1 , 
Table 2 -1 presents some illustrative calculations 
of the size of S.Kl (this is the annual value of the owner-
occupier subsidy for an individual with Kl units of housing) 
in each of the six Western countries examined in this 
Section. The subsidy is calculated using the following 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
TABLE 2-2-1: The Subsidy to Owner-Occupied Housing; 
Some Illustrative Calculations; Six 
tvestern Countries. (Dollars per annum.) 
Country Real Rate Marginal Tax Rate (U1) 
of Interest 
rO I 0 l .10 I .20 ! .30 I 
Australia I - ! * I .0425 
, 
.05 .0575 I r I 0 0 
I 
-283.33 -750 , 1-1478.57 
0 50 0 I .05 
I 
. -192.86 
.10 0 I 383.33 750 1092.86 , 
.15 0 716.67 1500 2378.57 
-Canada r * .015 .03 .045 
- -,... --
, 
.40 I .50 i .60 i .70 
I I 
! .065 I .0725 .08 .0875 
i -2600 I -4350 I -7200 -12250 I I -1350 -2700 -600 t -5250 1400 1650 1800 1750 
I 3400 4650 6300 8750 
.06 .075 .09 .105 
.05 0 116.67 150 64.29 -200 -750 -1800 -3850 
.10 0 283.33 525 707.14 800 750 450 -350 
.15 0 450 900 1350 1800 2250 2700 3150 
New Zealand r * -.0675 .0233 .0586 .08 .0958 .1089 .1204 
o 1000 450 -350 -1507.14 -3200 -5750 -9800 -16850 
.05 1000 783.33 400 -221.43 -1200 -2750 -5300 -9850 
.10 1000 1116.67 1150 I 1064.29 800 250 -800 -2850 I : I 
, 
.15 I 1000 1450 1900 2350 i 2800 3250 3700 ! 4150 ! , i 
, 
United Kingdom: - * .2375 .47 * -.37 .-1375 -.05 .0013 r 
I 0 0 3166.67 3525 3728.57 3700 3300 2250 -100 
i .05 0 2500 3150 3728.57 i 4366.67 4500 4500 3900 , 
I 
i I .10 I 0 I 1833.33 2775 I 3728.57 4700 5700 6750 7900 
I 
I 
.15 I 0 I 1166.67 2400 ! 3728.57 I 5200 6900 9000 11900 I I I I 
U.S.A. - * -.0063 .0033 .0141 i .0263 .04 .0557 .0738 r I 
0 0 40 , -45 -308.57 -840 -1800 -3510 : -6720 ! I I 
.05 i 0 I 356.67 I 630 784.29 760 450 -360 I -2170 I 
.10 I 0 i 673.33 ! 1305 l 1877.14 2360 2700 2790 2380 I .15 0 I 990 , 1980 2970 3960 4950 5940 6930 I I I i 
-
I I I West Germany I r .12 , .123 ! .126 I .129 .132 i .135 .138 .141 I 
0 0 I -820 -1890 -3317.14 -5280 I -8100 ; -12420 I -19740 I 
.05 0 -486.67 -1140 -2031.43 -3280 I -5100 I -7920 -12740 
.10 0 -153.33 -390 -745.71 -1280 I -2100 I -3420 -5740 
.15 0 180 360 540 720 I 900 1080 1260 
Source: See Text 
Data: q1K1 = $60,000; ~1 = .5; rc = rm = .15; 
01 = .04; t1 = .015. 
* r is not defined for this value of u. 
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~' •.... 
~ . data: It is assumed that the individual has 50 percent 
owner's equity in a $60,000 house; the (gross-of-tax) mort-
gage rate of interest equals the (gross-of-tax) opportunity 
rate of interest, equals 15 percent; th~ rate of (expo-
nential) depreciation on housing is 4 percent per annum. 
Calculations are performed for a range of different 
values of u l ' and r O' but it is supposed that there are 
no real capital gains on housing (of course, this is unrea-
listic, but any other precise value is difficult to 
A 
discover, empirically), so that 8 
Table 2-2-1 shows, for each country, the critical 
real rate of interest, r, for different marginal tax rates. 
This critical real interest rate increases with the indivi-
dual marginal tax rate. Hence, instance, under 
Australian tax legislation, if the hypothetical individual 
faces a marginal tax rate of 60 percent, he enjoys an owner-
occupier subsidy only if the real rate of interest 
exceeds 8 percent. If, however, the individual faces a 
marginal tax rate of 30 percent, he enjoys an owner-occupier 
subsidy provided the real rate of interest exceeds 5.75 
percent. 
In the special case of no inflation (and, hence, a 
real rate of interest of 15 percent), the Australian tax 
treatment of owner-occupied housing exhibits vertical 
inequity: An individual facing a marginal tax rate 
60 percent enjoys an owner-occupier subsidy of $6300 p.a. 
(approximately $12l/week), while an individual facing a 
marginal tax rate of 30 percent enjoys a subsidy of 
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$2378.57 p.a. (approximately $46/week). In terms of pre-
tax income, the subsidy to the individual with a marginal 
tax rate of 60 percent is approximately $303/week. This 
means that the present tax treatment of owner-occupied 
housing for this individual is equivalent to taxing owner-
occupied housing in the same way that rented housing is 
taxed, and giving this individual a cash handout of $303/ 
week. The subsidy in terms of pre-tax income is approxi-
mately $65/week for the individual with a 30 percent 
marginal tax rate; this is $238/week ss than for the 
individual with the 60 percent marginal tax rate. 
While the subsidy to owner-occupied housing can 
be quite large under Australian tax legislation, it is 
not clear that the subsidy is large in general. Real rates 
of interest have typically been very low (even negative) 
in recent years. Even a 5 percent real rate of interest 
seems high, historically. But at this real rate of 
interest, the only individuals enjoying a subsidy from 
owner-occupied housing are those with marginal tax rates 
less than 20 percent. Table 2-2-1 displays this result. 
The reason that landlords can be treated favourably 
relative to owner-occupiers under the Australian income 
tax derives from the tax treatment of capital gains. 
Relative to owner-occupiers, landlords derive proportio-
nately more of their after-tax incomes from tax free 
capital gains. 
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(b) Canada 
According to Canadian tax legislation effective as 
at 15th December, 19S0, imputed rentals on owner-occupied 
housing are not taxed. Generally, one;..half of "taxable 
capital gains" are included in the tax-payer's income and 
taxed at the normal income tax rate. Capital gains are not 
taxed as they accrue, but rather, as they are realised. 
Capital gains realised by an owner-occupier on the sale 
of his "principal residence" are, however, not taxable, 
although gains realised by a landlord on the sa of rented 
property are. The costs of property taxes, repairs, 
maintenance, casualty insurance premiums, mortgage interest 
payments, and depreciation are tax deductible on property 
purchased as an investment, provided the taxpayer made the 
outlays with the intention of producing actual (as distinct 
from notional/imputed) income. 
The Canadian tax provisions imply: 
(2-2-1S) 
which is the same as under Australian legislation; and 
(2-2-19) 
where: 1. It has been assumed that depreciation allow-
ances for tax purposes reflect actual economic 
depreciation. 
2. A is the percentage of expected capital gains 
actually realised in the tax period. 
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The unit subsidy on owner-occupied housing under 
Canadian tax law is: 
(2-2-20) S=Q1 [ 1:*1 }( 1-u1 ) re (1-~ 1) - (1-';1. 1) 81 } 
A _ > a.-ul) (1-<1>1) 16. 
r O-(8 -8)=r {l- } 1 < c (l-taAl) 
-The critical real interest rate is r 
> o as 
< 
+(81-8). If the real rate of interest exceeds this value, 
owner-occupied housing enjoys a positive subsidy. An 
examination of (2-2-20) reveals that the size of the 
subsidy depends upon the percentage of accrued capital 
gains actually realised. From (2-2-20): 
(2-2-21) 
This result is not surprising. It arises because of the 
favourable tax treatment of realised capital gains on 
owner-occupied housing, relative to rented housing. 
To test for vertical inequity, differentiate (2-2-20), 
with respect to u l : 
(2-2-22) 
" ~ 
r -(8 -8) o 1 
16. 
Some illustrative calculations for the Canadian 
case are presented in Table 2-2-1. It has been assumed 
that Al = 1; i.e., that all capital gains are realised as 
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they accrue. Calculations of the subsidy to owner-
occupied housing under alternative assumptions about Al 
can easily be performed, and compared with the calculations 
presented here. As (2-2-21) reveals, an assumption of 
Al;l tends to overstate the size of the owner-occupier 
subsidy_ 
A comparison of the illustrative calculations for 
Canada, with those performed for Australia, reveals that 
for those combinations of ul and rO for which the subsidy 
is positive in both countries, the subsidy is nearly 
always larger in Austral The Australian tax system 
also exhibits more vertical inequity, for any real interest 
rate. Table 2-2-1 reveals, for example, that if there is 
no inflation, the subsidy for an individual with a marginal 
tax rate of 60 percent is $1350 p.a. larger than for an 
individual with a marginal tax rate of 30 percent. This 
compares with a difference of approximately $3921 p.a. 
under Australian tax legislation. 
(c) New Zealand 
According to New Zealand tax legislation embodied 
in the Income Tax Act, 1976 (as amended), imputed rentals 
on owner-occupied housing are not taxed. Provided the tax-
payer does not acquire property with the primary intention 
of later real ing a capital gain on that property, there 
is no capital gains tax liability. Normal costs of repairs, 
maintenance, casualty insurance premiums, depreciation, 
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rates, and mortgage interest payments are tax deductible 
for landlords, but not owner-occupiers. However, as from 
1 April 1981, there has been provided a tax rebate of 
one-half of mortgage interest payments made by owner-
occupiers in the rst five years of owner-occupation. 
The total value the tax rebate is not to exceed $1000 
per annum. The stated aim of this recent tax initiative 
is to encourage low income families to acquire their own 
homes. The "user cost" measure provides an indication of 
the likelihood that this tax policy will achieve its objec-
tive. 
The New Zealand tax provisions imply that for home 
owners who been owner-occupiers more than five 
years: 
(2-2-23) Cl 
which is the same as under Australian and Canadian tax 
legislation. But for those owner-occupiers who have been 
homeowners for less than five years: 
where K1 represents the number units of housing capital 
in the house owned by the owner-occupier. 
For landlords, 
(2-2-25) 
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In deriving (2-2-23), (2-2-24), and (2-2-25) it has been 
assumed, realistically, that the representative landlord 
and owner-occupier is not subject to capital gains tax on 
realised capital gains. 
The subsidy to owner-occupied housing depends upon 
which of (2-2-23), (2-2-24), is accepted as the unit user 
cost of owner-occupied housing. In the first case 
(2-2-26) 
r { 
c 
:?: 0 as 
< 
In the second case 
(2-2-27) S 
> A - > 
< 0 as r O-(8 l -8)< {l-(l-ul ) (l-cjll)} 
( l-ul ) 
ulQ1K
l 
min{~rmcjllQ1Kl,lOOO}16. 
Clearly, provided the individual has some mortgage debt in 
his house (cjll>O), the owner-occupier subsidy is larger in 
the second case. 
The unit subsidy implied by New Zealand tax legis-
lation can be compared with the subsidies implied by 
Australian and Canadian legislation. The unit subsidy in 
(2-2-26) is less than the unit subsidy under Australian tax 
legislation because landlords are permitted depreciation 
allowances in New Zealand, but not in Australia. The 
subsidy is larger under Canadian legislation only if 
126 
Al>O; i.e., only if some capital gains are realised as 
they accrue. Care- should be taken in interpreting these 
comparisons: A larger owner-occupier subsidy under Austra~ 
lian (or Canadian) tax legislation does not mean that 
owner-occupiers would benefit from a move from New Zealand 
to Australian tax legislation, since the unit user cost 
of owner-occupancy is the same in both cases (and, also, 
in the Canadian case) .17. The unit subsidy in (2-2-27) 
might be larger than under Australian and Canadian tax 
legislations. With respect to Australian legislation, this 
requires 
while, with respect to Canadian legislation, this requires 
According to the hypothetical data employed in Table 
2-2-1, the unit subsidy in (2-2-27) is greater than under 
Australian legislation only if u l <.294, and it is greater 
/\ 
than under Canadian legislation only if u l <1/[S.S-30(rc -O l )]. 
These relationships are illustrated in Table 2-2-1. In 
that Table, the unit subsidy used for New Zealand is that 
presented in (2-2-27). 
To test the implications of New Zealand tax legis-
lation for vertical equity, differentiate (2-2-26), 
(2-2-27), with respect to ul ' to obtain 
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A 
(2-2-28) Gl > A -q {r (I-</> )~ }= 0 as ra-(GI-G) 1 c 1 (1-u)2 < 
1 
> r {l-(l-u )2{1_~ } 16. 
< c 1 ~l ' 
in both cases. It is interesting that the degree of dis-
crimination among individual owner-occupiers with. different 
marginal tax rates is unaffected by the recent policy 
initiative designed to encourage low-income earners to 
become owner-occup rs. The reason is that the policy 
does not discriminate among individuals of different 
incomes: Every individual who qualifies for the tax 
rebate receives the same additional unit subsidy, regard-
less of his income. 
(d) united Kingdom 
Imputed rent on owner-occupied housing has not been 
taxed since 1963. sed capital gains are taxed at 
a rate of 30 percent of the value of those gains, but 
owner-occupiers are exempt from capital gains tax liability 
on the disposal of their only or main residence (or of a 
residence provided r a dependent relative). There are 
also generous "roll-over" provisions on transactions in 
business assets, which effectively postpone liability for 
capital gains tax whilever all of the realised gains are 
used to purchase property for a similar purpose. Landlords 
are permitted to deduct costs repairs, maintenance, 
casualty insurance premiums, rates and local property taxes. 
There are no depreciation allowances on residential 
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property, but mortgage interest payments are tax deductible 
(up to a ceiling of £25,000), regardless of whether the 
owner is landlord or owner-occupier. 
The most remarkable feature of the United Kingdom 
housing market is the importance of local authority housing, 
however. At the end of 1977, 56% of dwellings were owner-
occupied, 31% rented from local authorities, and only 13% 
were rented privately. In terms of capital value, approxi-
mately 38% of the total housing stock value of f153.9 
billion was invested in local authority housing at the end 
of 1978 (King and Atkinson (1980, p.9)). 
King and Atkinson (1980) estimate a net rate of 
return on local authority housing of 2.09% in 1978. The 
estimate assumes management costs of 0.2 percent of the 
value of housing stock, repairs and maintenance of 0.3 
percent of stock, depreciation of 1.27 percent of stock, 
and a real rate of capital gain of 1 percent per annum. 
Following King and Atkinson, this might be interpreted as 
the "target ll rate of return on local authority housing. 
Comparing this rate of return with rates of return earned 
elsewhere in the economy indicates the extent to which 
local authority housing is subsidized. This "target" rate 
of return might be expressed algebraically as 
where: 1. The subscript "4" denotes local authority 
housing. 
2. r 4 is the "target
ll interest rate on equity in 
local authority housing. 
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The relationship between local authority rentals 
and the target rate of return is, from (2-1-30) 
(2-2-29) 
+( 4U4)t4+(1-~4U4)o4-(1-~4A4U4)84}+R4 
(1-a4u 4 ) 
The target rate of return can be expre as 
(2-2-30) r -(r -r ) 
c c 4 
where: (r
c
-r4 ) is the difference between the social rate 
of opportunity cost and the target rate of 
return earned on capital employed in local 
authority housing. 
The social return to an investment of (1-~4)q4K4 dollars 
of society's resources in local authority housing is 
(2-2-31) 
The opportunity cost of these resources, for society as a 
whole, is 
(2-2-32) 
There is a subsidy to local authority housing of: 
(2-2-33) 
This subsidy is in addition to any preferential tax 
treatment given local authority housing. 
(2-2-30) in (2-2-29) reveals 
(2-2-34) PK4=q4{rc(1-~4)+(1-S4u4)rm~4+(1 4u 4}m4 + 
€4u4)t4+(1-~4u4)o4-(1-64A4u4)04} 
-R -q {(r -r ) (l-~ )} 4 4 c 4 4 
It is not obvious how the user cost of local 
authority housing should be interpreted. The problem 
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arises because of the conceptual difficulty in distinguish-
ing between the local authority (or authorities) and their 
employer, the Government. The attitude adopted here is 
to view the target rate of return on local authority 
housing as a Government decision. Any difference between 
rates of return obtainable elsewhere, and this target rate 
of return is an explicit subsidy to local authority 
housing (effectively, tax payers foot the bill). Hence, 
the rental price charged local authority tenants (p* ) is 
K4 
the actual user cost (from the local authority's point of 
view) of one unit of housing capital, gross of all taxes 
(if any) and subsidies, including the subsidy arising from 
an artificially low target rate of return. 
Under present tax law in the United Kingdom, u 4=R4=0. 
The individual here is the Government. Hence, from (2-2-34), 
(2-2-35 ) 
where t 4=O, of course. 
The user costs of owner-occupied, and rented, housing, 
under present United Kingdom tax law are: 
For owner-occupied housing: 
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(2-2-36 ) 
which differs from the unit user costs for owner-occupiers 
under Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand tax law, by 
including a tax deduction for mortgage interest. For land-
lords 
(2-2-37) 
The subsidy to owner-occupied housing under United Kingdom 
tax legislation is 
(2-2-38) 
Since capital markets are assumed perfectly competitive, 
r =r. Hence, the unit subsidy is 
c m 
(2-2-39) 
In addition, there is a subsidy to local authority 
housing. This subsidy is defined here as the difference 
between user costs if the target rate of interest on local 
authority housing were set equal to the soc 1 rate of 
opportunity cost (i.e., r4=rc) and local authority rentals 
were taxed as private rentals are presently taxed, and 
user costs under present law. This unit subsidy (denoted 
S (A)) is 
(2-2-40) 
This subsidy is positive (respectively, zero, negative) as 
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(2-2-41) > 1 
< (I-<p 4) 
where it is assumed that <P4<1. Clearly, it is possible 
that local authority housing is subsidized relative to 
,private rental housing even if the target rate of return 
on local authority housing equals the social rate of oppor-
tunity cost. This is because of the differential tax 
treatment of private, and local authority,rented housing. 
The sign of the owner-occupier subsidy depends upon 
the relationship between Al and ul : 
If Al <3'3ul , (l-Ul)Ul 16. 
If Al= 3· 3ul , 
S ;; 0 as u l 
> O. 
If AI> 3. , 
S 
> 
< 
0 as 
A ~ 
r -(8 -8) o 1 
< 
> 
° -
r { 
c 
} - =----=:.=-::--(u l -· 3 Al ) (Ul _ O 3 Al )· 
. (l-ul ) u l °lul 
r {l- } 
c (u _o3A ) (u -'3 1) 1 1 1 
A comparison of the unit subsidy in (2-2-32) with those 
16. 
derived for other countries, reveals that the owner-occupier 
subsidy under united Kingdom legislation is always larger 
than under Australian legislation, and is larger than under 
Canadian legislation if 
The United Kingdom subsidy is larger than the first of the 
New Zealand subsidies derived above, and is larger than 
the second of the New Zealand subsidies if 
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There are two reasons why the United Kingdom subsidy might 
usually be larger than the owner-occupier subsidies in the 
other countries so far: The first is the taxation of 
capital gains realised by landlords (but not owner-occupiers) i 
and the second is the tax deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments for owner-occupiers_ 
Differentiation of (2-2-32), with respect to u l ' 
reveals: 
(2-2-42) 
> 
r { 
< C 
° -8 (1--3A ) 1 1 1 } > 
(l-ul ) < (l-u )2 0 
1 }_ 1 (-::-1--.---::3:'-::-A-l ) (1- - 3 AI) 
The computations for the United Kingdom case, appearing in 
Table 2-2-1, assume that Al~li i.e., all capital gains 
are realised as' they accrue. But as (2-2-32) reveals: 
(2-2-43) as 
1 
> A'> 
o as 8 1 O. 
Hence, the assumption of Al=l tends to overstate the 
actual size of the owner-occupier subsidy. As has already 
been seen, the same is true under Canadian tax legislation. 
With Al=l, the critical real interest rate is: 
for - ~ -3 -=r {Ul --3-(1-ul )ul }-olUl A -u l r ,r c +(8 -8) 
u l -
e 3 1 
The significance of this critical real interest rate is: 
(i) 
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(ii) > > If .3<ul <l, S < 0 as rO < r. 
(iii) 
The critical real interest rate, for different values of 
u l ' is presented in Table 2-2-1. 
(2-2-32) can be written, in terms of the real interest 
rate, as: 
(2-2-44) 
from which, 
(2-2-45 ) as 3ro 
> 0 as u ~ .3A l • < 1 < 
(2-2-45) is interesting. For every other country considered 
above, this partial derivative is unambiguously positive: 
In each of those countries, the subsidy to owner-occupied 
housing increases with increases in the real rate of 
interest. But under United Kingdom legislation, the same 
is true only if u l >o3A l . In Table 2-2-1 it has been assumed 
that all capital gains are realised as they accrue. Under 
this assumption, the owner-occupier subsidy increases with 
increases in the real rate of interest only for individuals 
with a marginal tax rate in excess of 30 percent, the 
statutory tax rate on realised capital gains. 
Without exception, the United Kingdom subsidies 
computed in Table 2-2-1 exceed those computed for Australia, 
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Canada, and New Zealand. The degree of vertical inequity 
associated with the subsidy is also larger under United 
Kingdom legislation than under legislation operating in 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 
The analysis presented here also permits an examina-
tion of the relative treatments of owner-occupiers and 
1 1 h · 18. oca aut orlty tenants. 
ml =m4 . Then a comparison of (2-2-35) and (2-2-36) reveals 
that the cost of housing is greater to an owner-occupier 
than to a local authority tenant if 
(2-2-46) A A 19 (l-u ){r (l-~ )+r ~ }+t -8 >r (l-~ )-8 . 1 c 1 m 1 114 4 4 
The right-hand side of (2-2-46) is the target rate of 
return to local authority housing, excluding capital gains. 
It is not clear that the left-hand-side exceeds this target 
rate of return, under all circumstances. The relative cost 
of owner-occupied housing depends upon the individual 
marginal tax rate, the share of equity in housing, the 
mortgage and opportunity rates of interest, rates and local 
property taxes, and rates of capital gain on housing. Table 
2-2-2 illustrates this dependence on individual circumstance. 
The table shows the difference (1-ul){rc(1-~1)+rm~1}+tl-8l 
-{r4(1-~4)-84}' under the variety of different circumstances 
considered by King and Atkinson (1980, p.lO). From Table 
2 of King and Atkinson, a value of 
has been selected. A mortgage interest rate of 12 percent, 
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TABLE 2-2-2: The User Costs of Owner-Occupation Versus 
the Costs of Local Authority Tenure; Some 
Illustrative Calculations of Differences in 
Rates of User Cost. United Kingdom. 
Debt and 
Interest 
fA: <Pl = .8 
= .09 r 
c 
.12 
.15 
B: <Pl = 
Ir = .09 
I c .12 
.15 
Source: 
Other 
Data: 
. 2 
(Percent per annum) 1. 
Marginal Tax Rate of Owner-Occupier (ul ) 
.25 .30 .40 .50 .60 
.001 -.0047 -.0161 -.0275 -.0389 
.0055 -.0005 -.0125 -.0245 -.0365 
.01 .0037 -.0089 -.0215 -.0341 
-.0125 -.0173 -.0269 -.0365 -.0461 
.0055 -.0005 -.0125 -.0245 -.0365 
.0235 .0163 .0019 -.0125 -.0269 
Variety of circumstances is from King and Atkin-
son (1980, p.10), excluding cases where the 
value of mortgage exceeds £25,000 ceiling for 
mortgage interest deductibility. 
A A 
tl = .01; rm = .12; 8 1 = .08; r 4 (1-<P 4)-8 4 = .0145. 
1. A positive figure indicates that owner-occupiers face 
larger costs than local authority tenants. The figure 
is the difference in the (percentage) rates of user 
cost. 
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and an annual rate of increase of house prices of 8 percent, 
have been assumed throughout. In addition, a property tax 
rate of 1 percent has been used. 
According to the housing circumstances illustrated 
in Table 2-2-2, owner-occupiers in the United Kingdom 
typically face smaller housing costs than do local authority 
tenants. Only for high rates of opportunity cost, and low 
marginal tax rates, do owner-occupiers pay more than local 
authority tenants. Of course, provided r ~r , the relative 
c m 
position of owner-occupiers depends upon mortgage debt, 
but the dependence is not significant: For owner-occupiers 
with marginal tax rates of 30 percent or more, local 
authority housing cheaper only if the rate of oppor-
tunity cost is percent, and it is never cheaper for 
owner-occupiers with marginal tax rates of 50 percent or 
more. 
(e) United States of America 
According to United States tax gislation effective 
as at November, 1978, imputed rentals on owner-occupied 
housing are not taxed. The tax law distinguishes between 
"short-term" capital gains (accruing on property held for 
less than twelve months), and "long-term" capital gains. 
"Short-term" realised capital gains are taxed at the 
normal income tax rate. There are two methods used to 
calculate tax liability on "long-term" realised capital 
gains. Under the first method, one-half of the realised 
capital gains are added to the individual's other income, 
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and the sum is taxed at the normal rates of tax. According 
to the second method (referred to as the "alternative tax"), 
special rates of tax apply: If the "long-term" capital 
gain is less than $50,000 it is taxed at a rate of 25 per-
cent; if the gain exceeds $50,000, the first $50,000 is 
taxed at a rate of 25 percent, and tax on anything over that 
is calculated as the difference between ordinary tax on 
other income plus half the capital gains, and ordinary tax 
on other income plus $25,000. The individual is permitted 
to choose the method which minimizes his total tax liability. 
As in the United Kingdom, individuals can escape 
the taxation of capital gains 20 . by reinvesting those gains 
in similar assets. 
Property taxes and mortgage-interest payments are 
tax deductible for both landlords and owner-occupiers. But 
depreciation allowances only apply to property held for 
the purpose of generating actual income, as (of course) do 
deductions for the costs of repairs, maintenance, and 
casualty insurance premiums. 
Supposing that an individual is taxed on long-term 
capital gains according to the first method: 2l . 
(2-2-47) Cl=ql{(l-ul)rc(l-~l)+(l-ul)rm~l+(l-ul)tl+ml 
+8l-(1-~ul)A181} 
(2-2-48) 
The unit subsidy on owner-occupied housing under 
united States tax law is: 
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(2-2-49) 
Given perfectly competitive capital markets, this subsidy 
is 
(2-2-50) 
> rc[Al (l-~Ul) - (l-ul )] -tl (l-ul ) . 
< Al(l-~ul) 
If capital gains are ignored, (2-2-50) is the unit subsidy 
employed in Laidler's (1969) study.22. Examination of 
(2-2-50) reveals: 
(2-2-51) > o . 
This result is in marked contrast to the corresponding 
results obtained for Canada and the United Kingdom, which 
also tax (some) capital gains. The opposite sign in 
this case arises because of the taxation of capital gains 
on owner-occupied housing. Since the value of 1..1 is 
subject to choice, there is (ceteris paribus) less 
tive for owner-occup to realise capital gains under 
United States tax legislation than under Australian, 
Canadian, New Zealand, or United Kingdom legislation. 
This point is returned to in Section 2.3. 
To test for ca1 inequity, differentiate 
(2-2-51), with respect to u1' to obtain: 
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(2-2-52) 
The subsidy under United States legislation 
larger than the subsidy under United Kingdom legislation 
if 
where it has been assumed (for simplicit0 that the indivi-
dual realises the same percentage of accrued capital gains 
under both tax systems. The differences between the 
United States and United Kingdom subsidies arise because 
of: The tax deductibility of rates and local property 
taxes for both owner-occupiers and landlords under United 
States legi ation, and for landlords only, under United 
Kingdom legislation; depreciation allowances for rented 
property under United States, but not United Kingdom, 
legislation; and the taxation of cap gains ised 
by both landlords and owner-occupiers under United States 
legislation, but by landlords only, under United Kingdom 
legislation. 
Some illustrative calculations for the United States 
case are presented in Table 2 2-1. It has been assumed 
that Al=l. As (2-2-51) reveals, this understates actual 
subsidies in the United States. In addition it is assumed 
that rates and local property taxes are l.5 percent of house 
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value (i.e., tl =·0 .)23. The subsidies computed under 
united States tax legislation are smaller than the sub-
sidies computed under united Kingdom tax legislation, 
but are larger than the subsidies computed for other 
countries (except for the cases r = ·15 and ul = ·6 or °7, 
in which case, subsidies are larger under Australian legis~ 
lation). The vertical inequity associated with the owner-
occupier subsidy in the United States is much the same as 
in Australia. 
(f) West Germany 
According to current West German tax legislation, 
imputed rentals on owner-occupied housing are subject to 
income tax. The assessment of income tax liability depends 
upon whether the residence is occupied exclusively by the 
owner, or the owner occupies one apartment only. 11 Lettinglt 
an apartment free of charge is viewed as owner-occupied 
use, and is taxable. If the owner occupies one apartment 
or flat, which 1S only a part of the housing owned, the 
imputed rental is set equal to average rental for an apart-
ment of comparable type, location, and fittings. All 
expenses (including mortgage interest payments, real estate 
tax, wealth tax, repairs and maintenance, depreciation) are 
deductible in assessing net taxable income. For one-family 
houses, or ownership apartments, the imputed monthly rental 
is fixed at one percent house value, assessed by the 
Department of Finance. No further deductions for maintenance, 
depreciation, and so on, are allowed, except mortgage 
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st up to the amount of the imputed rental. 
There is no capital gains tax on personal or 
private wealth held for more than two years. In other 
cases, the capital gains are taxed as part of all other 
income. All real estate is subject to real estate tax. 
In addition, there is a wealth tax which strikes real 
estate as part of private net wealth. 
Ignoring the wealth tax, the West German tax provi-
sions imply 
(2-2-53) 
where been assumed that residential property is 
held for more than two years, and that rental property 
forms part of the landlord's private net wealth. If the 
representative owner-occupier occupies a one-family 
dence, the annual user cost is 
(2-2-54) Cl 
If the representative owner-occupier occupies one apartment 
only in a multi-apartment dwelling, tax liability is 
(2-2-55) IT l (2) = u l {PK2-
q l (rm~l+ml+tl+ol)} 
= ulql{rc{1-~1)-8l/{1-u2)}' 
on assuming rm = rc' ql = Q2' ml = m2 , tl = t 2 , 01 = °2 , 
and 81 ~2. (2-2-55) in the place of ITl{l) in (2-2 4) 
reveals that in this second case, 
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(2-2-56) 
In the first case, the subsidy to owner-occupied 
housing is (assuming rm~l < .12) 
(2-2-57) S (1) 
The critical real interest rate is 
Testing for vertical inequity reveals: 
(2-2-58) dS(l) 
dUI 
} > 0 as r -(8 -8) 
< 0 1 
A _ 
8 u 
; .12+ 1 =-- 2 (l-u l ) 
In the second case, the subsidy to owner-occupied 
housing is 
(2-2-59) S (2) 
To test for vertical inequity, note that 
< 
o as u l > 
Table 2-2-1 presents illustrative calculations of 
the size of the owner-occupier subsidy under West German 
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tax legislation, assuming that the representative owner-
occupier occupies a single-family dwelling. At any real 
rate of interest less than 12 percent, the subsidy is 
negative. It is clear that West German tax legislation 
implies smaller subsidies to owner-occupied housing than 
legislation in any of the five other Western countries 
considered in this Chapter. 
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2.3 COMPARATIVE PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM STATICS OF HOUSING 
POLICY AND "USER COSTS" 
This Section examines the implications of changes 
. 
in tax policy instruments for the user costs of housing, 
both owner-occupied and rented,24. and for the subsidy to 
owner-occupied housing. In keeping with the partial 
equilibrium nature of the analysis, it is assumed that 
the gross rate of opportunity cost on equity is exogenous. 
Section 2.2 identified nine tax policy instruments in the 
user cost expression derived in Section 2.1. These 
instruments are: u., the individual tax rate; a., the 
1 1 
proportion of gross rental income subject to tax at the 
rate u.; S., the proportion of interest payments on debt 
1 1 
which are tax deductible; y., the proportion of the costs 
1 
of repairs, maintenance, casualty insurance premiums, 
which are tax deductible; E., the proportion of rates and 
1 
local property taxes which are (income-) tax deductible; 
s., the proportion of the economic value of depreciation 
1 
which is tax deductible; 6., the proportion of realised 
1 
capital gains subject to income tax; t., rates and local 
1 
property taxes as a proportion of capital value; and R., 
1 
tax rebates on one unit of housing capital. 
governments have some direct control over r . 
m 
In addition, 
The following partial derivatives can be derived 
from (2-2~1). They show the responsiveness of the user 
cost of housing to changes in each of the tax policy instru-
ments, and in r
m
.
25
. 
(2-3-1) 
(2-3-2) 
(2-3-3) 
(2-3-4) 
(2-3-5) 
(2-3-6) 
(2-3-7) 
(2-3-8) 
(2-3-9) 
(2-3-10) 
(lC. 
1 
aa-:-
1 
= 
u. > 
C. ( . 1 ) 
1 l-a.u. < 
1 1 
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> o as Ci < o. 
(lC. . 
~ = q. { (a. -1) r (1- <p. )+ (ct. -13 .) r <p. + (a . -y . )m. + (a . - E. )t. 
aU. 1 1 C 1 1 1 m 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
A 
+(a.-s.)o.-(a.-~.A.)G }-a.R. 
111 111 1 1 1 
(l-a.u.)2 
1 1 
(lC. u. < > 1 
-q . r <p. (1 1 ) as:- = = 0 as <p. = o. 1 m 1 -a.u. 1 
1 1 1 
(lC. u. 
< > 1 
-q. m. (1 1 ) F. = = 0 as m. = o . 1 1 -a.u. 1 1 1 1 
(lC. u. 
< > 1 
-q. t. (1 1 ) = 0 as t. = o . ~ 1 1 -a.u. 1 
1 1 1 
(lC. u. 
< > 1 
-q.o . (1 1 ) ~ = = 0 as o. = o . 1 1 -a.u. 1 
1 1 1 
(lC. A U. > > 1 1 
~ = q.A.G·(l ) = 0 as A.G. = o . 1 1 1 -a.u. 1 1 
1 1 1 
(lC. (l-u.E.) 
1 
= 
1 1 > O. ~ qi (I-a. u. ) 
1 1 1 
(lC. 1 1 > O. (lR. = (I-a. u. ) 
1 1 1 
(lC. q. <p • (l-u. S . ) > > 1 
= 
1 1 1 1 
= 0 as <p. = o . ar (I-a. u. ) 1 
m 1 1 
(2-3-3) through (2-3-10) have obvious interpreta-
tions. (2-3-1) simply says that taxing gross renta1s 
increases positive user costs, and reduces negative user 
costs. (2-3-2) is of especial interest: The sign of 
(lC./(lu. is ambiguous. However, consider the following 
1 1 
'.:; . 
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important case: Suppose that all gross rentals are subject 
to taxation at the rate u., but that costs of mortgage 
1 
interest, repairs, maintenance, and casualty insurance 
premiums, rates and local property taxes, are fully tax 
deductible. In addition, suppose that capital gains 
are taxed on an accruals basis, and that there are no tax 
rebates. Together, these assumptions implya.=S.=Y.=E. 
1 111 
=A 6. =1 R =0 i i 'i . (2-3-2) is 
(2-3-11) 
3C. (l-s.) 
1 1 
-" - = q. Cl . (-1 -) 2 
o u. 1 1 -u. 
1 1 
If there is full tax deductibility of economic depreciation, 
so that s.=l, then 3C./Clu.=Oj i.e., the rate of "user cost" 
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is insensitive to changes in the tax rate. If deprecia-
tion provisions for taxation purposes are even more 
generous, so that s.>l, then 3C./3u. is clearly negative. 
111 
Results like these were first discovered by Samuelson 
(1964). Since then, similar results have appeared in a 
number of places, including Hall and Jorgenson (1969). 
There is an enormous literature which is concerned 
with the proper sign to attach to 3C./3u. in the case of 
1 1 
the United States corporate income tax. Leading contribu~ 
tions to the debate include Hall and Jorgenson (1967), 
(1969), (1971), Coen (1968), (1975), Eisner and Nadiri 
(1968), Eisner (1969), (1970), (1973). All of these papers 
are partial equilibrium analyses. Not surprisingly, then, 
the most contentious issue in this literature relates to 
the extent to which the net rate of return on corporate 
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capital is affected by changes in the corporate tax rate. 
This issues is equivalent to the question of the shifting 
of the corporation income tax. Each of these issues is 
examined in Chapter 3, where it is argued that these sorts 
of questions can only properly be analysed in general 
equilibrium models. In the present analysis, these issues 
are ignored by the assumption that r is independent of u .. 
c 1 
This permits the partial derivative, aC./au., to be 
·11 
evaluated for each of the six Western countries examined 
earlier. In the case of Australia: 
aCl 
-q r (l-~ ) < 0 < 1 = as 91 = u l 1 c 1 
A 
aC2 q2(02-0 2) > > A 
aU2 2 
0 as 
°2 ° (1-u2 ) 
< < 2 
Hence, under Australian tax legislation, the treatment of 
owner-occupied housing favours those on higher marginal 
tax rates (higher incomes) relative to those on lower 
marginal tax rates. i.e., the taxation of owner-occupied 
housing reduces the progressivity of the individual income 
,tax. The condition on rented housing is interesting. 
Capital gains are essentially tax free, and depreciation 
allowances are not tax deductible. Richer landlords face 
smaller investment costs if the expected rate of capital 
gain on housing exceeds the rate of economic depreciation. 
In the case of Canada: 
aC l 
-q r (l-~ ) < 0 ~l < 1. as u l 1 c 1 
A 
aC2 -~A2q202 < 0 A20 2 
> O. = as aU2 2 (1-u2 ) 
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The condition on owner-occupied housing is the same as 
under Australian tax legislation. The condition on rented 
housing arises because one-half of capital gains are tax 
free. It is interesting that the Canadian tax treatment 
of landlords (which taxes one-half of capital gains but 
allows depreciation as a tax deduction) might actually 
produce a greater degree of vertical inequity than the 
Australian tax treatment (which does not tax capital gains, 
but which does not permit deductions for depreciation, 
either). A comparison of the ac2/au2 expressions obtained 
for Australia and Canada reveals that what is required is 
" O2 > e 2 (1-:1,;2 1\2) • 
In the case of New Zealand: 
(1 ) < 0 < 1,26. 
-<PI = as <PI 
which is the same as for Australia and Canada; and 
" aC 2 -q e < A > 2 2 
= = 0 as e = o. dU2 (1-u2 ) 
2 
Again, the condition on rented housing arises because 
of the failure to tax capital gains. 
In the case of the United Kingdom: 
= aU2 
q {o -{1-·3A )8 } 2 2 22> 
< 
o as O2 
Hence, United Kingdom tax legislation favours owner-occupiers 
on higher incomes over those on lower incomes; wh the 
same is true for landlords only if the rate of economic 
depreciation on rented housing is less than (100-30A2 ) 
percent of the expected rate of capital gain. 
In the case of the United States of America: 
A 
-ql{rc(l-~l)+rm~l+tl-~Alel} 
> Of 
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where it is assumed that realised capital gains are taxed 
as long-term gains under the first method described in 
Section 2.2. The condition on rented housing is the same 
as for Canada. In the case of owner-occupied housing, 
United States tax legislation favours those on higher 
incomes against lower income earners provided the sum of 
the mortgage and opportunity interest costs and local 
property taxes exceeds fifty percent of taxable capital 
gains. It is almost impossible to conceive of this not 
being the case. Indeed, the United States income tax 
encourages owner-occupiers never to realise capital gains, 
and so to avoid paying capital gains taxes indefinitely. 
When there is a high rate of inflation, and owner-occupiers 
are enjoying high rates of capital gain on their housing, 
there is an incentive to borrow against the value of 
those capital gains at a cost of (l-ul)rmdql per year,27. 
and to consume the value of the gains, rather than to 
realise the capital gains and so pay ~uldql in capital 
gains tax. To appreciate the magnitude of this incentive, 
consider the investment alternatives open to an owner-
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occupier who finds that his house has increased in value 
by an amount dql' and is likely to continue to increase in 
A 
value at a rate of 01 per annum. The individual could 
realise the capital gains, paying ~uldql in capital gains 
taxes, and invest the remainder, (l-~ul)dql' in an 
alternative investment for an annual net return of 
(l-ul)rc(l-~ul)dql' Alternatively, the individual could 
choose not to realise the capital gains, but instead, to 
borrow against them at a cost of (l-ul)rmdql per annum; 
with the dql still invested in his house, he continues to 
A 
accrue capital gains of 01dql on that sum, and he earns 
an after-tax return of (l-ul)r dql by investing the sum 
• c 
that he has borrowed in an alternative investment. In 
this second case, the annual net return on the capital 
A 
gains (dql) is (1-~ul)01dql+(1-ul)dql{rc-rm}' if the 
A 
individual realises capital gains of 01dql at the end of 
the first year. If r =r (which is realistic) the indi-
c m 
vidual earns a higher net return in the second case if 
(1-~ul)e1dql>(1-ul)rc(1-~ul)dqli i.e., if 81>(1-ul )rC ' 
But if this condition holds, then the individual would 
do even better to borrow against the additional capital 
gains 81dql and realise capital gains of (81+812)dql at 
the end of the second year; or even better, to borrow 
A A 2 
against the capital gains (01+01 )dql as well, and 
A A 2 A 3 
realise capital gains of (01+ 01 +01 )dql at the end of 
the third year; and so on. Hence, the individual earns a 
higher net return by never realising capital gains, but 
by continually borrowing against them as they accrue. 
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It is easy to see that if the government provides mortgage 
finance at subsidized rates of interest, r <r , the incen-
m c 
tives to never realise capital gains are even larger. 
In the case of West Germany: 
aC l 
.12-r > 0 .12 > = as = r u l c < < C 
A 
aC 2 -8 2q2 < A > 
aU2 
:: = 0 as 8 O. 2 2 (1-u2 ) 
The condition on owner-occupied housing applies to owner-
occupiers of single-family dwellings. The present tax 
treatment of this class of owner-occupiers discriminates 
against low income earners only if the nominal rate of 
interest exceeds 12 percent per annum. If the rate of 
interest is equal to 12 percent per annum, there is no 
vertical inequity associated with present tax law. The 
condition on rented housing is similar to those derived 
for other countr s. For an occupier of one apartment of 
a multi-apartment dwelling, owned by the occupier: 
This is similar to the condition for landlords, which is 
not surprising. 
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In each of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United states of America, the 
taxation of owner-occupied housing reduces the user costs 
of home ownership for high income owner-occupiers relative 
to low income owner-occupiers. It is interesting that 
housing policies designed to encourage home ownership 
should have this effect. 28 . 
This Section has explored the implications of tax 
policy disturbances for the user costs of home ownership 
for individual investors. The remainder of this Section 
employs the user cost concept in a diagrammatic exposition 
of the various partial equilibrium models of housing policy. 
In these analyses, the endogenous component of user costs 
is q., the price of housing stock. 
1 
In view of this, it is 
convenient to define the "rate of user cost" (denoted c.): 
1 
c. _ 
C. 
1 
1 q. 
1 
An examination of (2-2-l) reveals that this "rate of user 
cost" is composed only of exogenous variables and govern-
ment policy instruments (provided R. is ignored): 
1 
In the 
present analyses, c. changes in response to changes in tax 
1 
policy instruments, only. 
In Section 2.1, which derived the expression for 
the user cost of housing capital, it was noted that, with 
respect to the individual decision-making of an individual 
landlord, the optimal stock of housing is indeterminate. 
Since the aggregate demand curves for owner-occupied and 
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rented housing services can (realistically) be assumed to 
be downward sloping, however, industry output for both 
owner-occupied and rented housing is determinate. At 
the industry level, P~(s) is endogenous. The aggregate 
investment demand curves for rented and owner-occupied 
housing stock are derived from the aggregate consumption 
demand curves for housing services. The aggregate invest-
ment demand for rented housing is negatively related to 
the "user cost" of rented housing facing a representative 
landlord: Beginning from an initial position satisfying 
the optima1ity condition (2-1-29) for the representative 
individual, a reduction in the unit user cost of rented 
housing encourages each landlord to accumulate additional 
units of housing (at an infinitely rapid rate) i the larger 
stock of housing made available for renting will be 
accepted by renters only if the gross rental price PK(s) 
falls. Eventually, PK(s) falls to equality with the new 
unit user cost. But when this happens, landlords will 
cease to increase their stocks of housing. The aggregate 
investment demand for owner-occupied housing is negatively 
related to the user costs of owner-occupied housing for the 
same reason. 
In the case of owner-occupied housing, the aggregate 
investment demand curve shows the quantity of (number of 
units of) housing stock owner-occupiers are willing to 
invest in, given different unit rates of "user costll; 
equivalently, it shows the maximum annual cost owner-
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occupiers are willing to pay for different quantit of 
housing held as an investment. The aggregate investment 
demand curve for rented housing has a similar interpreta-
tion. 
The issue oj the vertical inequity associated with 
housing policy has already been examined. 29 • The present 
partial equilibrium analysis extends the previous dis-
cussion of horizont inequity in housing policy, and 
examines the other issues in housing policy; specifically, 
the incidence and efficiency aspects of the taxation of 
housing. 
According to the definition employed in Section 2.2, 
there is no subsidy to owner-occupied housing if owner-
occupiers are taxed in the same way as landlords. The 
effect of the introduction of a subsidy is to reduce the 
user cost associated with investment in any particular 
stock of owner-occupied housing, at least initia11y.30. 
Hence, for the representative owner-occupier, the user 
costs of investing in a house with a capital value of 
q1 is not C2 (1)=c 2 {1)ql (as it would be if there were no 
subsidy, but is C1=c l q l' The "rate of subsidy" (denoted 
s) might be defined to be the unit subsidy, S, expressed 
as a percentage of unit user costs before the subsidy: 
s ~ S/C2 (1) ~ S/c 2 (1)ql' 
The comparative static implications of the subsidy 
depend upon the assumptions made with respect to the supply 
of housing. Laidler (1969) and Reece (1975) assume that 
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owner-occupied housing is supplied perfectly elastically. 
Figure 2-3-l(a) illustrates the impact of the owner-occupier 
subsidy in this case. Before the subsidy, the aggregate 
investment demand curve of owner-occupiers for housing is 
DODO. Housing is supplied perfectly elastically at an 
The effect of the subsidy is 
to increase effective (seller-perceived) demand: Owner-
occupiers are prepared to pay more for each unit of 
housing since some of what they pay is reimbursed by 
the government. The extra amount owner-occupiers are pre-
pared to pay is the amount of the unit subsidy (S). The 
new effective demand curve is DODO' The vertical distance 
between DODO and DODO is S. The effect of the subsidy is 
to cause the stock owner-occupied housing to increase 
o 1 from Kl to Kl" The stock price of housing is unaffected. 
The area abed in Figure 2-3-l(a) shows the reduction in 
the annual costs of owner-occupation of the in al 
housing stock. The deadweight loss associated with the 
subsidy is bcf. This is the difference between the cost 
of the subsidy to the government, acfd, and the benefits 
received by owner-occupiers, abed + bfe. 
An alternative supply assumption is that the stock 
of owner-occupied housing is fixed total supply. This 
case is illustrated in Figure 2-3-l(b). The effect of 
o the subsidy is to cause house prices to rise from ql to 
1 q2' with no change in annual user costs. i.e., the whole 
of the subsidy capitalised in housing stock values. 
There is no deadweight efficiency loss. 
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FIGURE 2-3-1: 
(a) Perfectly Elastic Supply: 
s 
(b) Perfectly Inelastic Supply: 
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Each of the extreme cases illustrated in Figure 2-3-1 
is an unrealistic description of actual adjustments. They 
can be interpreted as showing the beginning and end points 
of a more complex adjustment process. Hhite and White 
(1977) suppose that housing is perfectly substitutable 
between uses, and they allow the supply schedule for 
housing to have any positive elasticity. Their analysis 
views housing demand as a consumption decision. The 
investment mot is preferred here. The comparative 
static results are the same, but the investment analysis, 
because of the key role played by the user cost of cap 
indicates which of the components of the Itprice of owner-
occupied housing,,31. are affected as a "direct" consequence 
of a change in government policy, and which change subse-
quently as market forces respond to those direct impacts. 
The present analysis, illustrated in Figure 2-3-2, examines 
the simplest case of a perfectly inelastic total supply 
f h . 32. o ouslng. 
In Figure 2-3-2, D2D2 is the landlord's demand 
curve. Be 
housing are 
occupiers ( 
the subsidy, the annual unit user costs of 
o 0 
c 2q =c2 (1)q for both landlords and owner-
r =r , a set of s 
c m 
icient conditions for 
'" 82 , and u l =u2 . Since 
housing is perfectly substitutable between uses (=q) • ) 
When the subsidy is introduced, the stock of owner-
occupied housing increases by (K~-K~), and the stock of 
o 1 1 0 
rented housing falls by (K2-K2 )=-(Kl -Kl ). The annual 
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1 
user costs facing owner-occupiers are c 2q. Hence, owner-
occupiers pay smaller user costs for more housing, and 
landlords (and, hence, renters) pay larger "user costs" 
for s housing. The cost of the subsidy program to the 
government is (C2 (1)ql-clql)Ki. This is the area of the 
rectangle adjh. Following vfuite and White (1977) it is 
possible to identify areas of gain and loss for each of 
the agents in the market, and so to compute the deadweight 
e ciency loss associated with the subsidy. 
The whole of the area klon represents the addition 
to landlords' user costs on the units of housing K~. 
Under present assumptions this is all passed on to renters, 
with no overall loss in welfare. Owner-occupiers gain 
acih on units occupied before the subsidy (i.e., K~) i 
acfe is the increase in the annual implicit rental value 
of the housing occupied, and efih is the reduction in its 
annual cost. This gain to owner-occupiers sets off against 
an equal amount of subsidy. The remaining amount of 
1 0 the subsidy is the area cdji paid out on the (Kl-Kl ) 
-(K~-K~) units of housing transferred from rental use to 
owner occupancy. Landlords sell this amount of housing 
o 1 to owner-occupiers for an annualised price of lmK2K2 
1 0 
=cdK1K l . But the value of output produced by owner-
occupied housing increases by only fjKiK~, and the value 
o 1 
of output produced by rented housing falls by lpK2K2 • 
Hence, the deadweight loss associated with the transfer 
of housing between uses 
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D.W.L. 
= lpo+fgj=cgf+fgj 
This area has been shaded in Figure 2-3-2. 
The partial equilibrium analysis illustrated in 
Figure 2-3-2 indicates the qualitative impact of the 
owner-occupier subsidy, in terms of its implications for 
horizontal equity (the difference between housing costs 
of owner-occupiers and landlords), for house prices (this 
is the issue of incidence), and economic efficiency. A 
similar analysis could be performed for any of the tax 
policy disturbances considered earlier in this Section. 
White and White (1977) employ an analysis similar to that 
described here to try to quantify the efficiency cost of 
the owner-occupier subsidy in the United States of America. 
The ~mite and White (1977) analysis is superior 
to the Laidler (1969) analysis in many respects. It 
might be noted, however, that the White and villite paper 
does not present as important a contribution to public 
finance as the authors claim. White and White devote a 
significant portion of their paper to a statement that 
when government taxation policies have differential impacts 
on different agents in the same market, use of the market 
demand curve to calculate deadweight efficiency losses 
biases measures those losses downwards. The reason is 
that use the market demand curve ignores the losses 
associated with transfers among different classes of 
agents operating in the same market. To emphasise this 
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point, White and ~fuite consider the efficiency losses 
due to the owner-occupier subsidy when the supply curve 
for housing is perfectly inelastic (this is the case 
considered above, in Figure 2-3-2). As is well-known, 
in this case, use of the market demand curve to estimate 
the deadweight loss associated with the subsidy would 
produce an estimate of zero. In , ~fuite and White 
demonstrate (as was demonstrated in Figure 2-3-2) that 
the deadweight loss exceeds zero. There are at least 
two important points that should be made about this aspect 
of the White and White (1977) paper. The first is that it 
is not clear to what extent app1 welfare economists 
have made use of market demand curves to estimate welfare 
losses associated with tax po1ic s aimed at a particular 
class (only) of agents in the market. The second, and 
more important, point is that there is nothing new in 
what 1ifuite and White have said; it has all been said 
before. In fact, the White and White analysis of the 
owner-occupier subsidy when supply is perfectly inelastic 
describes a tax incidence problem which is formally iden-
tical to the problems of the incidence and efficiency 
aspects of the taxation of income from capital, considered 
by Harberger (1962), (1966). White and lfuite make no 
mention of the Harberger tax incidence analysis. Their 
diagrammatic analysis is essentially equivalent to the 
diagrammatic analysis presented in Harberger (1966), 
however. 
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~ The next Chapter presents a three-sector general 
equilibrium model of tax incidence to analyse the owner-
occupier subsidy. The model presented there generalizes 
each of the partial equilibrium cases considered in this 
Section; it also generalizes the two-sector general equili-
brium model of Harberger (1962), (1966). Chapter 4 
applies the general equilibrium model to obtain some 
numerical results for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
the united Kingdom, and the United States. That Chapter 
also explicitly relates the three-sector general equilibrium 
model to the Laidler (1969) model referred to above. The 
case for developing a three-sector general equilibrium 
model to explore the implications of the owner-occupier 
subsidy was argued in some detail in Chapter 1. 
164 
Footnotes to Chapter 2: 
1. See Aaron (1970), (1972), La~dler (1969), White and 
White (1977), Reece (1975), Kiefer (1978) f for 
instance. Kiefer (1978) develops a '''user cost" of 
capital approach as well, although his approach is 
significantly diffe~ent from that pursued here. 
Kiefer recognises that the production of housing 
services uses land and labour, together with housing 
capital. However, Kiefer discovers that the impli-
cations of housing policy are adequately analysed 
if only housing capital is used. The most significant 
difference between the Kiefer analysis and that 
developed here is related to the treatment of 
capital gains. This source of difference is examined 
in some detail in section 2.2. 
2. This is analogous to the environment of the corporate 
investor in the Jorgenson neoclassical investment 
literature: Jorgenson (1967), for instance. 
3. Defined below. 
4. A unit of housing might be thought of as a dwelling 
unit, or as one square foot of dwelling-space, or 
as one of an infinite variety of quantitative 
measures. 
5. There are no liquidity constraints. 
6. There are no transactions costs associated with the 
acquisition of debt. 
7. A tax "rebate" differs from a tax "deduction" in 
that a "rebate ll is a reduction in tax liability of 
the amount of the "rebate", whereas a "deduction" 
is a reduction in taxable income of the amount of 
the "deduction". 
8. This is the notation employed by Dorfman (1969). 
9. Pontryagin et. al. (1962). 
10. The Modigliani-Miller conclusion is examined again, 
below. 
11. Of course, there is no need to restrict this expression 
to housing capital. Interpreted more broadly, this 
measure of user cost is, in fact, a generalisation 
(to include debt, among other things) of the user 
cost of capital employed in the (Jorgenson) neoclassical 
theory of investment. 
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12. This might be illusory, of course: The landlord may 
actually have some market power. The essence of 
perfect competition is that the agent acts "as if" 
he has not market power. 
13. Time arguments are suppressed here and in what 
follows. The subscript "2" is introduced to dis-
tinguish rented housing from owner-occupied housing. 
Owner-occupied housing will be denoted by a sub-
script "1". These subscripts are employed through-
out this thesis. 
" 14. Henc~, e2=~ 2' . The same is assumed for owner-occupied 
hous~ng: 01=01' 
15. This is not how Laidler (1969) defines the subsidy, 
and the computation of the subsidy here llows quite 
a different procedure from that followed by Laidler. 
Nevertheless, the un subsidy actually derived 
here is identical to that which Laidler would compute, 
following his methodology. The Laidler (1969) 
procedure is examined in greater detail in Chapter 
4. 
16. These relations are defined only for Ul>O. 
17. Owner-occupiers will benefit from such a move, 
however, if housing stock prices (ql) fall as a 
result of the move. 
18. This is the subject of King and Atkinson's (1980) 
study. 
19. King and Atkinson (1980, p.10) obtain a similar con-
dition, but ignore the differential incidence of 
rates and property taxes on owner-occupiers and local 
authority tenants. 
20. In the United States case, these "roll-over" provi-
sions apply to all assets, not just producer durables. 
21. It is also assumed that depreciation allowances on 
rented housing reflect true economic depreciation. 
This might not be realistic, however. Under United 
States tax legislation, there are accelerated depre-
ciation (in excess of straight-line) for rented 
housing. Since the present formulation assumes 
that true economic depreciation is exponential, it 
might be that ~2=l, but there is no way of being 
sure of this. 
22. 
23. 
24 .. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
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This subsidy is examined in Chapter 4. 
This value is employed by Laidler (1969) 0 
Strictly, this analysis refers to the "representative" 
owner-occupier, and the IIrepresentative" landlord. 
Each of the partial derivatives specialises for 
owner-occupied and rented housing, in each of the 
countries considered in Section 2.3. 
This condition is the same, whether before the pro-
vision of the tax rebate on mortgage interest, or 
after. 
dq, is the value of capital gains accruing on one 
unit of housing. Mortgage interest payments are 
tax deductible, so that ulrmdql of interest payments 
are effectively paid by the government, leaving the 
individual rmdql-ulrmdql={l-ul)rmdql to pay. 
King and Atkinson (1980) examine the implications 
of this aspect of United Kingdom tax legislation. 
Section 2.2 
This is before the new equilibrium is established. 
This is the term employed by White and White (1977). 
They avoid a precise definition of this term. 
This makes it easier to relate this analysis to the 
general equilibrium analysis of Chapters 3 and 4, 
which contemplate a three-sector model with a fixed 
total supply of capital. In each case, the effi-
ciency losses due to the favourable tax treatment 
of owner-occupied housing are caused by distortions 
in the allocation of capital among uses. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STATIC THREE-SECTOR MODEL OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
In this chapter, a static three-sector, two factor 
general equilibrium model of tax incidence is developed. 
It is shown how this model might be applied to an examina~ 
tion of the incidence and efficiency aspects of the 
favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. 
Three sectors are identified: owner-occupied housing, 
rented housing, and "other industry". 
~fuile the three-sector model developed here has its 
origins in the simpler two-sector model of Harberger 
(1962), it embodies some important departures from that 
model. In particular, following the argument of Ballen-
tine and Er (1975), the model developed here explicitly 
introduces income effects into demand equations. Further, 
unlike the Harberger model, the present model is formulated 
in a manner which does not require that all initial (i.e., 
pre-disturbance) taxes are zero; it is not even necessary 
that the sturbance economy is characterised by 
1 1 " 1. neutra tax po lCles. 
The Harberger (1962) model has been reviewed 
extensively Shoven and Whalley (1972), Shoven (1976), 
McLure (1974), (1975), Ballentine and (1975) I and 
Mieszkowski (1967). McLure (1975) also appraises the 
various extensions to, modifications and applications of, 
the Harberger model since 1962. Shoven and Whalley (1972, 
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Appendix B) explicitly derive the equations which describe 
the Harberger model. These same equations have been 
presented in Mc Lure (1975) and Boskin (1975), and have 
been discussed in some detail in Mieszkowski (1976). 
There is, in consequence, no need to present the Harberger 
two-sector model here. In any case, the Harberger model 
is a special case of the more general three-sector model 
developed in Section 3.3, below. 
The Harberger model of tax incidence is a particular 
characterization of the standard static two-sector, two 
factor general equilibrium model developed or inally by 
J!1eade (1955) and Johnson (1956) for the study of inter-
national trade. The Harberger analysis is not the only 
characterization of this model to be employed in the 
examination of tax incidence questions, however. Other, 
related, analyses appear in Johnson (1966), Johnson and 
Mieszkowski (1970), Herberg, Kemp, and Magee (1971), Magee 
(1971), Jones (1971), among others. 
While the Harberger model is developed from the 
neoclassical two-sector, two factor model of general equili-
brium, the model of tax incidence derived in Section 3.3 
is a characterization of the three-sector, two factor 
general eqilibrium model implicit in parts of the analyses 
of Samuelson (1953, esp. p.7), Meade (1950) I Travis (1964, 
pp.140-43)\, and exploited in Melvin (1968). Traditionally, 
interest in the three-sector, two factor model of general 
equilibrium has been confined to the analysis of inter-
national trade. In this context, it has been shown (by 
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Melvin, in particular) that there is an indeterminacy in 
production when countries are permitted to trade. The 
reason for this result is that when the number of products 
exceeds the number of factors, the production possibility 
frontier, while convex, will necessarily contain flat 
planes and straight lines. Melvin (1968) has shown that 
in the particular case of three products and two factors, 
the production possibility frontier is a ruled surface, 
in the sense that it can be completely described by 
st ght lines; Kemp, Manning, Tawada, and Nishimura (1980) 
have generalised this result. There is no reason, however, 
why there should be any indeterminacy in production when 
the economy is closed to international trade: In general, 
we should still expect a unique equilibrium pattern of 
production in the closed economy case. 
The Harberger-type class of tax incidence models 
(to which the model developed in Section 3.3 belongs) is 
not the only class of such models. Shoven and Whalley 
(1972), (1973) present an algorithmic solution procedure 
for a general equilibrium model (due to Scarf (1973)), and 
use this procedure to explore the same questions addressed 
by Harberger (1962), (1966).2. 
Shoven and Whalley claim that the algorithmic 
approach is superior to the Harberger approach for four 
main reasons: 
(1) The algorithmic formulation requires none of the 
linearity assumptions employed by Harberger, and is 
therefore better suited to an analysis of taxes of 
finite size; 
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(2) the algorithmic formulation is not restrictive in the 
number of sectors or factors embodied in the model; 
(3) the algorithmic formulation permits the analysis of 
several distortions simultaneously; and 
(4) the algorithmic formulation lends itself to dynamic 
extensions. 
Balanced against these advantages is the fact that the 
algorithmic approach permits estimates of welfare loss to 
be identified within upper and lower bounds, only. The 
differences between the upper and lower bounds can be 
quite large. 3. In defence of the Harberger approach, it 
should be noted that although the particular model presented 
in Harberger (1962) is restrictive in both the number of 
sectors and the number of simultaneous distortions con-
sidered, it has not been demonstrated that the general 
Harberger methodology is necessarily restrictive in either 
sense. Indeed, the analysis presented in Section 3.3 
demonstrates that the Harberger methodology permits some 
generalization. 
It seems unlikely that the algorithmic approach 
offered by Shoven and Whalley will ever completely replace 
the Harberger-type models of tax incidence. This, in 
itself, constitutes a good reason for economists to continue 
to modify and to extend the Harberger (1962) model, endea-
vouring (as much as is possible) to overcome whatever 
limitations that model might suffer from. The three-
sector, two factor model developed in this chapter is such 
an attempt. 
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>Ok' .... 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Sections 
3.1 and 3.2 are concerned with the elaboration of certain 
concepts which arise in the development of the general 
equilibrium model. Section 3.3 develops the model alge-
braically. Section 3.4 analyses the distribution" of the 
burden of non-neutral taxation among capital and labour. 4 • 
section 3.5 relates the measurement of the welfare costs 
of non-neutral taxation to the model developed in Section 
3.3. And Section 3.6 is concerned with second-best 
optimal tax policy. The issue analysed there is, given 
that governments are committed to a policy of taxing owner-
occupied housing favourably relative to rented housing, 
what are the second-best rates of tax which might be levied 
on capital in each sector? The second-best tax rates are 
those which minimize the welfare cost of the owner~occupier 
subsidy. 
3.1 INCOME AND EXPENDITURE TERMS IN THE "USER COST" OF 
CAPITAL 
Chapter 2 developed an expression for the user cost 
of housing capital, and exploited that expression in a 
partial equilibrium analysis of housing policy. This 
Section divides the user cost expression into its income 
and expenditure components, so that it might be employed 
in the development of a general equilibrium model, in 
Section 3.3. In addition, this Section examines the 
extent to which the user cost expression derived in Chapter 
2 is applicable to assets employed in non-residential uses; 
in particular, in corporate activity. 
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For capital employed by unincorporated enterprises 
the user cost expression of Chapter 2 is equally useful 
whether the capital is employed in residential or non-
residential uses. For present purposes, the important 
difference between corporate and unincorporated enterprise 
is the separation of ownership and control of capital in 
the former. Hence, in corporate activity, capital is 
employed in production, by producers who need not have 
any equity in the capital they employ: The asset-user is 
not the asset-owner. For the corporate production manager, 
the return on equity is part of the (user) cost of employing 
capital in production. If the producer wants to acquire 
more capital, for instance, he might borrow money to 
obtain the necessary finance (this is debt-financing), or 
he might issue shares (this is equity-financing), in which 
(latter) case the capital is effectively owned by the 
shareholder. In the first case, the producer (asset-user) 
pays interest charges on debt. In the second case, the 
producer pays a "required" rate of return on equity. 
Accordingly, there is no obvious reason why the asset-user 
(the corporate production manager) might seek to maximize 
the present net worth of (asset-) owners , equity, as was 
assumed in Chapter 2. (Of course, competition for equity 
funds will maximize asset-owners' net worth, anyway.) 
It turns out that the user cost expression of 
Chapter 2 does not need much amendment to make it suitable 
for use in the case of corporate activity. ~Vhat is needed 
is an appropriate interpretation of the opportunity cost 
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component of user cost. The value of capital employed 
in corporate activity is either debt or equity capital: 
using the superscript "c" to denote corporate activity, 
c c the value of debt capital is ~.q.K., and the value of 
~ ~ ~ 
c c 
equity capital is (l-~.)q.K .• The opportunity cost of 
~ ~ ~ 
equity is a cost facing the owner of equity (shareholder), 
not (directly, anyway) the corporate user of equity. If 
the owner of equity is willing to invest his equity in 
corporate activity, it must be because the net rate of 
return on corporate Sector equity is at least as high as 
the rate of opportunity cost on equity. In an equilibrium, 
there must be equality. But this means that the cost of 
equity to the corporation is 
c c 
r (l-~.)q.K .. 
c ~ ~ ~ 
Of this, the government takes 
c 
u. r (l-~.) q. K. 
~ c ~ ~ ~ 
by way of individual income taxes, leaving the owners of 
equity with 
c c (l-u.)r (l-~.) q.K., 
~ c ~ ~ ~ 
which is the opportunity cost of equity. Of course, the 
cost of debt to the corporation is 
c c 
r ~.q.K. 
m ~ ~ ~ 
On using (2-2-1), the user cost of corporate 
capital is 
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(3- 1) c { c c c c C.=q. r (l-~.)+(l-S.u )r ~.+(l-y.u )m. 
1 1 C 1 1 C m 1 1 C 1 
c c c C A C 
+(l-E.u )t.+( C.U )6.-(1-~.A.u )0.}- R. 
1 c 1 1 C 1 1 1 C 1 1 
(l-c/;u ) 
1 c 
where: 1. u is the corporation income tax rate. 
c 
A 
2. q., m., t., 6., 0. are sector-specific, but 
11111 
are the same in both corporate and unincor-
porated activity. 
3. All variables have been defined in Chapter 2. 
(3-l-l) differs from (2-2-1) by including a term 
c 
u.r (l-~.)q. 
1 c 1 1 
(l-a~u ) 
1 c 
which is excluded in (2-2-1). u.r ( ~~)q. is simply 
1 c 1 1 
individual tax liability on one unit of equity capital 
employed in corporate activity. 
The equilibrium condition from the equity-owner's 
point of view has already been stated. Where the equity-
owner and equity-user are the same entity, this equili-
brium condition is equivalent to the condition that might 
also be derived from the equity-user's point of view. 
But where the equity-owner and equity-user are different 
entities, the equilibrium conditions are not equivalent. 
In this case it is appropriate to treat the equilibrium 
conditions sequentially: The first condition (that for 
the equity-owner) ensures that the net rate of return on 
equity equals the net rate of opportunity cost; the second 
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condition (that of the equity-user) is that, as the result 
of profit maximization on the part of competitive users of 
capital, the user cost per unit of capital (including, 
where appropriate, the payments made as a return to equity) 
is driven to equality with the value marginal product of 
capital. In competition, the value marginal product of 
capital employed in Sector i is its gross rental value 
there (denoted P;.=MPK .• Pi , where MPK. is the marginal 111 
physical product of capital employed in Sector i, and 
p, is the price of Sector i output). i.e., equilibrium 
1 
requires: 
(3-1-2) p* K. 
1 
c, , 
1 
and this is true for capital employed in both corporate 
and unincorporated activity. 
(3-1-2) in (3-1-1) reveals, on using (2-1-9), that 
the rate of corporate income tax, per unit of corporate 
capital, is 
c c c c c c c q . {a ,u r (1-4>.) +u (a. -S . ) r 4> . +u (a. -y . ) m, 
1 1 C C 1 C 1 1 m 1 c 1 1 1 
c c c c 
+u (a. -E • ) t. +u (a. -z; . ) Cl • 
C 1 1 1 C 1 1 1 
c c C /, C 
-u (a.-6.A.)G.}-R. 
Cl 1 11 1 
c (l-a.u ) 
1 c 
Total income taxes (corporate plus individual) levied 
on corporate capital are, per unit of corporate capital: 
(3-1-3) TI~ = q.{a~u {l-u.)r (l-~~)+u.r (l-cjJ.)+u {a~-8~)r ~ 7 
1. 1. 1. C 1. C 1. 1. C 1. C 1. 1. m 1. 
c c c c c C +u (a.-y.)m.+u (a.-E.)t.+U (a.-I;;.)6. 
c 1. 1. 1. C 1. 1. 1. C 1. 1. 1. 
c c C A C 
-u (a. -l;. A . ) 8. }-R. 
c 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
c (1-a. u ) 
1. C 
The unit income tax on unincorporated capital 
in Sector i is, on using (2-1-9) in (3-1-2), (3-1-1): 
(3-1-4) TI'?- = q.{a'?-u. (l-u.)r (l-~';l)+u. (a';l-S';l)r ~~+u. (a';l-y'?-)m. 
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. C 1. 1. 1. 1. m 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
u u u u 
+u. (a.-E.)t.+U. (a.-s.)O. 
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
u u U A U (a. -l; . A . ) 8 . }-R. 
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
u (1-a. u.) 
1. 1. 
176 
where the superscript flU" denotes unincorporated activity. 
The "double taxation" of corporate capital reflected in 
the term 
u.r (l-<jJ.)q. 
1. c 1. 1. 
1-a~u 
1. c 
which appears in (3-1-3), but not in (3-1-4). 
(3-1-4) in (2-2-1) reveals that in the case of 
unincorporated activity, the user cost of capital can 
be written: 
(3-1-5) c~ 
1. 
u u (l-u.)r (l-<jJ.)q.+r <jJ.q.+t.q.+(m.+6.)q. 
1. c 1. 1. m 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
A u 
-8.q.+TI. , 
1. 1. 1. 
while (3-1-3) in (3-1-1) reveals that in the case of 
corporate activity, the user cost of capital can be 
written: 
(3-1-6) 
(3-1-7) 
C~=(l-u.)r (l-~~)q.+r ~~q.+t.q.+(m.+o .)q. 
~ ~ c ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
A C 
-0 . q. +II .. 
~ ~ ~ 
Hence, in general: 
C.=(l-u.)r (l-~.)q.+r ~.q.+t.q.+(m.+o.)q. 
~ ~ c ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
A 
-0. q. +II .. 
~ ~ ~ 
Denote user costs net of deprec tion, repairs, 
maintenance, casualty insurance premiums, and indirect 
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taxes, by C~. In equilibrium, this is equal to the net-
~ 
value-added, or net-product at factor cost, derived from 
one unit of capital employed in Sector i. Denoting this 
net-value-added by NVA., equilibrium is characterized by: 
~ 
A (3-1-8) NVA.=C~ (l-u.)r (l-~.)q.+r ~.q.-O.q.+II .• 
~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Total income derived from capital employed in Sector i 
(denoted YK.) is defined as the sum of net-value-added 
~ 
and capital gains. i.e., 
(3-1-9) 
A 
YK. {NVA.+O.q.}K. ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ 
;{(l-u.)r (l-~.)q.+r ~.q.+II.}K., 
~ c ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ 
where it has been assumed that expected capital gains 
A 
O.q.K. actually accrue. 
~ ~ ~ 
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It has been demonstrated that (l-u.)r (l-~.)q.K. 
1 c 111 
is the net income due to owners' equity. The net income 
due to the mortgagee is (l-u )r ~.,5. where u is the 
m m 1 m 
mortgagee's individual tax rate. The rest of the income 
in (3-1-9) goes to the government by way of income taxes. 
The government collects IT .K.+u r ~ .q.K. in income tax 
1 1 m m 1 1 1 
revenue. 
It is convenient to separate private and government 
income components in (3-1-8) and (3-1-9). To this end, 
denote the after-tax net-value-added of one unit of capital 
in Sector i by PK.' so that in equilibrium, 
1 
(3-1-10) PK . 
1 
c ~ -IT . -u r ~. q. 
1 1 m m 1 1 
== ( 1-Ut) r (1-4J e ) q . + ( 1-u ) r <p. q , -8 Iq. . 
1 C 1 1 m m 1 1 1 1 
PK. is sometimes referred to as the net-rental price of 
1 
capital in Sector i. Further, denote total private income 
derived from capital employed in Sector i by MK.. Then, 
1 
in equilibrium, 
(3-1-11) A _ {NVA.+8.q.-IT.-u r ~.q.}K. 
111 1 m m 1 1 1 
"-
= {PK +8. q. } K. .11 1 
1 
{(l-u.)r (l-~.)q.+( u)r ~.q.}K .• 
1 c 1 1 m m 1 1 1 
Arbitrage on the part of owners of capital ensures that 
the after-tax rate of return on debt equals the after-
t f t . 6. ax rate 0 re urn on equlty. 
to: 
(3-1-12) = (l-u.)r q.K. = 
1 c 1 1 
Then, (3- 11) simpli 
(l-u )r q.K. 
m m 1 1 
FIGURE 3-1-1: 
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Figure 3-3-1 illustrates the various components of 
the user cost of capital employed in Sector i. The sche-
dule VMPK. is the value marginal product schedule for 
~ 
capital in Sector i. The schedule is downward sloping, 
reflecting a diminishing marginal physical product. 
Capital is employed to the point where its value marginal 
product is equal to its user cost. It is assumed that 
capital has the same capital value in each sector. i.e., 
q. =q . (Vi, j) • 
~ J Then, (l-u.)r q. is also the same for ~ c ~ 
capital employed in each sector. The gross rental price 
PR. will normally be different among sectors because of 
~ 
differences in unit tax rates, TK rr.+t.q.+u r ~.q., and 
. ~ ~ ~ m m ~ ~ 
~ 
because of differences in m., and 8 .. The shaded rectangle 
~ ~ 
represents total taxes, TK K., levied on capital employed 
. ~ 
~ 
in Sector i. The rectangle labelled MK. is the area 
~ 
net income derived from capital employed in Sector i, 
excluding government income, TK K.. The rectangle E.K. 
. ~ 1 1 
1 
represents expenses incurred inproviding K. units of 
1 
capital for one period (these might be thought of as inter-
mediate costs). 
3.2 TAX INCIDENCE, TAX SHIFTING, AND TAX NEUTRALITY 
The imposition of a tax on the income of capital 
employed in any sector of the economy will usually alter 
both the gross and net rental prices of capital employed 
in that and other sectors. It is useful to refer to the 
effect of the imposition of the tax on the net rental price 
of capital as the incidence of the tax on the "sources" 
side of the budget. In addition, the imposition of the 
181 
tax usually affects commodity prices, and it is useful 
to refer to this effect as the incidence of the tax on 
the "uses" side of the budget. 
The incidence of a tax on capital income is related 
to the extent to which the tax burden is "shifted". In 
the case of excise taxes on consumer goods, the question 
of tax shifting concerns the ability of sellers (who 
bear the lIimpactll of the tax7 .) to pass the tax onto 
buyers (This is forward-shifting~)i the extent to which 
the tax may be shifted depends upon the shapes of the 
relevant demand and supply curves. In the case of a tax 
on capital income (such as the corporation income tax) , 
tax shifting relates to the ability of asset-users (who 
bear the "impact" of the tax in this case) to pass the 
tax onto asset-owners through lower net rental prices 
(net rates of return) on capital (This is backward-shift-
ing.), or onto other factors employed with capital in the 
production process. If, for instance, it is found that 
the imposition of a tax on capital in one sector causes 
the net rental price on capital (PK.) to fall by the full 
1 
amount of the tax there is full tax shifting, and capital 
is said to bear the full burden of the tax. 
The question of tax shifting has become the subject 
of some controversy, particularly in the context of cor-
t . 8. porate taxa lone Hall and Jorgenson (1967), (19691 
assume that the "required rate of return" on corporate 
equity is constant in pretax terms (i.e., ar /au =0). 
c c 
At the other extreme, Coen (1968) assumes that the "net 
discount rate" is independent of the tax rate. As was 
noted in Chapter 1, Ott and Ott (1973) avoid the question, 
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but their analysis reveals an implicit assumption that 
the imposition of a tax on capital in Sector i does not 
affect the net rental price of capital in that Sector. 
This is equivalent to the assumption made by Coen (1968). 
Sumner (1973) argues that neither of the Hall and 
Jorgenson, nor Coen, assumptions is acceptable. He 
suggests that: "Hall and Jorgenson, like tax legislation, 
ignore the opportunity-cost element in the return to 
shareholders. Coen's version is valid only for a partial 
equilibrium model of a world in which equity funds are 
the sole source of finance. ,,9. 
The "impact" of the corporation income tax falls 
on the asset-user. The Hall and Jorgenson assumption 
implies that there is full shifting of the tax. i.e., 
that the net rental price of capital employed in the 
corporate sector falls by the full amount of the corpora-
tion tax. But, as Sumner seems to have in mind,lO. if 
the corporation tax is fully shifted, the after-tax rate 
of return on equity invested in the corporate Sector 
falls relative to investments in unincorporated enter-
prises, causing equity funds to move out of the corporate 
Sector, and so raising rates of return there. 
As to Coen's assumption, if there is no shifting 
of the corporation tax, then, since debt interest escapes 
the tax while equity interest does not, the existence 
of the tax separates the costs of debt and equity to the 
corporation (the asset-user). Hence, it would be natural 
to expect the corporation income tax to induce corporate 
t.; 
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enterprises to subsitute from equity- to debt-finance. 
Tambini (1969) "is concerned with precisely this problem: 
",,- i 
.. 
"Why corporations do not try to avoid the tax entirely, 
or at least to avoid more of it, by shifting more to debt 
financing becomes quite a puzzle if we consi~er that 
debt and equity are perfect substitutes in production; 
corporate income is produced by corporate assets, and 
the value of the marginal physical product of one dollar's 
worth of assets is the same, no matter how it is financed. 
We would accordingly expect large shifts from equity to 
debt capital and vice versa for small divergences in 
h . . "ll. t elr respectlve costs. But Tambini notes that such 
shifts do not seem to have occurred: "Over the entire 
period 1927-60, the cost of equity capital has exceeded 
the cost of debt capital, generally by a non-trivial 
amount; the difference has tended to increase over time, 
becoming quite substantial in the last two decades. 
However, corporations over the same period continued to 
f ' h 1 h ' h h . 1,12. lnance t e arger part of t elr assets t roug equlty. 
Sumner would apparently regard this as evidence that 
there has been some shifting of the corporation income 
tax. Tambitii calculates, however, that when differential 
risk arguments are considered, the marginal costs to 
corporate enterprises of debt and equity were equal in 
1965 1 even under the assumption of approximately no shift-
ing of the corporation income tax. Accordingly, it is 
not clear that eoen's assumption is unrealistic. 
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section 3.1 noted that arbitrage by owners of capital 
ensures that the net-o rate of return on debt equals 
the net-of-tax rate of return on equity. This result 
does not imply that there has been no shifting of the cor-
poration income tax, although it does imply that the 
average cost of debt exceeds the average cost of equity 
in corporate activities (if u. is approximately equal to 
l 
u ). Impl 
m 
in the present analysis is the idea that 
the supplies of debt and equity are perfectly substitu-
table. Then, an increase in the tax rate on equity will 
normally reduce both the net rate of return on equity, 
and the net rate of interest on debt; it is not necessary 
that there be no shifting of taxes on equity. This atti-
tude permits both the gross- and net-of-tax rates of return 
on capital to be affected by government tax policies. 
In particular, each of these rates of return is determined 
endogenously, which is a significant departure from the 
partial equilibrium models referred to in Chapter 2. 
In the three-sector general equilibrium model 
developed in this Chapter, the questions of tax incidence 
and tax shifting are of fundamental importance. In 
general, taxes on capital in one sector are shifted to 
some extent, but not fully. The extent of the shifting 
depends upon factor shares in that and other sectors, 
factor intensities and absolute factor employments, the 
elasticities of factor substitution in each sector, the 
own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand for 
sectoral outputs, and the income elasticities of demand 
for sectoral outputs. 
185 
Much of the analysis of this Chapter is concerned 
with distortions due to the non-neutral taxation of income 
from capital. In this context, the pre-disturbance 
economy is characterised by a system of neutral taxation 
of factor incomes (commodity excise taxes are ignored.). 
The public finance literature indicates a consensus of 
opinion on the implications of neutral taxation, but there 
seems to be some confusion over precisely what sorts of 
income taxes are sufficient to yield those implications. 
Because this issue is critically important in the present 
analysis, the concept of tax neutrality in general equili-
brium models is explored in the remainder of this Section. 
In general, taxation is said to be neutral if it 
does not alter the pattern of equilibrium that would per-
tain without taxes. 13 . In a general equilibrium context, 
such taxes might be interpreted as those which do not 
alter the ratios of gross-of-tax factor prices, and gross-
of-tax commodity prices. 
Cost-minimization in production implies that 
P* K. 
1 
PLo 
1 
where: PLo is the gross-of-tax wage rate paid labour 
1 
in sector i. 
Vi. 
MPL . is the marginal physical product of labour 
1 
in sector i. 
The marginal cost of sector i output (denoted MC.) is 
1 
MC. 
1 
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In the absenqe ot 'mC.t.ernalities, monopoly elements, and 
commodity excise taxes, output prices reflect marginal 
costs. The ratio of marginal costs between Sectors i and 
j is 
MC. Pi./MPK. p* MPK . K. 
~ ~ ~ ~ __ J 
= = MC. Pi< /MPK . 
pr- . MPK. J K. J J J ~ 
PL/MPL . PLo MPL . 
~ ~ ~ __ J i,j=1,2,3 
PL /MPL . PLo MPL . 
J J J ~ 
The terms MPK./MPK., and MPL./MPL ., represent the J ~ J ~ 
marginal rates of transformation of Sector i output into 
Sector j output, using compensating increments of capital 
and labour, respectively. If gross (of tax) factor prices 
for capital and labour do not differ between sectors, 
the ratio of marginal costs equals the rate of product 
transformation. In the present analysis, assume that 
PLo = PLo (i,j=1,2,3). On the other hand, as equations 
~ J 
(3-1-1) and (3-1-3) reveal, there may be many reasons why 
pi. f p~. (i,j=l,2,3j ifj). One reason is that even if 
~ J 
there are no taxes on capital, the activity with the 
higher rate of depreciation on capital will (ceteris 
paribus) have a larger gross rental price on capital. And, 
of course, differential tax treatment will generate 
differentials between Pi<. and pi. (ifj)· 
The effects of di~ferenti~ls Ip~i-PKjl >0, have 
important objective welfare implications: If PL.=PL . and 
~ J 
PK.=PK. (l+a), (a>O), for instance, producers in different J ~ 
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activities face different relative factor prices. An 
implication is that, in Sector i production will be more 
. l' t' d' St' d' 14. b cap~ta ~n ens~ve, an ~n ec or J pro uct~on may e 
more labour intensive, than what is Pareto efficient. 
Accordingly, the economy's production possibility set is 
contained in the interior of the "first-best" set, except 
for the extreme points involving complete specialisation. 
(See Herberg, Kemp, and Magee (1971), for instance.) 
Taxes which generate this result are clearly not neutral; 
but, as has been noted, the result does not require the 
presence of any taxes. 
As an alternative, suppose that PL.>PL . I p* >P* K. K.' 
J ~ J ~ 
PK /PL . =PK. jPL .. Then, production will be efficient: J J ~ ~ 
The production possibility set is not distorted. However, 
the solution is not optimal, since the ratio of marginal 
costs, MC. jf-1C., will be less than the rate of product 
~ J 
transformation. Since consumer prices equal marginal 
costs underpresent assumptions, the marginal rate of 
commodity substitution in consumption differs from the 
marginal rate of commodity transformation in production: 
A reallocation of factors among industries can make all 
consumers better 0 at the prevailing output prices. 
If gross wages are the same in all sectors, and 
if gross rentals on capital are equal among activities, 
neutral capital taxes are any which alter PK. and PK. 
. ~ J 
in the same proportion. It has already been noted that 
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if the total supply of capital is fixed, capital bears the 
full burden of a neutral tax, with no effect on gross 
rental prices. (This is not true of non-neutral taxes, 
. 
however!) Since gross rental prices are unaffected by 
the imposition of neutral taxes, so too must the alloca-
tion of capital be unaffected. 
It can now be shown that with a fixed total capital 
stock, a neutral tax on capital is one which represents 
the same proportion of net value-added plus capital gains 
of capital in each sector. (i.e., [PK +§.q.] K.). The . 1 l l 
1 
reason is that the sum of after-tax net-value added and 
capital ins is the net income received by the owners of 
capital. If this net income is the same per unit of capital 
employed in each sector, then, if a neutral tax is imposed, 
this net income falls by the full amount of the tax, 
provided the total stock of capital is fixed. This amounts 
to an identical unit reduction in net income in each 
sector. Alternatively, suppose the tax is the same pro-
portion of gross value-added (net value-added plus deprecia-
tion), for instance, then the unit reduction in each 
sector differs according to differential depreciation 
rates, and this will distort the allocation of capital 
among sectors. It should be emphasised, however, that 
an equal percentage tax on net value-added plus capital 
gains (i.e., net income) in each sector is only neutral if 
the sum of these two income components is the same per unit 
of capital in each sector. There are good reasons for 
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expecting this to be true: If a unit of capital yields a 
higher net income in one sector than another, the present 
allocation of capital can be expected to change as asset-
owners respond to market incentives. It is for this 
reason that the Simons (1938)-Carter (1966) approach to 
taxation policy - which emphasises the virtues of an 
income tax striking all individual income at the same 
. d d . 1 1 15. rate - 1S regar e as approx1mate y neutra . 
3.3 DEVELOPHENT OF THE HODEL 
The model developed here is designed to permit 
analysis of the effects of the differenti tax treatment 
of capital. The model supposes that there are three 
sectors. This amounts to a signi cant generalization 
of the Harberger (1962) two-sector general equilibrium 
model of tax incidence. The three sectors are for rented 
housing, owner-occupied housing, and !lother industry". 
Combining the rented and owner-ocCupied housing sectors 
would permit the use of a simpler two-sector model, but 
this would prevent analysis of the differential tax 
treatment of these two groups, one of the most important 
of all issues in housing policy_ 
Like the Harberger (1962) model, the present model 
is formulated to permit comparative static analysis, and 
is written in the form of total differentials. Apart from 
this, there are some significant departures from the 
Harberger methodology. Most importantly, perhaps, the 
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model explicitly introduces income effects into demand 
equations. Unlike the Harberger model, the model presented 
here is a valid tool for the analysis of taxes of finite 
size. 
The Harberger model assumes that all individuals 
and the government have identical consumption patterns. 
This permits the use of aggregate demand equations (Gorman 
(1953), Muellbauer (1975». There is, of course, no 
loss of generality in this if one assumes that all con-
sumers have the same marginal propensities to consume 
out of income. As Ballentine and Eris (1975) have indi-
cated, Harberger's discussion (1962, p.224) suggests a 
beli that the assumption of identical marginal propen-
sities to consume means that all income effects of govern-
ment and private demand just cancel out. Mieszkowski 
(1967, p.260, n.10) seems to be of the same opinion. 
Thus, if one dollar is transferred from individuals to 
government there is no distortion in the pattern of demand. 
But this does not mean that the imposition of a tax may be 
analysed with income-compensated demand equations (as 
Harberger has done), since it is the absolute level of 
income, and not merely its distribution as between indivi-
duals and government, which changes when a tax is imposed. 
Thus, if one to argue that all income effects cancel 
out one has to assume, in addition, that all taxes are 
either zero or neutral. 
The loss in real income is a frequently used measure 
of the excess burden of the tax. Harberger (1966) 
actually uses this measure, along with his model of tax 
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incidence, to estimate the excess burden of the corpora-
tion income tax. The aim of his analysis is to measure 
real income losses while using income-compensated demand 
curves on the assumption that there are no real income 
losses. 16 • This methodological weakness of the Harberge~ 
model does not extend to the model developed here. 
The development of comparative static analyses in 
economics requires the specification of demand and supply 
equations for at least n-1 of the n non-separable markets 1? 
which characterise the economy. Iva1ras' Law can be employed 
to make the last market's equation redundant. The three-
sector model developed here spec ies demand and supply 
equations for two of the three product markets, and appeals 
to Wa1ras' Law to close the third market. 
The supply side of the economy is characterized by 
linear homogeneous production functions, perfect competi-
tion, and profit maximization. In addition each industry 
(i.e., sector) produces only one commodity, and this 
commodity is unique. Thus 
( 3-3-1) Q. = f.(K.,L.) 1,2,3 
1 111 
where: Q. is physical output of commodity i. 
1 
K. is the quantity of cap i taL services employed 
1 
in the production of commodity i. 
L. is the quantity 
1 
of labour services employed 
in the production of commodity i. 
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Denote the price of Sector i output by P. (i=1,2,3). 
1 
The value of Sector i output which is available for final 
consumption is P.Q., less the value of the output of 
1 1 
that Sector used as intermediate input in the maintenance 
f . t l' 11 18. d' h t' t o cap1 a 1n a sectors. Hence, enot1ng t e quan 1 y 
of Sector i output available for final consumption by S., 
1 
(3-3-2) P.S. 
1 1 
3 A 
= P.Q.- L a .. {q.K.(m.+o.-e.}}, 
1 1 j=l J1 J J J J J i=1,2,3. 
where: a .. is the percentage of the value of intermediate J1 
expenditure on capital in Sector j that absorbs 
output from Sector i. 
By definition, 
La .. 
. J1 
1 
I, j=I,2,3. 
The system of equations (3-3-2) embodies the input-output 
configuration of this economy: The a .. are the input-J1 
output coefficients with respect to intermediate usage. 
(3-3-2) can be written 
(3-3-3) 
3 q . K . (m. +0 . -0 . ) 
S. = f. (K. ,L.) (1- L a .. { J Jp 6 J J}), i=1,2,3. 1 1 1 1 . 1 J1 . . J= 1 1 
It is convenient to define 
(3-3-4) E e .. _ J1 
A 
a .. q . K . (m. +0 . -e.) 
J1 J J ] ] J 
P.Q. 
1 1 
i,j 1,2,3. 
E e .. is the share of intermediate expenditure, on capital J1 
employed in Sector j, in the output of Sec.tor i. 
Labour is taken to be numeraire. This implies that 
(3-3-5) dPL . == 0 , 
1 
i==1,2,3. 
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In addition, it is supposed that the expected rate of 
..... 
capital gain (8.g.), the (per unit of capital) costs of 
1 1 
repairs, maintenance, and casualty insurance premiums 
(m.g.), and the unit depreciation charges (c.g.) are 
1 1 1 1 
invariant with respect to the disturbances analysed here. 
i. e. , 
A 
(3-3-6) d8.g. ~ dm.g. = dO.g. = O. 
1 1 1 1 1 1. 
The model developed here is characterized by fixed 
factor endowments. Hence: 
(3-3-7)* 
3 
2: dK. 
1 .1. 
3 
2: dL. == O. 
i=l 1 
Total differentiation of (3-3-3) reveals, on using 
(3-3-4) and (3-3-6); 
(3-3-8)* 
dS. 
1 
S. 
1 
:;;; 
1 
3 E 
1- E 8 .. 
j=l J1 
af. K. 
dK . dL . 3 E dK. dp. 3 E {8 • -.-2:.+8 • __ 1_ E 8: : __ J +--.2:., E 8 .. } 
K. K. L. L. . 1 J 1. K. P.. IJ 1. , 
1 1 1 1 J= J 1J= 
i=l,2,3. 
where: 8 = K. 1 1 is the elasticity of Sector i output Q. 
1 1 
with respect to capital. 
a L. 
8 - --- ~ is the elasticity of Sector i output L. aL.oQ. 
111. 
with respect to labour. 
The partial derivatives af./aK., af./aL., are the 
1 1 1 1 
marginal physical products of capital and labour, respec-
tively, in Sector i. Under competition, marginal physical 
products egual real factor prices. i.e., 
af. P* a f. PLo 1 K· 
= 1 1 
= 
1 
, 
aL. p:-1 1 
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Accordingly, under competition, eK. and e are the shares 
l. Li 
of capital and labour, respectively, in the value of 
Sector i output: 
(3-3-10) 
( 3-3-11) 
e K. 
l. 
e L. 
1. 
= 
PK* K. . l. 
l. 
-=---=-- = P.Q. 
l. l. 
PL L. . l. 
l. 
P. Q. ' l. l. 
[PK +TK + (m. +15 . ) q . ] K . • • l. l. l. l. l. l. 
P.Q. 
l. l. 
Given constant returns to scale, e +8 =1 K. L. 
By definition, 
(3-3-12) 
d (K. jL. ) 
1. 1. 
K./L. 
1. 1. 
d (P~. jPL .) 
1. 1. 
-0 .• -==*--'=Ij=p--
1. PK. L. 
1. 1. 
1. l. 
i=1,2,3. 
i=1,2,3. 
1,2,3). 
1,2,3 
where: o. is the elasticity of substitution between 
--- 1. 
capital and labour in Sector i. Its presump-
tive sign is positive. 
Evaluating (3-3-12) for each Sector produces, on using 
(3-3-5), (3-3-6): 
(3-3-13)* dK. 1. 
K. 
1. 
dL. 
1. 
---r:-
l. 
= -0. 
l. 
(dPK. +dTK. ) 
1. l. 
p* K. 
i=l,2,3~ 
1. 
From Euler's theorem on linear homogeneous functions, 
competitive profit maximization generates: 
(3-3-14) 
i. e. , 
(3-3-15) 
P.Q. = PL L.+PK* K. , 1. 1. • 1. . 1. 
P.Q. 
1. l. 
1. 1. 
= PL L,+[PK +TK +(m.+Q.)q.]K. .1. •. l. l. 1. 1. 
1. 1. l. 
1,2,3. 
,2,3. 
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Hence, the total value of Sector i output is made up of 
payments to labour, PL L., taxes on capital, . ~ 
~ 
TK K. f the 
. ~ 
~ 
after-tax net-value-added due to capital, PK K., and the . ~ 
~ 
expenses, (m. +0 . ) q . K .• 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
Total differentiation of (3-3-14) 
yields, on using (3-3-S): 
(3-3-16) P.dQ.+Q.dP. == dL.+PK* dK.+K.dPK* , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. ~ ~ . 
~ ~ 
Further, competitive profit maximization impl s: 
(3-3-17) P.dQ. == P~ dK.+dL. , 
~ ~ i ~ ~ 
i==1,2,3. 
i=l,2,3. 
Combining (3-3-16) I (3-3-17) generates, on using 
(3-3-6) : 
(3-3-18)* dP. 
~ 
== Ki dP* 
_0 K. 
Q. ~ 
~ 
Ki(dP +dT ) 
-Q K. K. 
. ~ ~ 
~ 
1,2,3. 
Total income available for spending by consumers, 
including government, (denoted M) is defined: 
{3-3-19} 
333 
M ~ E MK + E TK K.+ E PL L.o i i=l i ~ i=l i ~ 
3 
Recalling {3-1-6}, the term E M is made up of the total 
. 1 K. ~= ~ 
after-tax net-value-added due to capital, plus the value 
3 A 
of capital gains, E 8.q.K. 0 
. 1 ~ ~ ~ In consequence, on using 
(3-3-1S) : 
(3-3-20) 
~== 
3 A 
M - E {P.Q.-(m.+o.)q.K.+8.q.K.} 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
3 
L {P.Q.-(m.+o. 
i==l ~ ~ ~ ~ 
}q.K. }. 
~ ~ 
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The income M is available for spending on final (as dis-
tinct from intermediate) output. It is assumed that all 
individuals, and government have identical consumption 
patterns. Aggregate final consumption demand for Sector 
i output (denoted D.) is represented by: 
1. 
i=l,2,3. 
Total differentiation of (3-3-21), logarithmically, for 
commodities 1 and 2, reveals: 
(3-3-22) 
dD. 
1 
D. 
1 
::::: 
3 D dP. aD. /a M 
L n.. _p_l+~ . dM, 
j=l 1J j i 
i=1,2. 
D 
where: n .. is the elasticity of demand for Sector i output 
---- 1J 
with respect to the price of commodity J. 
Writing M as: 
(3-3-23) 
3 A 3 3 
M = E (PK +8.q.)K.+ E TK K.+ E PL L., j=l j J J J j=l j J j:::::l j J 
permits, on using (3-3-5), (3-3-6), (3-3-7): 
3 A 3 
(3-3-24) dM == E [ (P K +8. q. ) dK . + K . dP K ] + E [T K dK. + K . d T K ] • j=l j J 1 J J j j=l j J J j 
(3-3-24) in (3-3-22) gives: 
(3-3-25)* 
dD. 3 dP. dD./aM 3 
1 = En .. ~ + 1 {E [ (P K +8. q . ) dK . 
j=l 1J j j=l j J J J 
3 
+K.dPK ]+ E [TK dK.+K.dTK ]}g J j j=l j J J j 
1,2. 
Examination of the system of equations so far, 
- 1 
dPK ' 3 
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above represent 12 linear independent equations in these 
unknowns. To close the system, use is made of the equili-
brium conditions for product and factor markets: 
and 
D. = S. , 
1 1 
These conditions provide: 
(3-3-26) * 
dO. 
1 
D. 
1 
dS. 
1 
-g:-
1 
and, on using (3-3-6), 
(3-3-27)* 
i==1,20 
i=l,2. 
(3-3-26)* and (3-3-27)* each represent an additional two 
independent equations, with which to close the system. It 
is convenient, in what follows, to introduce the normaliza-
tion that 
A 
(3-3-28) P + e.q. == l. K. 1 1 i=1,2,3. 
1 
Substitution permits the model to be reduced to 
three linear independent equations in three endogenous 
variables (unknowns), dKl/K l , dK 2/K 2 , and dPKl = dPK2 == 
dPK = dPK• Algebraic solutions for each of these variables 3 
are obtained using Cramer's Rule. Solutions for all other 
endogenous variables can then be obtained by substitution. 
It is convenient to define: 
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A 
<P K . - (PK +e.q.)K./M . J. J. J. i=1,2,3. 
J. J. 
A 
E (PK +0. q . ) K . . • J.J. J. 
,j.. _J. J. 
'f' K - -----:-M-:-----
<P K . is the share of private after-tax income from capital 
J. 
employed in Sector i in total income; <PK is the share of 
total private after-tax capital income in total income. 
The first two linear equations in dKl/Kl , dK 2/K2 , 
dPK, are obtained as follows: (3-3-18), (3-3-28) I (3-3-27), 
(3-3-7) I in (3-3-25) generates: 
(3-3-29) 
dD, 
J. 
D. 
J. 
= 
i=l,2. 
M 
where: n. is the income elasticity of demand for the final 
J. 
output of Sector i. 
On the supply side: (3-3-13), (3-3-18) in (3-3-8) 
gives: 
(3-3-30) 
dS. 
J. 
-s:- = 
J. 
3 E dK. 
- E e .. __ J + 
'-1 ]J. K. J- ] 
3 E 
eK E e .. i'-l ]J. ]- ) 
P* K, 
J. 
i=1,2. 
Combining (3-3-29), (3-3-30), and (3-3-26) produces, on 
using (3-3-7), (3-3-28): 
(3-3-31)* 1 
3 E 
1- E 8" j=l J1. 
8 
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3 E 8 E 8 .. L. K .. J1. 1. I- 1.J p* K. p* K. 1. 
1 
E 1- E 8 .. j=l J1. 
3 
E 
1. 
} 
( 3-3-31) the first two equations. The third 
obtained as follows: (3-3-13) provides: 
dL. 1. 
L.dK. 1. 1. + 
a. (dPK +dTK )L. 1. . . 1. 1. 1. 
p* K. 1. 
Hence, on using (3-3-7), (3-3-27), 
(3-3-32) 
3 
E dL.=O 
1 1. 
But from (3-3-7) f 
3 dK. 1. E L'-K = 
. 1 1. 1.= i 
so that (3-3-32) is: 
3 dK. 3 a.L. 3 a.L. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
E L'--==+K dPK. E -P* +. E ~P* TK .. 1. i 1.=1 K. 1.=1 K. 1. 1. 1. 
} 
1,2. 
(3-3-33)* 
3 G.L. 
1 1 
= -.r ~TK .. 
1=1 K. 1 
1 
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The three equations are the two in (3-3-31), and equation 
(3-3-33). 
To simplify notation, define: 
where 
A. 
1 
B .. 1J 
3 
L: B.. , j==l 1J 
D 
- n· . GK /p* 1J . K 
J j 
M 
+ n'<PK 1 . 
J 
Further, define: 
where 
C. 
1 
F .. 1J 
J. 
1 
GL G. . 1 
1 
+ 
3 E 
GK L: G .. 
.. 1 J 1 1J 
p* K. 
1 
cp 
m 
- n,1J K (TK -TK ) 1 j j 3 
E· K. E 
+Ji{G .. -~G3·) J1 't'K 1 
1 
3 E 
1- L: G .. 
j =1 J 1 
3 
,2, 
i=1,2i j 1,2,3. 
i=1,2, 
19. i I j =1,2 I 
i=l,2. 
In matrix notation, (3-3-31) I (3-3-33) are: 
3 .L. 
1 1 
L: P'"* 
i=l K. 
1 
x 
3 
-{ L B1J.dTK.-C1dTK j=l J 
3 
== -{ L: B2 ·dTK -C 2dTK j=l J j : 
3 G.L. 
- L: ~T j=l Pr<. Ki 
1 
The determinant of the matrix of coefficients is: 
(3-3-35) 
The algebraic solution for dP K is 
(3-3-36) 
3 cr.L. 
1 1 { J ( 
- 2: ~.dTK' (F ll - 1) F22 1 K. 1 
1 
Hence, the change in the net price of capital (which 
answers the incidence question) due to changes in the 
policy instruments, dTK., depends upon factor shares, 1 
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factor intensities and absolute factor employments, elas-
ticities of substitution, own-price and cross-price 
elasticities of demand for final outputs, the income 
elasticities of demand for final outputs, the size of 
the unit tax changes and the differences among tax rates 
in different sectors. The incidence equation is valid for 
the analysis of taxes of finite size; and it is not 
necessary that initial taxes be zero, nor (even) that they 
be neutral. Each of these features amounts to a significant 
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improvement on the usual Harberger-type models. Equation 
(3-3-36) is much more complex than the incidence equation 
found in the usual Harberger-type models, however. There 
are two main reasons for this: Firstly, this is a three-
.sector (rather than a two-sector) model. And secondly, 
the present formulation explicitly allows for taxes of 
finite size. 
Use of equation (3-3-36) in conjunction with (3-3-18) 
permits an examination of the effects of tax changes on 
output prices, permitting an examination of tax incidence 
on the uses, as well as the sources, side of the budget. 
Use of Cramer's Rule on (3-3-34) also permits solu-
tion of the system for dKl/K l and dK2/K 2 " Then, on using 
(3-3-7), the solution for dK2 is obtained. For dKl/K l , 
Crarner's Rule produces: 
3 
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(3-3-38) 
D 
A similar equation for dK3/K3 can easily be obtained on 
application of (3-3-7) to (3-3-37), (3-3-38). From each 
of these equations, the "reduced form coef cients", 
aKi/aTK . (i,j 1,2,3), are derived. It seems natural to 
J 
refer to these coefficients as "tax multipliers". They 
summarize both the impact and feedback effects of tax 
changes on the allocation of capital. The first tax multi-
plier, aKl/aTK ' is derived from (3-3-37): , 1 
(3-3-39) 
The multiplier, aK2/aTK I is derived from (3-3-38): 2 
aK 2 [ Ll L3 . 3 cri Li 
(3-3-40) arr;- = -K2 B12 { (A2 -C2 ) Kl ( 1 - K3 ) -F 2li:l~} 2 ~ 
204 
The multiplier, dK3/ TK 1 is obtained by using (3-3-37) and 
3 
(3-3-38) in (from (3-3-7)): 
This multiplier is: 
(3-3-41) 
3 cr.L. L2 L3 
B13 {(F22 -g2) 2::1 ~;~- (A2-C2 ) K2 iS 3} 
~ 
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The multipliers (3-3-39), (3-3-40), and (3-3-41) 
compare with the Ott and Ott (1973) "assumption" that 
CJK . 
3-42) . ~ 
CJTK . 
~ 
= 
CJK. 
~ 
~ K. 
~ 
i=1,2,3. 
i.e., that CJP~./CJTK. = 1: An increase in the unit tax 
~ ~ 
rate TK. produces an equal increase in the gross (unit) 
~ 
rental price of capital, with no affect on net rental 
prices. Clearly, the questions of tax shifting and tax 
incidence cannot be explored in models which employ this 
t . t' t' 20. res r~c ~ve assump ~on. 
Estimates for each of the cross-partial derivatives 
CJK, 
~ 
CJTK . 
J 
might be derived from (3-3-37), (3-3-38). 
i,j=1,2,3;irfj, 
However, it is 
simpler to employ the adding-up property, due to fixed fac-
tor suppl s, that 
CJK. 
(3-3-43) E--~­
. CJTK 
0, j=1,2,3 
~ . 
J 
and the symmetry of cross-substitution effects; i.e., 
(3-3-44) 
CJK. 
~ 
CJTK . 
J 
= 
CJK. 
_J_ 
CJT ' K. 
~ 
i,j ,2,3. 
The first of these conditions simply says that when capital 
is in fixed supply, a change in the tax rate on capital in 
any Sector j can only reallocate the existing stock of 
capital. The second of these conditions is not so obvious, 
although it appears (sometimes implicitly) in nearly every 
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21. 
analysis of the welfare costs of the taxation of capital. 
An intuitive explanation of this condition might proceed 
1 22. as fol OWS. For simplicity, consider a two-sector 
model with no taxes initially. The government imposes a 
tax of TK on capital employed in Sector I, and then 
. 1 
follows this with a tax of TK on capital employed in 
2 
Sector 2. The tax TK raises 
1 
aK l 
TK (Kl+~·TK ) 
1 Kl 1 
in revenue. The tax TK raises 
2 
aK 2 dK TK (K2+~ .TK )+TK ( 1 2 K2 2 I 
dK l in revenue. The term TK (~.TK ) is the addition to 
1 K 2 
revenue (conceivably negativer derived from Sector I when 
Alternatively, suppose the government imposes the tax TK 
2 
first, and the tax TK second. Then, total revenue is 
I 
aK2 aK I aK2 
T2=TK {K2+~·TK )+TK (Kl+~·TK )+TK (~.TK ) 2 K2 2 I KI I 2 KI 1 
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Now, in this comparative static world, the total revenue 
raised by the government, from a system of taxes, should 
be independent of the order in which those taxes are 
imposed. But this requires that Tl = T2 , which can be true 
only if ClKl/ClTK = ClK2/ClTK . 2 1 
(3-3-43) and (3-3-44) can be used to produce three 
linear independent equations in Cl Kl/Cl TK == ClK 2/ClTK ' 2 1 
ClKl/ClTK = ClK 3/ClTK ' dK2/dTK = dK 3/dTK . These equations 3 1 3 2 
can be written: 
(3-3-45) 
ClK l ClK 2 dK 3/ClTK -ClKl/ClTK -dK2/dTK 
= ClTK 
== 1 2 
1 
(3-3-46) 
ClK l ClK3 dK 2/dTK -dKl/dTK -ClK 3/ClTK 21  :::: == dTK 3 
ClTK 1 
(3-3-47) 
dK2 dK3 ClKl/ClTK -ClK2/ClTK -dK3/ClTK 
~ == = 1 2 3 TK 3 2 
In view of the solutions for each of dK l , dK 2 , dK 3 , 
write 
(3-3-48) dK. 
1 
3 dK. 
1 
:::: . L arr--.dTK. ' 
J=l K. J 
J 
i=1,2,3. 
The equations (3-3-39), (3-3-40), (3:"'3-41), (3-3-45), 
(3-3-46), (3-3-47), and (3-3-48) can be used to calculate 
the distortions in the allocation of capital among sectors, 
due to a set of tax changes dTK. (j==1,2,3). The measure 
J 
of distortion is valid whether the initial set of taxes 
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is neutral or non-neutral. (In particular, initial taxes 
need not be zero.) For this reason, the model presented 
here can be used to analyse the effects of introducing a 
distortionary tax policy in an economy which is already 
distorted by a set of non-neutral taxes. This useful 
property is not enjoyed by any of the previous Harberger-
type analyses of tax incidence. 
The model can be specialized to consider the distor-
tions created by a move from a system of neutral taxes to 
the present system of non-neutral taxation. This specia-
lization affects nothing in the model so far; it merely 
permits an alternative form of (3-3-48) to be derived: 
Associated with a neutral tax system there a unit tax 
(i.e., tax per unit of capital T~. on capital employed in 
1 N 
Sector i. There is no need for TK. to be zero {which 
1 
is the restrictive assumption made by Harberger (1962), 
(1966», but it will be the same in each sector if unit 
net incomes (income per unit of capital) are equalized 
among sectors, and if there are no other non-neutral taxes 
in the economy. (3-3-48) can be specialized to obtain: 
(3-3-49) dK i 
N 3 3K i N 
=K.-K.= E ~T . (TK -TK) 1 1 j=lO Kj j 
3 3K. 3 3Ki N = E __ 1_. T" T 3T K -.~ ~T . K.' j=l K. j )=1 0 K. ) ) ) 
i=1,2,3. 
where: TK . is the present actual unit tax on capital in ) 
Sector j. 
K. is the capital stock employed in Sector i 
1 
under the present tax system. 
K~ is the stock of capital employed in Sector i 
1 
under neutrality. 
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The assumption of a fixed total supply of capital 
ensures that taxation induced distortions are reflected 
in changes in the allocation of capital, with no change 
in the total stock of capital. Now, if a set of unit 
taxes TN is neutral, and if the total capital stock K. 
J 
is in completely inelastic supply, then by finition 
N the taxes TK . must produce the same equilibrium allocation 
J 
of capital to each sector as if all the TK . were zero. 
Hence, 
(3-3-50) 
i. e. , 
(3-3-51) 
(3-3-51) 
(3-3-52) 
K~ 
1 
(TK .=O,j=1,2,3) 
J 
3 dK. N 3 dK. 
= ~ ___ l_. T _ ~ ___ 1_(0)=0, j=ldTK. Kj j=ldTK . 
J J 
3 dK i N .~ ~.TK.=O, 
J=l K. J 
J 
in (3-3-49) produces: 
3 dK. 
_ 1 
dK.- ~ ~T--.TK ' 
1 . 1° K . J= . J 
J 
J 
i=l,2,3. 
This is the measure of distortion suggested in Harberger 
(1964a.), and employed by Ott and Ott (1973). 
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The model, as it has been developed so far, is 
quite general in the sense that it can be employed to 
analyse tax-induced distortions in a variety of interesting 
contexts. In this thesis, the model is specialized to 
consider the general equilibrium implications of the 
favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. 
This context simplifies the expressions A., B .. , C., 1 1J 1 
and F .. , employed in the tax-incidence multipliers derived 1J 
above. There is virtually no labour income in the output 
f h · h th . d or rented. 23 . I . o ous1ng, w e er owner-occup1e n V1ew 
of this, applications of the model set the share of 
capital in the outputs of owner-occupied and rented 
housing equal to unity. A further sirnpli cation arises 
because all of the output of both owner-occupied and 
rented housing is for final consumption; put another way, 
the whole of the intermediate expenditure on capital 
employed in all three sectors is for output produced in 
the non-residential sector. To see the importance of 
these sirnplifications, denote 
Sector 1: Owner-Occupied Housing 
Sector 2: Rented Housing 
Sector 3: Other Industry 
Then, 
C =C =0 1 2 
M 
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F .. =n .IP K (TK -TK ), lJ l. . 3 i,j=l,2. ] J 
Even with these simplifications l however, there are 
a large number of parameters in the measure of distortion 
(3-3-52), which need to be estimated in order to apply 
the model developed here. In applying the model in Chapter 
4, some of the parameter value estimates employed have been 
taken from independent estimates provided by (among others) 
Laidler (1969) and Lee (1964). But an equal number of 
parameter values are obtained by inference: The general 
equilibrium structure of the model permits six parameter 
values to be inferred from independent estimates of the 
other six parameter values. The procedure adopted is 
detailed below. 
D D M M Estimates for nIl' n 22 , nI' n 2 , 03 are obtained from 
independent sources. To derive the other parameters (with 
the exception of n~3)' define the share of spending on 
Sector i final output, in total final spending, as: 
3 E 
P.D. P.Q. (1- E e .. ) 
(3-3-53) a i _ l l = II j=l Jl i=1,2,3. 
M 
It can be shown that 
(3-3-54 ) 
3 M 
l: a.·n. = l. 
. 111 1= 
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Hence, since values of ni, n~ are known, independently, 
estimates for n~ are easily derived on using (3-3-53) and 
D D D (3-3-54). The remaining parameters are n12' n21' n13' 
D D D D 
n 3l , n23' n32' n33" Using the property that demand func-
tions are homogeneous of degree zero, permits three equa-
tions in these seven unknowns to be derived: 
(3-3-55) 
3 
I 
j=l 
D M 
n .. +n. == 0, 
1J 1 
i=l,2,3. 
A further three equations in these unknowns are obtained 
from the Slutsky equation, as follows: 24 • The Slutsky 
equation might be written: 
(3-3-56) 
aD. 
1 
ap. 
J 
aD. aD. 
1 1 (ap.) -DjaM J u const. 
i,j 1,2,3, 
where: 
aD. 
1 (ap,) is the compensated cross-substitution 
J u const. 
term. 
But the Slutsky equation might also be written: 
(3-3-57) 
aD. 
_J 
ap. 
1 
oD. aD. 
( ~J) -D J 
oPi u const. i'oM' 
i,j=1,2,3, 
In addition, it is well-known that the cross-substitution 
terms exhibit symmetry,25. so that: 
(3-3-58) • aD. 1. (a P . ) 
J u const. 
aD. 
== (~) 
1. U const. 
Hence, on combining (3-3-56), (3-3-57), (3-3-58): 
(3-3-59) 
i. e. 
(3- 60) 
aD. aD. aD. aD. 
l. l. J J 
ap. + Dj.~ = ~ + Di'~ 0 
J 1. 
D D. D.D. M 1. 1. J 
n· .• P-+-M--' n . 1.J. 1. 
J 
D D. D.D. M J J l. n ..• P-+-M--' n . , J 1.. J 1. 
(3-3-60) can be rearranged to yield: 
(3-3-61) D 
P.D. D P.D. M M 
- J J J J( _ ) n .. -P-D . n .. +--M n. n· , 1.J . . J1. J 1. 1. 1. 
213 
i,j=1,2,3. 
i,j=1,2,3. 
Now, in equilibrium, with no savings, P.D./P.D. = a./a., JJ 1.1. J l. 
and P.D./M=a .. Hence, in equilibrium 
J J J 
(3-3-62) D n,· = 1.J a. 1. 
D M M 
n ' ,+a . (n ,-n . ) , J1. J J 1. i,j=1,2,3. 
The three equations provided by (3-3-62) can be used 
together with the three equations in (3-3-55) to obtain 
each of the cross-price elasticities from the known values 
D M M Md" 1 'bl 11 1 f n22 , n l , n2 , n3 , an a p aus1. e va ue 0 
3.4 THE BURDEN OF THE NON-NEUTRAL TAXATION OF CAPITAL. 
There are two effects of the taxation of income 
from capital: (1) Changes in the distribution of income; 
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and (2) impacts on economic efficiency. The second effect 
the subject of Section 3.5. The first effect relates to 
the incidence of taxes on capital income. This issue has 
been examined in some detail in earlier sections, but 
there is one aspect of tax incidence that has been left to 
this section: This is the question of tax burden. In 
particular, this section is concerned with the distribution 
of the burden of a non-neutral change in taxes on capital 
between the two factors of production, capital and labour, 
and on capital among sectors, Harberger (1962) addressed 
a related issue: Much of that paper is concerned with the 
burden of the corporation income tax. 
From (3-3-23), the mon value of national income 
can be written: 
(3-4 
3 A 3 3 
M - E (PK +0.q.)K.+ E TK K.+ E PL L .. i=l ill 1 1 j 1 i=l i 1 
The equilibrium conditions in the capital and labour 
markets permit: 
A 3 3 3 
(3-4-2) M = (PK+0q) E K.+ E TK K,+PL E L. 1 1. 1 . 1 . 1 1 1= 1 1= 
Dividing through (3-4-2) by PL gives an expression for 
national income in terms of labour (i.e., in units of 
labour) : 
(3-4-3) M 
3 
+ E L . 
. 1 1 1= 
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In the present model, labour has been taken as 
numeraire, so that PLo = PL = 1. Thence, the tax incidence ~ 
equation for dfK' (3-3-36), is actually an equation for 
d(PK/PL). The change in national income in terms of labour, 
following a policy change from neutral taxation to non-
neutral taxation is: 
(3-4-4) 
where: 
(3-4-5) 
M 
d(PL) 
P 3 if 
= d(pK) E K.+d(pK), 
L i=l ~ L 
if (~) is total tax revenue from capital income, in PL 
terms of labour. 
Evaluating d(TjPL) : 
3 N 
E TK K. -TK K .. . 1 . ~ ~ ~= ~ 
Capital can be said to bear the full burden of the 
non-neutral taxation of capital if the net income on 
capital falls by the same amount as the increase in tax 
3 
revenue. i.e., if -dPK E K. = difK, which can be written 
. 1 ~ ~= 
(3-4-6) 
-dT K 
3 
E K. 
i=l ~ 
In this case, d(MjPL) = O. Now, since labour is in fixed 
total supply, 
(3-4-7) r r 1 
dl:PL : L. j= ~ L. i=l ~ . i=l ~ L 
M 
• d (p) . 
L 
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3 
So, if d(M/PL == 0, d(M/PL EL,) = O. i.e., the share of 
. 1 J. J.= 
labour in national income is unaffected by the change in 
tax policy. 
3 3 
In other cases, if -dPK E Ki>dTK (i.e., -dPK>dTK/ E K.), i=l i=l J. 
then capital bears more than the ~ull burden of non-neutral 
3 3 
taxation. And if -dPK L K.<dTK (i.e., -dPK<dTK/ E K,) f i=l J.. i=l J. 
then capital bears less than the full burden of non-neutral 
taxation, with some of the burden falling on labour. In 
the first case, national income in terms of labour falls, 
and the share of labour in national income increases. i.e., 
3 
P E 
d(~) L. 1 < o , d J.= > O. PL M 
i.. 
In the second case, national income in terms of labour 
increases, and the share of labour in national income falls. 
i.e., 
> 0, < O. 
If PK/PL is unaffected by the policy change, then, since 
capital and labour are each in fixed total supply, 
A 
(3-4-8) 
P +Oq 
== d( K ) 
PL 
o 
3 
i~lKi PK+Oq 
3 .d( P
L
) 
L L. 
i=l J. 
==d 
A 3 
(PK + oq) L: K. /M i=l J. 
3 
PL E L./M 
. 1 J. J.= 
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This implies that the after-tax share of national income 
going to each factor changes by the same percentage. In 
this case, the burden of non-neutral taxation is shared 
between capital and labour in proportion to their (after-
tax) shares in national income. 
If labour bears the full burden of the non-neutral 
tax policy, then the share of the after-tax income of 
capital in national income must be unaffected by the 
pol icy. i. e . , 
(3-4-9) 
But this implies: 
(3-4-10) 
i. e. , 
( 3-4-11) 
On using (3-4-4) , 
dPK 
A 
o. 
3 M M PK 3 L K .. d(p -(p-)d(--) L K. 
1 L L PL i=l 1 
(P +8q) 
K 
~ K.l 2 
i=l 1 I 
(3-4-11) can be written 
3 
dPK L K. dTK 1 i=l 
+ == 
as: 
(PK +0q) 
~ 
or, 
3 
M-(PK+8q) L K. i=l 1 
== o. 
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, A 
which, on using the normalization that PK+8q 1, yields: 
(3-4-12) 3 
L: K.-M 
i=l 1 
This compares with (3-4-6) I in which case capital bears 
the full burden of non~neutral taxation. 
To summarize, capital bears the full burden of 
non-neutral taxation if (from (3-4-6» 
(3-4 13) = 
-dT K 
--3--
E K. 
i=l 1 
Capital bears more than the full burden of non-neutral 
taxation if 
(3-4-14) dP < K 
-dT K 
3 
E K. 
i=l 1 
The burden of non-neutral taxation is shared between 
capital and labour if 
(3-4-15) 
-dT K 
3 
L: K. 
i=l 1 
I 
and is shared between capital and labour in (precise) 
proportion to their (after-tax)shares in national income 
if (from (3-4-8» 
(3-4-16) 
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Finally, labour bears the full burden of non-neutral taxa-
tion of capital if {from (3-4-12» 
( 3-4-17) 
-dT K 
3 
L: K.-M 
i=l 1 
26. 
The burden of the non-neutral taxation of capital 
can also be separated into sectoral burdens. The burden 
of non-neutral taxes on capital in Sector i is simply the 
change in the net income obtained from capital employed 
in that Sector. This change in net income is: 
( 3-4-18) 
where: 
A 
d {(PK +8. q. ) K. } .11 1 
1 
(PK+eq) is the after-tax net value-added plus 
capital gains on one unit of capital after 
the disturbance, and is equal across sectors. 
The total burden of the non-neutral taxation of 
capital is the change in the aggregate net income of 
capital. In this three-sector model, this burden is 
(3-4-19) 
3 3 3 N 
L: d{(PK +8.q.)K.}=(PK+8q) E dK.+dPK E K. i=l ill 1 1 i~l 1 
3 N 
=dPK E K. 
. 1 1 1= 
A simple diagram (Figure 3-4-1) can be used to 
illustrate the burden of capital taxes on sectoral net 
incomes. Th illustration employs two sectors only {a 
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third sector is easily included, but adds nothing here) . 
In addition, there is a fixed total stock of capital, 
initial neutral taxes are zero (for simplicity), a tax is 
imposed on capital in Sector 1 only, and net value-added 
A 
plus capital gains per unit of capital (PK +0.q.) is .11 1 
equalised between sectors both before and after the distur-
bance. 
The schedules VMP~ , VMP~ , in Figure 3-4-1, are 
1 2 
net productivity schedules, and are defined: 
(3-4-20) VMP' K. 
1 
~ 
VMP (=p* )-(8 .+m.-G.) K. K. 1 1 1 
1 1 
i=l,2. 
These schedules can be related to the VMPK. schedule of 
1 
Figure 3-1-1: The schedule VMP~. can be obtained from 
1 
the schedule VMP K. by subtracting an amount Ei per unit 
1 
of capital. 
With no taxes on capital, equilibrium net income 
is 
A N (PK+0q) per unit of capital in each sector. If a tax 
is imposed at a rate TK per unit of capital in Sector 1, 
1 
the net- and gross-of-tax unit incomes (i.e., income per 
unit of capital) are separated by this amount in Sector 1. 
The quantity of capital employed in Sector 1 falls by 
(K~-Kl) units, while the quantity of capital employed in 
N N Sector 2 increases by an equal amount, (K 2-K 2 ) = (Kl-K l ). 
Net income on capital in Sector 1 is given by the area 
of the rectangle abcd before the disturbance; after the 
disturbance, it is ijkd. The net loss in net income is 
" (P K +8 1 q 1) + T K 1 1 
i ~~~ 'f ",0 le 
(PK+8q)N - T~l J~\;;:\ • ~ it 
" I (PK +8 1 q1 -1r; 
1 " VMP J 1 
=(PK +8 2q 2) K1 l 
2 d h 
Kl 
N 
Kl 
Sector 1 
A 
VMP' = VMP -(m.+8 -8.)q. K. K. l ill 
l l 
ql~ .~~ g~~~S 
N 
K2 
dK2 
K2 
Sector 2 
VMp D 
, K2 
CIj 
H 
GJ 
C 
~ 
t:!j 
W 
I 
~ 
I 
I-' 
N 
N 
I-' 
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. aboi+jock=K~dPK+(PK lql)dKl " The change in tax revenue 1 
is Imji=TK Kl . Sector 2 net income before the disturbance 1 
is given by the area of the rectangle efgh; after the 
disturbance it is prsh. The net increase in net income 
N A 
is qrsg-efqp=K2dPK+(PK +8q2)dK2. Since jock=qrsg, the 2 
net reduction in aggregate net capital income is aboi+efqp 
2 N 
=dPK L: K .• 
. 1 1 1= 
In terms of gure 3-4-1, caRital bears more than 
/precisely/less than, the full burden of the non-neutral 
> 
taxation of capital if aboi+efqpzlmji. 
Chapter 4 employs the measures of tax burden developed 
here to estimate the distribution of the burden of non-
neutral taxation among sectors, and between cap and 
labour. Estimates are derived for Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the united Kingdom, and the United States of 
America. In these applications it is convenient to write 
(3-4-18) as 
(3-4-21) Burden on Sector i 
N 
= dK.+dPKK. 
1 1 
A 
on using the normalization that (PK +8.q.)=1 .11 
1 
1,2(3) . 
3.5 THE WELFARE COSTS OF NON-NEUTRAL TAXATION OF CAPITAL. 
This Section presents a measure of welfare loss 
associated with the distortions due to the non-neutral 
taxation of income from capital. The measure adopted can 
be found (in part) in Hotelling (1938), Corlett and Hague 
(1953), and in other papers, and is developed explicitly 
in Harberger (1964a). 
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The diagrammatic illustration of tax burden, 
developed in Section 3.4, can be modified to illustrate27 . 
the measurement of the efficiency cost of non-neutral 
taxation in a two-sector model (again, the third sector 
adds nothing, except complexity, here). Figure 3~5-l 
has been developed for this purpose. 
Following the imposition of a tax TK in Sector I, 
1 
there is a transfer of capital from this sector to 
Sector 2. i.e., capital is transferred from the sector 
with the higher unit income gross-of-tax (this is the social 
unit rate of return) to the sector with the lower unit 
income. The loss in national income due to the removal of 
(K~-Kl) units of capital from Sector 1 to Sector 2 is the 
area abji less the area fglk. But since (K~-Kl)=(K2-K~), 
the area ecji is exactly matched by the area fglk. Hence, 
the remaining area of "deadweight loss" is the area abce. 
But this area can be written: 
(3-5-1 ) 
(3-5-1) is merely a special case of the generalized 
measure of welfare loss presented in Harberger (1964a). 
Hence, if a set of differential taxes TK. per unit of 
J. 
capital in Sector i is imposed on a previously neutral 
tax system, the change in welfare (expressed in units of 
income) is: 
(PK +Slql) + TK 1 
(PK+8Q)N 
A ... (P
K 
+q
1
81 ) q 1 
c 
~ I A (PK q2 8 2) 2 
dK1 
J 
Kl KN 1 
Sector 1 
"MP' 
VHP ' 
Kl 
i . ) q. 1 1 
k 
N 
K2 
dK2 
1 
K2 
Sector 2 
VMP' 
K2 
I§ 
~ 
tr.l 
w 
I 
U1 
I 
f-' 
N 
N 
..,. 
(3-5-2) 
where: 
~w = -~ETK dKo = 
o • ~ 
~ ~ 
-~EETK TK .Go 0 
o 0 0 0 ~J 
~J ~ J 
Go 0 
~J 
= dK./dTK ' in linear form. ~ . 
J 
This measure of welfare loss is derived in Harberger 
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(1964a). The derivation requires the linearity assump-
tion, G .. = dK./dTK ' and the symmetry of cross-substitu-~J ~ . 
J 
tion terms, (3-3-44). (3-5-2) is used to measure welfare 
losses in the sections which follow. 
Figure 3-5-1 can be used to relate the measures 
of tax burden developed in Section 3.4 to the measure of 
welfare cost developed here. In terms of Figure 3-5-1: 
the total burden on capital of the imposition of a tax 
TK on capital in Sector 1 is nbco+pfhq. nedo goes to 
1 
the government, and pfgq (=pfhq+fgh) goes to labour. 
Hence, the net loss so far is ebc. But labour income in 
Sector 1 falls by mabn, of which maen goes to the 
government. Hence, the total loss of national income 
is abe+ebc=abce. This is the welfare cost derived earlier 
in this section. 
In general, a non-neutral tax disturbance causes 
national income to fall by ~Wi taxes on capital change by 
3 N 3 N 
dTK= E TK K.-TK E K.; and net income due to capital changes i=l i ~ i=l ~ 
3 
by dPK E K .. Since there is only one other factor of 
. 1 ~ ~= 
production, the before-tax income of labour changes by 
3 
d(PLL)=-~W-dTK-dPKi~lKi' 
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3.6 SECOND-BEST OPTIMAL TAX POLICY. 
The previous Section presented a measure of the 
welfare cost of non-neutral taxation of capital. The 
"adding-up" property, (3-3-43), can be used to verify that 
there is no welfare loss if all the TK. are the same. ]. 
Thus, suppose that TK.=T~(i=I,2,3). Then (3-5-2) is: 
]. 
0, 
on using the adding-up property. 
Equality of unit tax rates on capital in all 
sectors generates the "first-best" optimal tax policy. 
For a number of socio-economic and political reasons this 
tax policy is unlikely ever to be followed by any Western 
government. As was seen in Chapter 2, the Governments 
of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States of America are committed to a policy 
of subsidizing owner-occupied housing, to encourage home 
ownership. The following question naturally arises: 
Given that owner-occupied housing is to be subsidized 
relative to Sectors 2 and 3, are there values of TK ' TK ' 
1 2 
and TK 
3 
subsidy? 
which would minimize the welfare cost of this 
i. e. , what are the second-best optimal tax rates 
(if they exist) for capital in each sector, given that 
owner-occupied housing is to be subsidized relative to 
rented housing? This question is examined in this section. 
As is usual in studies of differential tax incidence, 
it is assumed, here, that the government's fiscal programmes 
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require it to maintain the present total tax yield from 
capital (denoted TK). i.e., 
3 
(3-6-l) L: TK K. = TK 
. 1 . 1 1= 1 
The subsidy to owner-occupied housing is represented by 
an additional constraint: 
(3-6-2) s > o. 
The objective is to find values of TK ' TK ' TK which 
1 2 3 
minimize the welfare costs of the taxation of capital, 
subject to the constraints (3-6-l) and (3-6-2). 
written 
(3-6-3) 
On using (3-3-49), (3-3-52), (3-6-l) can be 
3 N 3 
L: TK ( K . + L: G. . TK ) = TK ' 
. 1 . 1. 1 1J . 1= 1 J= J 
where G .. is the linear form of ClKi/ClTK . (i,j=1,2,3). In 1J N J 
(3-6-3), K., G .. , are constants. The welfare cost of a 1 1J 
set of non-neutral taxes TK . (i=1,2,3) is presented in 
1 
(3-5-2). Hence, the second-best tax rates are the solution 
to: 
(3-6-4) 
3 3 
= ..... ~ L: L T T G .. 
i=l j=l Ki Kj 1J 
3 N 3 _ } 
-A l { L: TK {K.+ L: TK G .. )-TK i=l i 1 j=l j 1J 
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on using the symmetry conditions (3-3-44). Al , A2 are the 
Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints 
(3-6-1), (3-6-2) respectively. A2 is of especial interest, 
since it represents the marginal value of the owner-
occupier subsidy; i.e., it shows the additional welfare 
loss resulting from an arbitrarily small increment in 
the owner-occupier subsidy, evaluated at the second-best 
optimal solution. 
First-order necessary conditions for a minimum 
, 1 d 28. lnc u e. 
(3-6-5) 
(3-6-6) 
(3-6-7) 
Combining (3-6-5) and (3-6-6) reveals that 
(3-6-8) 
But from (3-6-7), 
(3-6-9) 
(3-6-9) in (3-6-8) reveals: 
(3-6-10) 
3 N 3 
( L K i /K 3) . l: G 3 . T K. = 0, 
i=l J=l J J 
which implies 
(3-6-11) 
3 
l: G3 . TK = o. j=l J j 
(3-6-11) is interesting: It reveals that there is no 
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distortion in the allocation of capital to Sector 3 (other 
industry) associated with moving from the n rst-best" 
neutral tax system to the second-best non-neutral tax 
system. i.e., the allocation of capital to Sector 3 
under second-best tax policy is the same as under 
neutrality. 
(3-6-11) in (3-6-7) reveals that A1 O. Hence, at 
the second-best optimum, the welfare loss is independent 
of the absolute level of capital taxation (at least, for 
small changes). This, too, is a "first-best" result, 
holding under neutral taxation. 
(3-6-2) in (3-6-11) reveals: 
(3-6-12) 
where the TK ' TK are understood to be the second-best 
1 3 
tax rates. The second-best TK ' TK are related by (3-6-2). 
1 2 
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(3-6-12) and (3-6-2) reveal that at the second-best 
optimum, 
( 3-6-13) 
Hence, when owner-occupied housing is subsidized relative 
to rented housing it is optimal to tax rented housing 
and non-residential capital at the same rate only if 
owner-occupied housing and other industry are economically 
independent. Complementarity implies T < TK ' for 
K2 3 
instance. 
From (3-6-5), (3-6-6) 
(3-6-14) 
(3-6-14) indicates that an arbitrarily small increment in 
S (denoted as) induces an additional welfare loss of 
3 
(3-6-15) z; as.Gl .• TK . = j=l J J 
The second-best optimal tax rate on owner-occupied 
housing is obtained by substituting (3-6-2) and (3-6-12) 
in (3-6-1): 
(3 6-16) 
G / 2 G 2 2 G32/ 2 if -SKN+ ( 32 G ) S~ -G S -G (32/ G33) S +2G23 ( G33) S T = K 2 33 3 22 33 
Kl 3 
z; K. 
. 1 1. 1= 
(3-6-16) can be used in (3-6-2) and (3-6-12) to obtain 
second-best tax rates TK ' TK . 
2 3 
231 
Welfare loss under second-best tax policy is, on 
using (3-6-11) in (3-5-2) 
(3-6-17) 
3 
~W = ~ L: TK dK. 
. 1 . ~ ~= ~ 
= ~SdKl 
where: dK. is the difference between capital employed in 
~ 
Sector i under second-best tax policy, and 
capital employed in Sector i under neutrality. 
The next Chapter, which applies the general 
equilibrium model developed here, calculates numerical 
values for the second-best tax rates TK , TK ' TK ' given 1 2 3 
that owner-occupied housing to be subsidised. It also 
measures the improvement in welfare that would arise if 
the second-best policy were to replace existing tax policy. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE: 
1. Of course, if we are interested in the distortions due 
to non-neutral taxation, initial taxes are neutral. 
2. This procedure is described in detail in Shoven and 
Whalley (1972). It cannot easily be related to the 
Harberger approach. 
3. The differences correspond to the differences involved 
in using Paasche and Laspeyres index numbers to 
measure welfare change. 
4. This is analogous to the question of the burden of 
the corporation tax, analysed in Harberger (1962). 
5. These different types of income are described in 
Section 1.3. 
6. The implications of this result are explored in the 
next section. 
7. The "impact" of a tax is to be distinguished from the 
incidence of the tax. The "impact" relates to the 
(Seligman (1959, p.203)) " •.• immediate result of the 
imposition of a tax on the person who pays it in the 
first instance." 
8. For an account of the controversy, see Krzyzaniak and 
Musgrave (1963), (1970) on the one side, and Cragg, 
Harberger, and Mieiszkowski (1967), (1970) on the 
other. . 
9. Sumner (1973, p.984). 
10. Sumner does not elaborate. 
11. Tambini (1969 pp.186-l87). 
12. ibid. p.187. 
13. This seems to be the interpretation Harberger (1964a) 
has in mind. 
14. Depending upon the size of the output effects. 
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15. It is well-known that this tax policy is not neutral 
with respect to savings,however. 
16. This point is made by Ballentine and Eris (1975, p.636, 
n.7). It is likely that the assumption of no income 
losses biases the Harberger model towards a finding 
of no income losses. But it is not easy to see why, 
in terms of the equations of the Harberger model. 
17. A separable market is one for which there are sufficient 
behavioural equations to permit the determination of 
the endogenous variables in that market, independently 
of other markets. 
18. No other intermediate inputs are explicitly recognized 
in this model. 
19. Use these summary statistics simplifies the complex 
expressions which follow; it also permits economy 
computation in Chapter 4. 
20. These reservations about the ott and Ott (1973) paper 
were developed in Chapter 1. 
21. See Harberger (1964a), for instance. In mathematical 
language, (3-3-44) is the "integrability condition". 
22. Harberger (1964a) offers a different economic explana-
tion. His explanation is less satisfying, since it 
requires the examination of measures of welfare loss 
due to taxes. The intuition offered here is not so 
restrictive. 
23. There are no figures available, but Denison (1964, 
esp. p.18) nds the labour content to be so small 
that he does not publish it. At the extreme, Ott and 
Ott (1973) assert that a capital share of unity is 
de f in i tiona 1. 
24. Debreu (1974), Diewert (1977) demonstrate that when 
the number of consumers equals or exceeds the number 
of commodities in a pure exchange economy, the aggre-
gate excess demand function need satisfy no restric-
tions other than continuity and Walras' Law. In 
particular, the Slutsky conditions will generally not 
hold. However, . Diewert (1980) proves that the Slutsky 
symmetry conditions hold for aggregate demand functions 
if individual preferences are "quas i-homothetic" in 
the Gorman (1953) sense. Essentially this assumption 
was made to defend the use of aggregate demand curves, 
earlier in this Section. 
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25. See Hicks (1946, p.3l0). 
26. 
3 
Note that ~ K.-M<O, 
i=l 1 
3 
than -dT/ L K .. 
. 1 1 1= 
3 
so that -dT/( L K.-M) is greater 
i=l 1 
27. Harberger (1966) offers a similar illustration, and 
others appear in Shoven and Whalley (1972, pp.292-293), 
and Shoven (1976, pp.1263-l265). This is only an 
illustration. Many of the tax incidence terms in 
(3-3-36) do not appear here. 
28. On using the symmetry conditions (3-3-44) I and the 
adding-up restrictions (3-3-43). 
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CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATIONS OF THE THREE-SECTOR MODEL 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Th Chapter applies the three-sector general 
equilibrium model of Chapter 3 to an empirical investiga-
tion of the distortions created by housing polic s in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. This analysis requires making use 
a large number of parameter values. In most cases, 
parameter values are inferred from independent studies. 
Section 3.3 developed the general equilibrium 
model, and indicated that its application to an analysis 
of housing policy permits some simplification. The "own~ 
price" tax multipliers, for which numerical values are 
computed below, are: 
D 
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and the change in net rental pr of capital, , is: 
3 
(4- 4) 1: B 
j 
{ 
where: D = Al { 
From (3-1-2), (3-1-6), note that 
(4 -5) p* = q.{(l-u.)r (l-~.}+(l-u )r ~.+m.+o.-0.}+TK I K. 1 1 C 1 m m 1 1 1 1 . 
1 1 
1,2,3. 
where: IT.+t.q.+u r ~.q. is the unit tax rate on 
111 m m 1 1 
capital employed in Sector i. 
237 
In applying the model developed in Chapter 3 it 
is necessary to obtain unit tax rates, TK., for capital 
1 
employed in each s~ector. In Secto~ 3, which includes both 
corporate and unincorporated enterprises, this unit tax is 
taken to be 
(4-1-6) 
3 
Each of the other two sectors (owner-occupied and rented 
housing) are assumed to be composed entirely of unincor-
d . 2. h porate enterprlses, so t at 
(4 -7) 
IT.K. + t.q.K. + u r ~.q.K. 
1 1 111 m m 1 1 1 
K. i=1,2, 
1 
which corresponds to the theoretical unit tax developed in 
Chapter 3. There is, of course, no error in using the unit 
tax in (4-1-6) if Sector 3 is composed either entirely of 
corporate, or of unincorporated, enterprises. 
Application of the general equilibrium model requires 
estimates for everyone of the variables in (3-1-3), (3-l-4), 
(4-l-S). It is, of course, not possible to obtain official 
estimates for many of these variables, although in many 
cases it is possible to infer "likely" values from other 
official statistics. Values chosen for u. are intended to 
1 
describe the tax rate of the "representative" asset-owner, 
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and values of u , the "representative" mortgagee. It is not 
m 
possible to avoid error in choosing these values. But 
perhaps the major source of error in the es~imates presented 
in this Chapter is in the selection of an appropriate set 
of 8.. These values are intended to represent the "expected" 
~ 
rate of capital gain on assets. The difficulty in selecting 
"correct" values for these variables needs no emphasis. 
Since so many of the variables employed in this Chapter are 
necessarily only approximately accurate, care has been 
taken to detail the logic by which they were obtained. The 
Appendix B-4-2 details data sources and methods. 
Having declared the likelihood of using "incorrect" 
values for some of the variables required in the estimations 
below, it should be noted that this does not prevent the 
final estimates from providing an lIorder of magnitude" 
calculation. Frequently, this is the most that can be 
expected of exercises in applied economics. 
Once the variables in (4-1-5) have been obtained, 
it is then possible to compute values for 
A 
(4-1-8) = [PK* -(m.+8.-e.)q.-TK ]K. . ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ = (PK +8. q. ) K . . ~ ~ ~ 
(4-1-9) M 
= 
~ ~ 
== K., 
~ 
3 
E M + 
. 1 K. ~= ~ 
3 
E K. + 
i=l ~ 
3 
E TK K. + 
. 1 . ~ ~= ~ 
3 
3 
E PL L. 
. 1 . ~ ~= ~ 
E TK K. + L3 , i=l i ~ 
~ 
i=1,2,3. 
(4 -10) 
(4-1-11 ) 
tP K. == 
~ 
ct>K == 
"-
(PK +8.q.)K. 
. ~ ~ ~ 
~ 
M 
3 
3 ~ K. i=l ~ ~ ct>K. == 
i=l ~ M 
= 
K. 
~ 
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D Values for each of the elastici ties n.. (i=l, 2; j==l, 2,3) 
~J 
are obtained on using (3-3-62), (3-3-55), and certain "known" 
parameter values. This exercise requires estimates of 
expenditure shares. Expenditure shares are calculated by 
(from (3-3 3)): 
(4-1-12) G. 
~ 
(4-1-13) 
P. D. 
~ ~ 
M = 
p* K. 
K. ~ 
~ i=1,2 
Estimates of expenditure shares also permit estimation of 
M (. M M) d' n3 g~ven n l , n 2 ' accor ~ng to 3-54) . 
With estimates of the elasticities, it is possible 
to compute values for 
(4 -14) 
(4-1-15) 
(4-1-16) 
(4-1-17) 
B .. 
~J 
A. :::: 
~ 
o 
M == nij 
~ K. 
+ n.tP K I ~ . 
J 
D 
n· 38 K ~ 3 
p* 
K3 
3 
~ B .. 
j=l ~J 
J 
M 
+n.tP K ~ 3 
i,j 1,2, 
i,j=1,2, 
i==1,2. 
i=1,2. 
Then, on obtaining values for 03 (the elasticity of subst 
tution between capital and labour in Sector 3, "other 
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industry"), and 8 = PR K3/(P~ K3+L 3), estimates of each K3 3 3 
of the aK./aTK ( ,2,3) are easily obtained. Using 1 . 
1 
estimated values for TK . 
1 
(i=1,2,3) the distoFtions, dK., 
1 
are derived on using (3-3-52), and the welfare loss asso-
ciated with the non-neutral.taxation of housing capital 
is computed from (3-5-2). 
Section 4.2 presents an empirical evaluation of 
the distortions due to the non-neutral taxation of housing 
in the five Western countries, identi ed above. 4.2.1 
presents a re-examination of La ler's analysis. 4.2.2 
presents order of magnitude calculations of the size of the 
owner-occupier subsidy. 4.2.3 estimates the welfare cost 
of non-neutral taxation of housing. 4.2.4 examines the 
distribution of the burden of non-neutral taxation among 
sectors, and between factors. 4.2.5 estimates second-best 
tax rates (following the analysis of Section 3.6), and 
estimates improvements in welfare that might be associated 
with the introduction of the second-best tax policy. Section 
4.3 presents some sensitivity analysis. In particular, it 
indicates the sensitivity of estimates presented in earlier 
sections to changes in certain key parameter values. 
In the case of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United States, the three sectors identified are: 
Sector I, owner-occupied housingi Sector 2, rented housing; 
and Sector 3, other industry. However, in the case of the 
United Kingdom, the sectors are: Sector 1, owner-occupied 
housing; Sector 2p local authority housing; and Sector 3, 
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other industry. In the United Kingdom case, private rental 
housing is ignored: This tenure group accounts for approxi-
mately 13 percent of dwellings, only; 56 percent of dwellings 
, 
are owner-occupied, and the remaining 31 percent are rented 
from local authorities. 
4.2 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE DISTORTIONS DUE TO THE 
NON-NEUTRAL TAXATION OF HOUSING IN FIVE WESTERN 
COUNTRIES. 
4.2.1 Re-examination of Laidler's Analysis. 
La's (1969) analysis examines the welfare cost 
(in terms of Marshallian consumer surplus) that arises 
because the failure to tax consumers on the (imputed) 
service income generated by owner-occupied housing in 
United States. The analysis is partial equilibrium in 
nature. The unit subsidy to o~mer-occupiers is defined 
as the d ence between tax liability if imputed income 
on owner-occupied housing were treated as nother" income, 
and present tax liability. The welfare cost is the dead-
weight loss associated with this subsidy. 
La r's partial equilibrium analysis is a spec 
case of the general equilibrium analysis developed here. 
Because the model is the most frequently cited 
analy of the welfare cost of the owner-occupier subsidy, 
it is important to examine its general validity in the light 
of the model developed here. 
The value marginal product of owner-occupied housing 
is the value, in terms of income, of the marginal utility 
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associated with the consumption of owner-occupier housing 
services. In equilibrium, this marginal utility equals 
the gross imputed rental value (including taxes) of one 
un of owner-occupied housing, PK • In Laidler's analysis, 1 
there is no inflation or capital gains. If imputed income 
on owner-occupied housing were to be taxed like "other 
income ll , owner-occupiers would be permitted deductions for 
repairs, maintenance, and casualty insurance premiums 
(mlqlKl ), depreciation (olqlKl ), state and local property 
taxes (tlqlKl ) and mortgage interest payments (rm~lqlKl)' 
and would be taxed on the net income derived from 
equity in the house. Hence, on using (3-1-4), income tax 
ility under "neutrality"3. is unit of capital) : 
(4-2-1) 
The gross rental price of owner-occupied housing under 
"neutrality" is, on using (,4-1-5) 1 (4-2-1), and ignoring 
capital gains: 
(4-2-2) PK (N) 1 
Actual taxation of owner-occupied housing is not 
neutral in the Laidler sense. The tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing has been fully described in Section 2.2 
(part (e)). Ignoring capital gains, these tax provisions 
imply, on using (3-1-4): 
(4-2-3) 
The actual gross rental price is, on using (4- 5), (4-2-3): 
(4-2-4) 
The subsidy due to the non-neutral taxation of 
owner-occupied housing is (per unit of capital): 
(4-2-5) S = P* (N) - P* = ill (N) - ill Kl Kl 
= ul{rc(l-~l)+rm~l+tl}qlo 
Since 
TN 
= ITl(N) + tlql + Umrm~lql Kl 
TK = IT + tlql + umrm~ 1 ql' 
1 1 
the unit subsidy can be written: 
(4-2-6) 
On assuming (as Laidler does) that rc r , (4-2-5) is 
m 
(4-2-7) 
A comparison of (4-2-7) with (2-2-50), the unit 
subsidy obtained in Section 2.2, reveals that the unit 
subsidies are identical if there are no capital gains. 
The implications of capital gains for the size of the 
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owner-occupier subsidy depend, most significantly, upon AI' 
the proportion of accrued capital gains actually realised 
in the tax period. Hence, on using (2-2-50), no capital 
gains are realised, the unit'subsidyis that used by, Laidleri 
but if, on the other hand, all capital gains are realised 
as they accrue, the unit subsidy is: 
244 
(4-2-8 ) 
where it is assumed that realised capital gains are taxed 
as long-term capital gains according to the fifty percent 
rule, described in Section 2.2 (e). 
Laid1er's computation of the distortion in capital 
stocks, arising from the owner-occup subsidy, is a 
special case of (3-3-48): 
(4-2-9) 
1 
Hence, it is implicitly assumed that 
(4-2-10) 0, all j -:j. 1. 
This is the essence of partial equilibrium analy s. A 
further restriction of the partial equilibrium technique 
is its implication that the net rate of return on capital 
is invariant with respect to the tax rate on housing income. 
This implies that 
(4-2-11) 
= 1, 
1 
which is the assumption implicitly made by Ott and Ott 
(l973) • 
yield: 
The tax multiplier, 8K1/8TK ' may be expanded to 1 
(4-2-12) 
where: 
ap* 
Kl 
aTK 
p~ (N) 
1 
1 
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:::;; 
is the own-price elasticity of 
demand for owner-occupied housing, . 
evaluated at the point on the 
VMPK schedule which corresponds 1 
to neutral taxation. 
As is \vell-known,5. given perfect competition, and profit 
maximization with constant returns to scale, the own-price 
elasticity of demand for capital may be expanded so that 
(4-2-13) 
Since 8L 0 in this analysis (i.e., 8K 1), there is no 1 1 
difference between the elasticity demand for housing as 
D 
a factor of production (nKl) , and the elasticity of demand 
for housing as a consumer good. Accordingly, (4-2-2) I 
t4-2-13) in (4-2-12) gives: 
(4 -2 4) 
where it has been assumed that r = r . 
c m 
Since 
(4-2-14) can be written, in terms of Kl! 
aKl 
D 
(4-2-15) nIl (Kl-dKl ) 
aTK 
== ql{rc+ml+ol+t l } 
, 
1 
which, on using (4-2-9) reveals: 
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(4-2-16) 
(4-2-16), (4-2-7), (4-2-9) yields, as the expression 
for "overinvestment" i.n housing: 
(4-2 7) 
The Marshallian deadweight loss associated with 
the "overinvestment", dKl, is: 
(4 2-18) 
(4-2-17) in (4-2-18) reveals: 
(4-2-19) 6W =: 
(4-2-19) is the measure of welfare loss employed by 
Laidler. Apart from its partial equilibrium restrictions, 
the obvious weakness of the Laidler analysis is its 
ignorance of capital gains. If capital gains are included, 
overinvestment is, on using (2-2-50), (4-2-5), in (4-2-17), 
(4 2-20) 
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and the welfare loss is: 
This welfare cost measure might be smaller than, larger 
than, or equal to, the Laidler measure, depending upon 
A 
the relative sizes of AI' 8 1 , and ul . 
Table 4-1-1 re-works the Laidler estimates of 
dK l and 6.W under the following additional assumptions: 
Capital gains accrue at a nominal rate of 5 percent per 
annum, but are not realised. The other parameter values 
used by Laidler are r 
c 
, 
.06, 01 = .0225, ml .0125, 
D 
tl .015, and nIl = .5. In this special case, (4-2-20) 
permits 
(4-2-22) 
0.1125ul q l Kl 
qldK l = .06+.ll25ul ' 
and (4-2-21) permits 
(4-2-23) 6. W == 
-.0042l875U1Q1Kl 
.06+.ll25ul 
Data used in Table 4-1-1 are for the United States, 
1960, and are taken from Table 3 of Laidler (1969). The 
significance of capital gains clear: A rate of capital 
gain of 5 percent per annum implies an over investment in 
owner-occupied housing of $98,331 million (compare with 
Laidler's $61,775 million) f and an annual welfare loss of 
$813 million (compare with Laidler's $510 million.) The 
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point of this revision is not to suggest that Laidler's 
estimates are inaccurate; this cannot be asserted without 
having reliable data on expected rates of capital gain 
on housing. What the revision is intended to demonstrate 
is that if there are expectations of capital gains on 
housing, measures of distortion can generate quite 
different results, depending upon the treatment of those 
capital gains. 
4.2.2 The Owner-Occupier Subsidy in Five Nestern 
Countries 
The analysis of Chapter 2 permits an order of 
magnitude calculation of the size of the owner-occupier 
subsidy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America, on using the 
aggregate data of Tables B-I to B-S. The results, 
presented in Tables 4-2-2 to 4-2-6, permit a variety of 
marginal tax rates. 
(a) Australia: 
From (2-2-8), the aggregate value of the owner-
occupier subsidy in Australia is: 
(4-2-24) 
where: u I is the marginal tax rate of the representa-
tive owner-occupier. 
Using the aggregate data of Table B-I (Appendix B-4-2) , 
this is 
.T-·, 
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TABLE 4-2-1: Overinvestment in Owner-Occupied Housing 
and Implied We1 re Losses; Accounting 
for Capital Gains; United States, 1960. 
($ Million) 
Value of OWner- Relevant Overinvest::n:ent Annual Welfare 
()ccupied Ma.rginal LDss 
Housing Stock Incarre 
Tax Rate Laid1er Revision Laid1er Revision 
7954 0 0 0 0 0 
20006 .20 3381 5456 -25 -41 
, 
31024 .20 5243 I 8461 -39 -63 
I 
46065 .20 7785 12563 -58 -94 
,I 
48641 .20 I 8220 13266 -61 -99 I 
82641 .22 15208 24138 -125 , -199 
I 
42741 .22 7864 , 12482 -65 I -103 I I I I 
I I i 
67020 .26 14074 ! 21965 I -137 I -214 
I i I 
1 i i 
346105 61775 I 98331 I -510 
i 
-813 
I 
Notes: 1. Data are from Laid1er (1969, Table 3). 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
Capital gains are assumed to accrue at a 
rate of 5% p.a., but not be realised. 
Le., 1..1 = 0; 81 = .05. 
Estimates assume rc .06; 01 = .0225: m1 = 
.0125; t1 .015; n~l = -1.5. 
Estimates of overinvestment are obtained by 
applying the formula in (4-2-22) to va1ue-of-
owner-occupied-housing data. 
Estimates of welfare loss are obtained by 
applying the formula in (4-2-23) to va1ue-of~ 
owner-occupied-housing data. 
(4-2-25) 
u 
= -J-:-{ {l-ul )42l1.88+l754.95-32l8.8} l-ul 
= 114211.88- 1463.85 
Table 4-2-2 presents illustrative calculations 
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of the owner-occupier subsidy, for a variety of marginal 
tax rates effective in Australia in the fiscal year 
1976-77. The figures are quite large for reasonable 
representative marginal tax rates. As Table B-1 reveals, 
the subsidy to owner-occupied housing is approximately 
as large as total (direct plus indirect) tax revenue 
from rented housing: 
(b) Canada: 
On using (2-2-20) I the aggregate value of the 
owner-occupier subsidy is 
(4-2-26) SKI 
Assuming that one-half of capital gains are realised, 
the data of Table B-2 (Appendix B-4-2) reveal: 
(4-2-27) 
u l SK = u1 7585.02- -- 2293.86 1 l-u 1 
Table 4-2-3 presents illustrative calculations 
of the owner-occupier subsidy in Canada, under a variety 
of marginal tax rates. The marginal tax rates shown are 
a selection of effective (federal plus provincial) 
marginal rates applying to individual income-earners 
TABLE 4-2-2: 
I 
.20 I 
I 
t I I Subsidy 476.41 
L 
The Owner-Occupier Subsidy in Australia; 
Different Marginal Tax Rates; Fiscal 
Year Ending 30 June, 1977. 1 . 
.27 
($ million per annum) 
Marginal Tax Rate of Representative 
Owner-Occupier (ul ) 
I I I .35 .45 .55 .60 
I 
595.78 ! 660.91 697.65 527.38 331.35 
i 
Source: See Text. 
Notes: 1. Estimates correct to 2 decimal places. 
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.65 
19.14 . 
~ 
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TABLE 4-2-3: The Owner-Occupier Subsidy in Canada; 
Different MarginallTax Rates; Year Ending 
31 December, 1978 .. 
($ million per annum) 
Marginal Tax Rate of Representative 
Owner-Occupier (ul ) 2" 
.2304 .2736 .36 
I 
.5184 .6192 
I 
Subsidy 1060.86 1211. 27 1440.31 I 1462.94 966.71 i 
, , 
I I I 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. Estimates correct to 2 decimal places. 
2. Marginal tax rates are a selection of 
effective (federal plus provincial) rates 
affecting individual income-earners filing 
returns in Ontario. 
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in the province of Ontario. The figures presented in 
Table 4-2-3 might be compared with a Federal Government 
expenditure of $945 million on housing in 1978. 6 . Every 
one of the illustrative calculations presented in Table 
4 2-3 exceeds this figure (although in some cases by 
only a small amount). 
(c) New Zealand: 
In view of (2-2-26) the subsidy to owner-occupied 
housing in New Zealand, before the introduction of the 
mortgage interest rebate is 
(4-2-28) 
Using the data of Table B-3 (Appendix B-4-2), this is 
(4-2-29) 
u l l-u
l 
{(1-ul }2010.75-718.13} 
Table 4-2-4 presents estimates of the subsidy to owner-
occupied housing for a variety of different marginal 
tax rates effective New Zealand in the fiscal year 
ending 31 March 1978. 
It is clear that the subsidy to owner-occupied 
housing implied by New Zealand tax legislation is sign 
ficant. The figures presented in Table 4-6-3 might be 
compared with other items of Government "expenditure" on 
housing: In the fiscal year 1977-78, $54.254 million was 
I 
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TABLE 4-2-4: The Owner-Occupier Subsidy in New Zealand; 
Different Marginal Tax Rates; Fiscal Year 
Ending 31 March, 1978. 1 . 
($ million per annum) 
Marginal Tax Rate of Representative 
Owner-Occupier (ul ) 
.421459 .485917 .50575 .595 
I 
! 
I 
, Subsidy 324.30 298.27 i 282.10 , 141. 37 I 
I I I 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. Estimates correct to 2 decimal places. 
, 
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paid to the Housing Corporation by way of annual appro-
priation; $58.3 million was paid out for housing construc-
tion under various works programmes. The sum of these two 
most important actual expenditure items is less than the 
subsidies computed in Table 4-6-3, even when the marginal 
tax rate is .595 (the highest marginal tax rate in 1977-
78) . 
(d) The United Kingdom: 
In view of (2-2-39) the value of the owner-
occupier subsidy in the United Kingdom is 
(4-2-30) SK = 1 
Using the data of Table B-4 (Appendix B-4-2), this is 
(4-2-31) 
(il - .15) 
1155.06- 1 3390.88 (l-ul ) 
Estimates of the annual value of the owner-occupier subsidy 
in the United Kingdom are presented in Table 4-2-5(a). 
A variety of marginal tax rates are considered. The 
figures are large. They might be compared with total 
explici t subsidies of £ 1387 million to local authority 
housing in 19780 7 . 
In Section 2.2 the subsidy to local authority housing 
was defined as the increase in user costs if the target 
rate of return on local authority housing were set equal 
to the social rate of opportunity cost, and rentals were 
taxed as private rentals under present law. In view of 
TABLE 4-2-5 (a): 
.25 
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The Owner-Occupier Subsidy in the 
United Kingdom; Different Marginal Tax 
Ratesi Year Ending 31 December, 1978. 1 • 
( £, million per annum) 
Marginal· Tax Rate of Representative 
Owner-Occupier (ul ) 
.30 .40 .50 .60 
: Subsidy i 2313.76 j 2625.44 3166.55 3543.16 
i 
3631. 91 
Source: See Text. 
Notes: 
I 
I 
Subsidy 
1. Estimates correct to 2 decimal places. 
(b) : The Subsidy to Local Authority Housing 
.25 
3646.76 
in the Un Kingdom; Different 
Marginal Tax Rates of Representative 1 
Landlord; Year Ending 31 December, 1978 •. 
( £ million per annum) 
Marginal Tax Rate of Representative 
Landlord (u2 ) 
i 
.30 .40 .50 .60 
3522.50 3211. 85 2776.95 2124.60 
I 
Source: See Text. 
Notes: 1. Estimates correct to 2 decimal places. 
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(2-2-40) the annual value of the subsidy to local authority 
is 
(4-2-32 ) 
using the data of Table B-4, and assuming that t4 = .01, 
A4 0.5, the local authority subsidy is 
(4-2-33 ) 
u 2 
= 3107.24+587+ 
l-u 2 
(u2-·l5) 890.67 2582.8 
Estimates of the value of the local authority subsidy 
are shown in Tab 4-2-5(b). The estimates are much the 
same as for owner-occupier subsidy; they dominate the 
explici t Government subsidy of a:, 1387 million to local 
authority housing in 1978. 
(e) The United States of America: 
From (2-2-40), the value of the subsidy to owner-
occupied housing in the United States is 
(4-2-34) 
Using the aggregate data of Table B-5, this subsidy is 
(4-2-35) 
l-~ul 
= u l 12431.85-ul 1240.02, l-ul 
where it has been assumed that one-half of accrued capital 
gains on owner-occupied housing are realised. Table 4-2-6 
presents estimates of the owner-occupier subsidy for a 
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TABLE 4-2-6: The Owner-OccupierSubsi.dy in the United 
States; Di.fferent Marginal Tax Rates: 
Average 1953-59. 1 . 
($ million per annum) 
Marginal Tax Rate of Representative 
Owner-Occupier (ul ) 
.20 .22 .26 
, 
Subsidy 2207.37 2423.73 2853.24 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. Estimates correct to 2 decimal places. 
I 
i 
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variety of marginal tax rates effective in the united States 
in 1960. 
The subsidies presented in Table 4-2-6 are quite 
large, as they are in other countries considered here. 
Even a marginal tax rate of .20 implies a subsidy which 
is 6.6 percent as large as total tax receipts from capital 
in all uses, and 50 percent as large as present tax receipts 
from all housing. 
4.2.3 The Welfare Cost of the Non-Neutral Taxation of 
Housing. 
Tables 4-2-7 to 4-2-11 describe the computation of 
the distortions due to the non-neutral taxation of housing 
capital, for each of the five Western countries examined 
in other sections. The tables show unit tax rates, tax 
multipliers, estimates of overinvestment (dK.) in each 
1 
sector, and they present estimates of the annual welfare 
loss due to non-neutral taxation. Table 4-2-12 presents 
capital allocations in each country under present law, 
and under neutral taxation. The estimates presented in 
Tables 4-2-7 to 4-2-12 are discussed below. Each country 
is examined. 
(a) Australia: 
Table 4-2-12 reveals that under neutral taxation 
58.65 percent of housing would be owner-occupied. 
Presently, approximately 68.3 percent is owner-occupied. 
Non-neutral taxation causes a flow of 785.32 million 
normal units (generating $785.32 million per annum under 
~ 
ff 
ti 
1 
2 
3 
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TABLE 4-2-7: computation of Distortions in Capital 
Allocation; Australia; Fiscal Year Ending 
30 June, 1977. 
Unit Tax 
on ca~ital 
T • 
K. 
1 
($/Nonnal 
Unit) 
009841' 
I .2617 x 
I I 
.3558 i 
.~ 
-
Estimates of dK. /dTK Estimates of 1 • OVerinvest:ment J 
dK. 4. dK. dK. 1 
_l_=~ 
3TK. dTK. (Million Norroa.l 
J 1 Units) 1. 
-
-4831. 38 1918.98 2912.40 1083.02 
1918.98 -2085.8 166.82 ;- -297.7 
2912.40 166.82 -3079.22 
Annual W=lfare loss: 2 . 
($ Million) 
-785.32 
-
122.80 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. One normal unit generates one dollar of net 
income under present law. Figures correct 
to 2 decimal places. 
2. The welfare loss is a positive figure. It 
is the negative of the change in national 
income due to non-neutral taxation. 
3. Figures correct to 4 decimal places. 
4. Figures correct to 2 decimal places. 
! 
i 
I 
i 
I 
f{? 
~ 
1 
2 
3 
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TABLE 4-2-8: Computation of Distortions in Capital 
Allocation; Canada; Year Ending 
31 December, 1978. 
Unit Tax Estimates of dK./dTK Est.imates of on capital ~ . Overinvestrnent J T 3. 
dK. dK. 4. dK. K. ~ 
~ aT~ = ~ (Million Normal ($ftbrrral Units) 1. Unit) j i 
,... , 
- -
.1844 -4760.06 2107.48 2652.58 1209.51 
.2886 x 2107.48 -3288.08 1180.60 - 97.82 
I 
, 2652.58 1180.60 -3833.18 I I -1307.33 .5576 J i 
--
l.. 
--
Annual Welfare Loss: 2. I 
($ Million) 238.82 
Source: See Text. 
Notes: 1. One normal unit generates one dollar of net 
income under present law. 
2. The welfare loss is a positive figure. It 
is the negative of the change in national 
income due to non-neutral taxation. 
3. Figures correct to 4 decimal places. 
4. Figures correct to 2 decimal places. 
I 
! 
f1? 
~ 
1 
2 
3 
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TABLE 4-2-9: Computation of Distortions in Capital 
Allocation; New Zealand; Fiscal Year 
Ending 31 March, 1978. 
Unit Tax 
on ca~ital 
T • 
K. ]. 
($/Norrnal 
Unit) 
, 
.2574 
. 4463 x 
j .3776 
Estimates of 8K./8TK 
aK. 
]. 
aTK. 
J 
-1534.85 
550.97 
983.88 
]. . 
J 
= aI}j 
4. 
8TK. ]. 
550.97 983088l 
-762.23 211.26 . 
I 211.26 -1195.14 J 
Annual Welfare Loss: 2 . 
($ Million) 
Estimates of 
Overinvesi:Irent 
dK. ]. 
(Million :tb:r:rnal 
Units)l. 
222.27 
-
-118.61 .-
-103.66 
17 .43 
Source: See Text. 
Notes! 1. One normal unit generates one dollar of net 
income under present la"". 
2. The welfare loss is .a positive figure. It 
is the negative of the change in national 
income due to non-neutral taxation. 
3. Figures correct to 4 decimal places. 
4. Figures correct to 2 decimal places. 
I 
1 
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4-2-10: Computation of Distortions in Capital 
------------- Allocation; united Kingdom; Year Ending 
31 December, 1978. 
unit Tax 
on ca~ital 
T • 
K. 
1 
( /Nonra1 
Unit) 
Estirna.tes of ClK, /ClTK 1 . 
J 
ClK, ClK. 4. 
3T~, :: aT;, 
J 1 
Est.iroates of 
Overinvestment 
dK. 
1 
(Million Nonna1 
units) 1,5 
r 
.
. 10161' 
4 i .-.4129 x 
-10149.34 10717.96 568.62 
10717.96 -16531.56 5813.60 
-3411. 29 l 
6705.64 ' 
, 
3 I : .3941 Ji 
; L 
-568.62 5813.60 -5244.98 J -3294.35 ! 
L ~ 
2 6 Annual Welfare Loss: ' 
(£ Million) 
2917.04 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. One normal unit generates one POlli1d of net 
income under present law. 
2. The welfare loss is a positive figure. It 
is the negative of the change in national 
income due to non-neutral taxation. 
3. Figures correct to 4 decimal places. 
4. Figures correct to 2 decimal places. 
5. 
6. 
dK. 
1 
~W == 
(G'lTK +G'4TK +G'3TK )-dK, (1), i=1,4,3. 1114 1 3 1 
-~{TK (dKl+dKl(l)+TK (dK 4+dK 4 (1» 1 4 
+TK (dK3+dK3(1»}-~W(1) 3 
~ 
~ 
1 
2 
3 
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TABLE 4-2-11: Computation of Distortions in Capital 
Allocation; United States; Average 1953-59. 
! I 
Unit Tax 1 Estima.tes of K./ TK 
I Estimates of I 
on ca~ital ~ . I Overinvestrrent J T . 
K. K. 4. dK. K. , ~ 
~ _~_= _J_ (Million ~rrral ($/Nonnal TK. TK. I units) 1. Unit) J ~ i 
; 
.3561 -4076.19 2383.91 1892.28 , 2622.66 I 
.6691 x 2383.91 -2382.00 -1.91 1= -747.66 
i 
1.4650 1892.28 -1.91 -1690.37 -1875.00 
~ J L 
Annual Welfare Loss: 2. 1156.58 
($ Million) 
Source: See Text. 
Notes: l. One normal unit generates one dollar of 
net income under present law. 
2. rfhe welfare loss is a positive figure. 
It is the negative the change in 
national income due to non-neutral 
taxation. 
3. Figures correct to 4 decimal places. 
4 • Figures correct to 2 decimal places. 
TABLE 4-2-12: Capital Allocations in Five Western Countries; 
Present Law, Neutral Taxation. 
capi tal Allocations 
Present Law Neutral Taxation 
~_s= ~ !g8l0\0 g~o\O c: s= ~_ ~8I~ g~o\O Country/ 
''"0 ~ 0 '"0°0 ~-~ ~ "0°0 
Sector ft~~ 1-'- Hl 1-'- fjj HI rt ~ 1-'- ~ Hl 1-'- g Hl ft ft ~- UJ 1-'- ft ft ~-1-'8 I-' I-'lQ ~g ~ 1-'..0 
Australia: 
1. Ckmer-OCCUpierl 4405.63 
! 
68.30 3322.61 58.65 
Housing 
2. IEnted Housing 2044.36 31.70 2342.06 41.35 
'lbtal Housing 6449.99 ! 19.02 100 5664.67 16.71 100 
3. Other 
i 80.98l Industry 27464.62 I 28249.94 83.29 
'IDTAIS 33914.61 100 I 133914.611 100 i 
I 
canada: I I 
1. Ckmer~cupierl 7585.02 ; 60.30 6375.51 56.56 
Housing i 
I 2. Rented Housing 4993.78 : 39.70 4895.96 I 43.44 
'lbta1 Housing 12578.80 29.19 I 100 ' 11271.47 ! 26.16 100 
: I I 3. Other 30509.95 I I Industry 70.81 i 31817.28 i 73.84 ' i I 
I 
i 
'lOl'ALS 43088.75 100 43088.75 t 100 
! 
New Zealand: I 
1. Ckmer~ierl 1723.50 70.00 1501.23 I 63.65' 
Housing 
2. Rented Housing 738.64 , 30.00 857.25 36.35 
'lbta1 Housing ~~62.14 42.36 100 2358.48 40.57 100 
3. Other 3350.84 57.64 3454.5 59.43 Industry 
'IDTAIS 5812.98 100 5812.98 100 I 
I i i 
United Kingdan: I I 1. <Mner~cupierl 7587.82 1 53 . 09 ! 10999.11 100 Housing 
I 4. IDeal Authority 6705.64 i 46.91 0.00 0.00 Housing , I 
'lbtal Housing 14293.46 28.94 I 100 10999.11 I 22.27 100 
3. Other I I I 
Industry 35089.44 I 71.06 I 38383.79 I 77.73 I 
'lQI'ALS 49382.90 100 I 49382.90 i 100 i 
! I 
Uni terl States: i : ! I i , 
1
55
•
77 1. <Mner~cupierl 17929.84 I 61.15 15307.18 i 
I 
I 
Housing j I I I 
2. Rented Housing 11392.81 I 38.85 12140.47 : 44.23 
'lbta1 Housing 29322.65 1 25.01 100 27447.65 ; 23.41: 100 
3. oth:!r 87926.69 I 74.99 89801. 69 : 76.59 Industry 
'lQI'ALS 117249.34 100 1117249 • 34 : 100 
Source: See Text 
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present law) of capital from non-residential, to residential, 
uses. 
Table 4-2-7 presents the welfare cost of the non-
neutral taxation of housing (using 3-5-2). The figure is 
$122.8 million per annum. The estimate is large by COID-
parison with Reece's (1975) estimate of $15.745 million 
as the annual deadweight loss due to the Australian owner-
occupier subsidy in 1966-67. 8 . Whether the figure 
obtained here is absolutely large or small cannot be 
answered objectively. Nevertheless, some feel for the 
magnitude of the loss can be obtained by viewing the 
measure in a more familiar context. The welfare cost 
arising from the non-neutral taxation of housing capital 
was approximately $9.50 per capita in 1976-77. It might 
be even more enlightening to view the welfare cost as 
representing the dollar value of extra resources the 
government could appropriate if it were to remove the 
non-neutral tax provisions and seek to maintain the same 
level of aggregate welfare as at present. 9 . This figure 
of $122.8 million might then be compared with a total 
government outlaylO. (in 1976-77) of $164 million for 
h · d . .. 11. f . ouslng an communlty amenltles, or lnstance. 
The welfare loss measures presented in Tables 4-2-7 
to 4-2-11 do not pretend to measure the total loss in 
welfare due to the non-neutral taxation of capital. One 
reason is that many deadweight losses are likely to be 
obscured by the level of aggregation employed here; 
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distortions within sectors generate no deadweight losses 
in this analysis. A second, related, reason is that the 
sectoral break-up used here almost certainly generates 
smaller measures of welfare loss than would be generated 
by many other sectoral break-ups, since the welfare loss 
measure depends upon the nature of the sectoral break-up. 
(b) Canada: 
Table 4-2-12 reveals that under neutral taxation 
56.56 percent of housing would be owner-occupied, compared 
with 60.3 percent under present law. Nearly all the 
distortion in capital allocation due to the non-neutral 
taxation of housing is between owner-occupied housing and 
non-residential activity: Of the 1307.33 million (normal) 
units of capital moving from non-residential uses to 
housing, as a result of non-neutral taxation, 1209.51 
million (normal) units (92.52 percent) are attracted to 
owner-occupied housing. 
The estimated welfare cost of the non-neutral 
taxation of housing is estimqted to be $238.82 million in 
1978. This is approximately $10 per capita. 
(c) New Zealand: 
Tables 4-2-9 and 4-2-12 reveal. the pattern of dis-
tortion in capital allocation, due to non-neutral taxation 
of housing in New Zealand. Under neutral taxation, 63.65 
percent of housing would be owner-occupied; under present 
law the figure is 70 percent. Non-neutral taxation causes 
a flow of 103.66 million normal units (generating $103.66 
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million of net income annually) from non-residential, to 
residential p uses. Most of the distortion in capital 
allocation is between housing tenures, however. 
The welfare cost of non-neutral taxation is $17.43 
million per annum, approximately $5.50 per capita in 1977-
78. Notwithstanding the considerations elaborated in 
the Australian study, estimate of welfare loss obtained 
here does seem to be quite small, relative to the 
measures derived for other countries. There are some 
good reasons for this. It is c from the formula used 
to measure welfare losses, that the measured loss is 
larger the more the tax-induced "underinvestment" 
concentrated in the most heavily taxed sector, and the 
larger is the dispersion in unit tax rates among sectors. 
In the case of New Zealand, more than 50 percent of the 
overinvestment in owner-occupied housing (the most lightly 
taxed sector) is at the expense of investment in rented 
housing (the most heavily taxed sector), but the dis-
persion in tax rates among sectors is quite low. The tax 
rate on owner-occupied housing is higher in New Zealand than 
in the United States because of the general ineligibility 
of mortgage interest payments and local property taxes as 
tax deductions in New Zealand. Furthermore, the unit tax 
on Sector 3 income is remarkably low in New Zealand. In 
this sector, income taxes as a percentage of gross-of-tax 
net income, excluding capital gains, (i.e., IT3K3 ~ p~ K3 ) 3 
are only 9.77 percent. Much of the income of this sector 
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is earned by corporate enterprises, and is nomina y 
subject to corporate taxation at a rate of 45 percent. 
Any after-tax income distributed to shareholders is then 
taxed as individual income. The fact that the average 
tax rate on Sector 3 income is so small is indicative 
of this sector's ability to take advantage of substantial 
incentive taxation allowances and exemptions, including 
two different investment allowance schemes, a tourist 
promotion allowance, and at least four different export 
incentive allowances. In 1975-76 (the last year for which 
this datum is avail ) these incentive allowances reduced 
Sector 3 taxable income by some $116.2 million, over 26 
percent income taxes actually paid. 
(d) The United 
The study of the welfare cost of the non-neutral 
taxation of housing in the United Kingdom is not as 
straight-forward as in other countiies. Under present 
united Kingdom housing policy, both owner-occupied and 
local authority housing receive preferential tax treatment 
relative to capital employed in non-residential activity. 
The first step in assessing the welfare implications of 
this policy is to measure the distortions in capital 
allocation associated with the policy. As was shown in 
Chapter 3, the distortions can be measured, in principle, 
by considering the changes in capital allocation that 
would eventually occur if the present tax system were 
replaced by a system which levies the same unit tax rate 
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(possibly zero) on capital in all uses. In the United 
. h' . 1 1 h' d 1 . 12 . K1ngdom, t e emp1rlca resu ts of t 1S stu y are pecu 1ar. 
They reveal that the introduction of a neutral tax policy 
would cause more units of capital to move out of local 
authority housing than are presently employed in that 
sector. 
The result presented above suggests that neutral 
taxation would be associated with a negative quantity of 
capital employed in local authority housing. This is not 
a feasible result, of course. Because the result is not 
feasible, it is important to explain why it arises, in 
the context of the model developed in Chapter 3. One 
weakness of the general equilibrium model, revealed by 
this result, is the absence of non-negativity constraints; 
the model implicitly assumes interior solutions with 
respect to the efficient allocation of factors. Another 
weakness of the model, emphasised by this result, is its 
linearity assumptions: in particular, the assumption of 
constancy of tax multipliers is untenable for large changes 
in tax rates. 13 . On the other hand, the fact that results 
like this do not arise in the study of any other country14. 
suggests that a large part of the explanation of this 
result is simply that the United Kingdom housing policy 
exhibits considerably less neutrality than housing policies 
in other countries. 
Because the "first-best" allocation of capital to 
local authority housing is not feasible, an empirical 
assessment of the distortions due to united Kingdom housing 
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policy is necessarily more complicated than for other 
countr s. The analysis proceeds in a number of stages. 
The first step is to identify the least distorted feasible 
solution, and the associated policy. The figures presented 
in Tables 4-2-10 and 4-2-12 are estimates of the diffe-
rences between capital allocations, and levels of national 
income, under present law, and under the least distor-
tionary feasible policy. Under the least distortionary 
\ 
feasible policy, there is no capital employed in local 
authority housing. Under the (infeasible) "first-best" 
tax policy, the stock of capital employed in local authority 
housing is -2175.66 million normal units. Hence, with 
respect to the "first-best" policy, the distortion 
the allocation of capital to local authority housing under 
the least distortionary feasible policy is 
(4-2-36) dK4 (1) = 3501.04 million normal units. 
It can be shown that a tax policy which minimizes welfare 
loss subject to (4-2-36) 15. 
(4-2-37) TK ::::: TK 0, 
1 3 
TK ::::: 
dK4 (1) 
4 G 44 
(4-2-38) 
This tax policy implies 
(4-2-39) 
G 
dKl{l) ::::: dK4 (1) (~) = -2269.84 million G44 
normal units. 
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(4-2-40) 
G 
dK 3 (1) = dK (1) (~) = -1231.20 million normal 4 G44 
units. 
(4-2-41) l\W(l) = 
= £ 370.72 million per annum. 
The distortions presented in Tables 4-2-10 and 
4-2-12 are 
(4-2-42) 
(4-2-43) 
(4-2-44) 
(4-2-45) 
-3411.29 million normal units 
-3294.35 million normal units 
dK 4 = ,( G 41 T K 1 +G 44 T K 4 +G 43 T K 3) -dK 4 ( 1 ) 
= 6705.64 million normal units16 . 
l\W = -~{TK (dKl+dKl(l})+TK (dK4+dK4 (1)) 1 4 
+TK (dK 3+dK 3 (1}}}-l\W(1) 3 
= £ 2917.04 million per annum. 17. 
The estimated welfare cost of the present tax system 
relative to the least distortionary feasible policy is 
approximately £50 per capita in 1978. Th is considerably 
larger than the figures computed for any other country, 
But even this might not be the most appropriate manner in 
which to view the welfare cost of United Kingdom tax 
policy: It is probably more illuminating to observe that 
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the annual welfare loss is greater than the annual rental 
value (including subsidies) of local authority housing. 
(e) The United States of America: 
Table 4~2-12 presents the precentage distribution 
of capital stocks among sectors under present law, and 
under neutrality. Under neutral taxation, 55.77 percent 
of housing would be owner-occupied; during the period 1953~ 
59, the figure was 61.15 percent. Table 4-2-11 reveals 
that most of the distortion in capital allocation due to 
the non-neutral taxation of housing is between residential 
and non-residential uses. This is in contrast to the New 
Zealand pattern. Non-neutral taxation causes a flow of 
1875 million normal units from non-residential, to resi-
dential uses (where one normal unit generates $1 of net 
income in average 1953-59 prices). 
The welfare cost of non-neutral taxation averaged 
$1156.58 million, annually, during the period 1953-59. 
This estimate can be compared with previous estimates of 
the welfare cost of the non~neutral taxation of housing in 
the United States. It is signi cantly larger than the 
welfare loss computed by Laidler (1969) on the basis of 
1960 data (compare $1156.58 million with $510 million). 
One interesting reason for this is that,as White and White 
(1977) have suggested, Laidler's technique underestimates 
the deadweight loss of the owner-occupier subsidy by 
failing to consider the distortions created in the alloca-
tion of capital among rental and owner-occupation. The 
~" 
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model developed here explicitly allows for this particular 
distortion, and in a more general manner than is adopted 
by Hhite and White (1977). In addition, the present model 
permits consideration of distortions between residential 
and non-residential uses, and these also imply welfare 
losses. 
The estimate of Table 4-2-11 can be updated, and 
compared with the welfare cost statistic computed by Ott 
and Ott (1973). Christensen (1971) estimates a stock of 
capital corporate and residential uses of $1480.6 
llion, and an after-tax rate of return to capital of 
9.5 percent, in 1969. These figures imply an after-tax 
return to capital in 1969 of $140,657 million. Following 
Ott and Ott (1973), the estimate of welfare loss presented 
in (4-2-127) is found to be (1156.58 ~ (Er q.K~) = 
. c l l 
l 
1156.58 ~ (9281.77+5220.99+23715.55) =) 3.873 percent of 
the after-tax return to capital on average 1953-59 data. 
Assuming, as Ott and Ott (1973) do, that "economic waste" 
is a constant proportion of the after-tax income of 
capital, the welfare cost of the non-neutral taxation of 
capital in 1969 is estimated to be $5,447.16 million. 
This value is significantly smaller than the $11.7 billion 
Ott and Ott (1973) obtain using the same data as has been 
used here. In part, the reason for this difference is 
the assumption made by Ott and Ott (1973) that capital 
taxes are not shifted (backwards). A further source of 
difference lS that the present analysis permits comple-
mentarity; Ott and Ott (1973) do not. 
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4.2.4 The Burden of the Non-Neutral Taxation of Housing. 
(4-1-4) permits an examination the distribution 
of the burden due to non-neutral taxation between factors, 
and among sectors. A number of non-neutral tax changes 
are of interest, but only two are considered here. The 
first (A) is an equal-yield tax disturbance such that 
3 N 3 N 
~ TK K.-TK(A) Z K. = O . 
. ~ . 1 ~ ~ ~= 
There is only one neutral tax rate satisfying this equa-
tion, of course. A second non-neutral tax disturbance of 
interest (B) is a move from a system which taxes capital 
in uses at the rate presently ed on non-residential 
activity, to the present non-neutral tax system. In this 
latter case, the change in tax revenue is 
(where N TK(B) = TK ), which is non-zero in general. 
3 
Tables 4-2-13 to 4-2-17 present estimates of tax 
burdens and "benef sIt by sector, due to each of the tax 
disturbances A and B. Estimates are derived for Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 18 . The tables are largely self-explanatory. A 
deta discussion of the Austra results is presented 
here, and some inter country comparisons are made. 
Table 4-2 3 reveals that capital bears more than 
the full burden of an equal-yield non-neutral tax distur-
bance in Australia. The distribution of the burden among 
sectors is of interest. The "benef 11 to Sector 1 (owner-
occupied housing) is $1006.78 million per annum. The 
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TABLE 4-2-13: Tax Benefits and Burdens by Australian 
Sector; Present Law, Neutral Tax Policies; 
Fiscal Year Ending 30 June, 1977. 
($ Million Per Annum) 
Tax Burdenj Tax Payments Difference 
Factor Benefit!. Under Neutrality Present & Neutral 4. Taxes 
rJ!I (A) 2. 3. 2. N 3. 2. 
I 3. ~(B) T~(A) TK(B} ~(A) :~(B) K K 
I 
n Cfl 1· 1006.78 1137.50 1052.13 : 1182.07 -625.06 -755.78 OJ CD 
re 0 f-4. IT 
IT 0 2 -337.10 -245.51 74l. 833.22 -206.65 -298.24 OJ Ii 
f-' 
3 -1240.25 -136.27 8945.56 10050.33 831. 71 -272.27 
Totals; -570.57 755.72 10739.32 • 12065.62 I 0 -1326.29 
labour 447.77 447.77 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. Defined as the change in net income due to 
non-neutral taxation. Burdens are negative; 
benefits are positive. 
2. T~(A} = $0. 3167jNormal Unit. 
3. T~(B) = $0. 3558jNormal Unit. 
4. Defined as: Present Taxes minus Neutral 
Taxes. 
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TABLE 4-2-14: Tax Benefits and Burdens by Canadian 
Sector; Present Law/ Neutral Tax Policies; 
Year Ending 31 December, 1978. 
($ Million Per Annum) 
I 
Tax Burden/ Tax payments Difference .Between 
Factor Benefitl. Under Neutrality Present & Neutral 4. Taxes 
~(A) 2. T~(B) 3. T~(A) 2. T~(B) 3. ~(A) 2. !~(B) 3. 
! 
b? (ft! 1 1299.25 1916.75 2937.27 3554.78 -1538.53 -2156.04 
'"d (') ! f-'. rt 2 166.73 640.93 2255.63 ! 2729.83 -814.21 -1288.41 Et g 
f-' 
3 -859.46 2222.20 14658.61 17740.27 2352.74 -728.92 
I 
Totals: 606.52 4779.89 : 19851.51 : 24024.88 
! 
0 , -4173.37 
, 
I , I 
I.a.}:x:)ur -845.34 , -845.34 , 
I 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. Defined as the change in net income due to 
non-neutral taxation. Burdens are negative; 
benefits are positive. 
2. T~(A) = $0. 4607/Norma1 Unit. 
3. T~(B) = $O.5576/Norma1 Unit. 
4. Defined as: Present Taxes minus Neutral 
Taxes. 
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TABLE 4-2-15: Tax Benefits and Burdens by New Zealand 
Sector; Present Law, Neutral Tax Policies; 
Fiscal Year Ending 31 March, 1978. 
($ Million Per Annum) 
Tax Burden/ 'Tax Payments Difference Between 
Factor Benefit3. Under Neutrality Present & Neutral 4. 
g: 
'"Cl f-'. ' 
IT' 
PI f--': 
Taxes 
~(A) 2. ~(B) 3. N 2'1 ~ 3. I 2 ' 3. TK(A) K(B) I ~(A) . I ~(B) 
r 
~: 1 244.82 I 285.17' 526.46 : 566.81 -82.76 -123.11 
() , I 
IT' I o ' 2 -105.73) -82.69, 300.63: 323.67 29.06 6.02 I-i 
.74 ! 
, 
3 41. 09 : 1211.45 I 1304.28 53.70 -39.14 
Totals 87.35 243.57 , 2038.54 2194.76 0 -156.22 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. Defined as the change in net income due to 
non-neutral taxation. Burdens are negative; 
benefits are positive. 
2. T~(A) := $0. 3507/Norma1 Unit. 
3. T~(B) $0. 3776/Norma1 Unit. 
4 . Defined as: Present Taxes minus Neutral 
Taxes. 
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TABLE 4-2-16: Tax Benefits and Burdens by United Kingdom 
Sector; Present Law, Least Distortionary 
Feasible Policy, Year Ending 31 December, 
1978. 
( £. Million Per Annum) 
Tax Burden/ Tax Payments Difference :Between 
Factor 13enefit1. Under Neutrality Present & Neutral 4. 
l 
~l 
, I-'.! 
s-: 
f-J' 
, 
~(A) 2. r 
: 
~:1 -2526.41 @, 
~ ,4 6705.64 
; 
, 
~(B) 3. ~(A) 2. 
-826.67 2635.45 
6705.64 o 
Taxes 
~(B) 3. I ~(A) 2. ~(B) 3. , 
4335.19 -1864.33! -3564.07 
o -2768.84' -2768.84 
3, -206.35 5725.26 9196.99, 15128.60 4633.17; -1298.44 
Totals: 3972.88: 11604.23; 11832.44: 19463.79 
I 
I 
o -7631. 35 
l.aJ:x)ur 
-6889.92 -6889.92: 
I 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. Defined as the difference between net income 
under present law and net income under least 
distortionary feasible tax policy. Burdens 
are negative; benefits are positive. 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
T~(A) =£ 0.2396/Norma1 Unit. 
TN(B) =£ 0.3941/Norma1 Unit. 
K 
Defined as: Present Taxes minus Tax Payments 
under Least Distortionary Feasible Policy. 
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TABLE 4-2-17: Tax Benefits and Burdens by United States 
Sector; Present Law, Neutral Tax Policies; 
Average Annual, 1953-59. 
($ Million Per Annum) 
Tax Burden/ Tax Payrre:nts Difference Between 
Factor Benefit1 . Under Neutrality Present & Neutral 
'I'a:Xes4• 
~ 1-'. 
or 
I-' 
~(A) 2. ~(B) 3. ~ 2. ~(B) 3. rt: 2. ~(B) 3. K(A) K(A) 
i 
~ 1 2593.51 4409.07 5220.28 I 7035.84 -2576.21 -4391. 77 g i 
ti 2 -777.54 1084.02 5352.56 7214.12 -2557.99 -4419.55 
I 
3 '::'2001.52 5879.48 22660.26 30541.27 5134.20 -2746.81 
! 
Totals -185.55 11372.58 33233.10 44791.23 0 -11558.13 
Lal:x:>ur -971.03 -971.03 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. Defined as the change in net income due to 
non-neutral taxation. Burdens are negative; 
benefits are positive. 
2. T~(A) = $1.0869/Norma1 Unit. 
3. T~(B) = $1.465/Norma1 Unit. 
4. Defined as: Present Taxes minus Neutral 
Taxes. 
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burden on Sector 2 (rented housing) is $337.10 million 
per annum. And the burden on Sector 3 (other industry) 
is $1240.25 million per annum. The "excess burden" on 
capital is the net loss in the aggregate net income of 
capital. This lIexcess burden" is $570.57 million per 
annum. Since the aggregate loss in national income is 
(this is the welfare loss) $122.80 million, and there is 
no change in tax revenue, labour income increases by 
$570.57-$122.80 =) $447.77 million per annum. 
Table 4-2-13 also presents the tax burdens due to 
the second non-neutral tax disturbance. In this case, the 
"benefitll to owner-occupied housing dominates the burdens 
imposed on capital employed in rented housing and in other 
industry. There is a net "benefit", to capital as a whole, 
of $755.73 million per annum. In this case, however, there 
is a loss of tax revenue of $1326.29 million per annum. 
The increase in labour income is ($1326.29-$755.75-$122.80 =) 
$447.77 million per annum. 
The change in labour income is the same in both 
cases, A and B. This result can be explained as follows: 
If taxes on capital are neutral initially, the imposition 
of a different neutral tax rate causes a redistribution of 
income between capital and government, with no effect on 
national income. This is because capital is assumed to 
be in fixed (perfectly inelastic) supply. There is, in 
consequence, no burden (or "benefit") on labour resulting 
from a neutral tax disturbance on capital. NOw, in general, 
a set of tax changes dTK.(A) 
1 
N 
= {TK.-TK(A)}, i=l,2,3, can 
1 
282 
be written: dTK. (A) = {TK.-T~(B)} - {T~(A)-T~(B)}, i=1,2,3. 
l l N N 
But the set of disturbances {TK (A) -TK (B)} has no e,ffect on 
labour income. Hence, the fect on labour income due to 
N 
a set of tax disturbances dTK. (A) = {TK.-TK(A)}, 1,2,3, 
l l 
is the same as the effect on labour income due to a different 
N 
set of tax disturbances dTK . (B) = {TK.-TK(B)}, ,2,3. 
l l 
This is the result illustrated in Table 4-2-13. 
other countries exhibit somewhat different patterns 
of tax burden arising from the non-neutral taxation of 
housing. For instance of the five countries considered, 
Australia is the only country for which labour '''benefits" 
as a result of the non-neutral tax treatment of housing. 
Tables 4-2-13 to 4-2-17 also present estimates of 
the tax payments by sector ,under each non-neutral tax 
policy. It is interesting that in Australia, Canada, and 
the United States, tax payments on both owner-occupied 
housing and rented housing, under each neutral tax policy 
(which imply higher than present unit tax rates), exceed 
tax payments under present law, even after all the adjust-
ments in capital allocation that would be associated with 
a move to neutral taxation. In a Marshallian partial 
equilibrium analysis, of the sort employed by Laidler (1969), 
this result would be possible only if the demand for housing 
were relatively inelastic (Le., n.~' :> -1, i=1,2); in 
II 
fact, the demand is relatively elastic. Perhaps even more 
interesting for policy makers is the result that in Sector 
3, tax payments actually fall with no change in the tax 
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rate on capital in that sector, under the second of the 
non-neutral tax disturbances considered here. These obser-
vations serve to illustrate the dangers involved in using 
partial equilibrium models to examine tax incidence. 
4.2.5 Second-Best Tax Policy 
Section 3.6 developed an analytical discussion of 
second-best tax policy in relation to housing. This 
Section presents estimates of the second-best tax rates on 
capital in each sector, and estimates the improvement in 
welfare which would result from a move to the second-best 
tax policy. Tables 4-2-18 and 4-2-19 present the results 
for each country, excluding the United Kingdom. 19. Table 
4-2-18 shows present, and second-best, tax rates on 
capital, and the welfare improvement associated with the 
second-best policy, in each country. Table 4-2-19 shows 
capital allocations under second-best tax policy. 
The results presented in Tables 4-2-18 and 4-2-19 
are remarkable. In particular, the United States'results 
deserve some discussion. The results presented in Table 
4-2-18 reveal that the United States Government could 
initiate a policy which taxed capital in all uses at lower 
rates than at present, while still maintaining the same 
total tax yield from capital, and the same unit subsidy to 
owner-occupied housing, and in so doing could remove 89 
percent of the welfare cost of non-neutral taxation under 
present law. Table 4-2-18 presents the appropriate set of 
unit tax rates to achieve these results. The second-best 
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TABLE 4-2-18: Second-Best Tax Policy; Comparison of 
Present and Second-Best Tax Rates; Welfare 
Improvement due to Second-Best Tax Policy; 
Four Western Countries. 3. 
Country Tax Rates on Capital Welfare Improvement 
1\ Units of .! 
%2. 
TK TK TK National I 
1 2 3 Income i 
1 
I 
I 
Australia ($/Normal Unit) ($m. p. a. ) I 
Present Law .0984 .2617 .3558 I I 
Second-Best .2996 .4629 .3084 95.12 77.46 
Canada ($/Normal Unit) ($m. p. a. ) 
Present Law .1844 .2886 .5576 
Second-Best .4529 .5301 .4580 222.94 93.35 
New Zealand ($/Normal Unit) ($m. p. a. ) 
Present Law .2574 .4463 .3776 
Second-Best .3074 .4963 .3408 4.5 25.82 
United States ($/Normal Unit) ($m. p. a. ) 
Present Law .3561 .6691 1. 4650 
Second-Best .2531 .5661 .2527 1032.01 89.23 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. The figure is: Present Welfare Loss-Second-
Best Welfare Loss. 
2. The figure is: 
-(Second-Best Welfare Loss-Present Welfare Loss) 
Present Welfare Loss 
3. United Kingdom not analysed. 
TABLE 4-2-19: 
Country/ 
Sector· 
Australia: 
1. ONner~cupied 
Housing 
2. Rented Housing 
Total Housing 
3. Other 
Industry 
'IDTALS 
Canada: 
1. ONner~cupied 
Housing 
2. Rented Housing 
Total Housing 
3. Other 
Industry 
TOI'ALS 
New zealand: 
1. CMner~upied 
Housing 
2. Rented Housing 
Total Housing 
3. Other 
Industry I 
TOI'AIS 
Uni tErl States: 
1. CMner-Q::cupied 
Housing 
2. Rented Housing 
Total Housing 
3. Other 
Industry 
TOI'ALS 
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Capital Allocations in Four Western 
Countries; Present Law, Second-Best 
Tax Po1icy.1. 
Capital Allocations 
Present Law Second-Best Taxation 
i 
fJ6!:10\0 Er ff ~. ~ ff ~. r;? bl 0\0 ~bl~ r;?tr:0\0 '~I-J t'Qgo t'Q°o ~'ll-J t'Qgo fA ~ ~. H"l ~. ffi H"l rt I-J ~. fit H"l ~. H"l 
I-Jg i g g~' tIl ~. S"I-J g~' g I-J 
! 
I 
i 4405.63 I 
i 
68.30 3661.61 64.64 I 
2044.36 I 31.70 2003.06 35.36 
6449.99 19.02 I 100 5664.67 16.71 100 
27464.62 
I 
i 
80. 98 1 28249.94 83.29 i 
, 
33914.61 100 33914.61 100 , 
7585.02 I 60.30 6680.26 59.27 , 
4993.78 39.70 4591.21 40.73 
12578.80 29.19 100 11271.47 26.16 100 
30509.95 70.81 i 31817.28 73.84 
43088.75 100 ! 43088.75 100 ! 
I 
, 
1723.50 
I 
70.00 1638.17 69.46 
738.64 30.00 720.31 30.54 
2462.14 42.36 100 ; 2358.48 40.57 100 
3350.84 57.64 I 3454.5 59.43 
5812.98 100 .5812.98 .. 100 
17929.84 61.15 16103.18 58.67 
11392.81 38.85 11344.47 41.33 
29322.65 25.01 100 27447.65 23.41 100 
87926.69 74.99 89801.69 76.59 
117249.34 100 117249.34 100 
Source: See Text 
Notes: 1. United Kingdom not analysed. 
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tax rates derived for Canada remove an even larger percentage 
of the wel cost of non-neutral taxation, but requires 
taxing housing (both owner-occupied, and rented) more 
heavily than at present. 
The United States i result has some analogy with the 
"Laffer curve", at the centre of the recent renewed interest 
in so-called lisupply-side" economics. Supply-s economics 
emphasises the role of tax rate changes in distorting 
economic decisions between work and leisure, savings and 
consumption, and market and non-market activity. The Laffer 
curve suggests the possibility that increases in tax rates 
might distort economic decisions in such a way as to reduce 
aggregate output, and even tax revenue. The United States' 
result obtained above arises because of the fects of tax 
rate changes on the allocation of capital, rather than on 
the total supply of capital. Further, the result depends 
upon unequal changes in sectoral tax rates: an equal reduc-
tion in tax rates in each sector has no aggregate supply-
. d ff . h dId 1 d' h 3 20. S1 e e ects 1n t e mo e eve ope 1n C apter . 
Of all the countries examined here, New Zealand 
exhibits the smallest welfare improvement under a second-
best tax policy. In part, the reason for this is the 
relatively low degree of dispersion among tax rates under 
present law. But even in the case of New Zealand, the 
second-best tax policy would remove more than 25 percent of 
the welfare loss associated with present tax policy. 
Significantly, in the case of New Zealand, capital alloca-
tions under second-best tax policy are not very different 
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from capital allocations under present law. Hence the 
"social costs" (referred to in Chapter 1) associated with 
a shift from owner-occupied to rental housing are likely 
to be insignificant. 
4.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS. 
Applications of the three-sector general equilibrium 
model of tax incidence require the specification of a large 
number of parameter values. In particular, own-price, 
cross-price, and income elasticities of demand are required 
for each of the three sectoral outputs, and an estimate of 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour 
in Sector 3 ("Other Industry") has also to be specified. 
n~3' the own-price elasticity of demand for Sector 3 final 
output, presents the most difficulties. The reason is 
that Sector 3 is a "catch-all", residual, sector. Even 
on theoretical grounds, it is not clear exactly what n~3 
represents, and empi cal attempts to measure such an 
elasticity would be nonsensical. 
It turns out that some of the distortions estimated 
in earlier sections are quite sensitive to changes in 
certain parameter values; in particular, to changes in n~3' 
This is not surprising, for two principal reasons: First, 
the model is linear, so that even very small changes in slope 
parameters at one set of equilibrium points can generate 
large shifts between equilibria. Second, the model 
developed here is characterised by a very high degree of 
interdependence among sectors, and among variables within 
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sectors. This interdependence is at two degrees. One degree 
of interdependence is due to the empirical assumption that 
demand equations satisfy the restrictions of the Slutsky 
equations. Hence, changing one elasticity can, in principle, 
change all other elaqticities. The other, more important, 
degree of interdependence arises because of the structure 
of the tax incidence model developed in Chapter 3. The 
interest in general equilibrium models arises from the desire 
to explore the interdependence of one variable with respect 
to others. But the model developed in Chapter 3 imposes a 
further degree of interdependence through its assumption of 
fixed factor supplies. In particular, the "adding-up" 
property (3-3-43) is restrictive in this sense. 
An examination of the sensitivity of endogenous 
variables to parameter changes in the tax incidence model 
developed here is complicated by the possibility of comple-
mentarity among sectors. Hence, demand equations are 
required to satisfy the Slutsky conditions, and if the ovm-
price and income elasticities of demand for Sectors I and 2 
D 
exceed unity {as they do here) values of n33 much less than 
unity (in absolute value) imply gross complementarity 
between Sectors I and 3, and 2 and 3. If n~3 is suffi-
ciently small (so that cross-price effects dominate own-
price effects in Sector 3), the tax multipliers dKI/dTK = 3 
dK3/dTK ' and dK 2/dTK = dK 3/dTK are all negative. The I 3 2 
lIadding-up" property then implies that 8K 3/dTK is positive. 3 
This incredible result is not inconceivable on theoretical 
grounds, although it has some unfortunate implications for 
I 
I 
1 
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TABLE 4-3-1: Sensitivity Analysis of Welfare Cost 
Estimates; Australia; Welfare Cost of 
Non-Neutral Taxation ($ Million per 
annum) 
Sector 3 Elasticity of Substitution (a 3) 
Own-Price 0 3 = 0.5 a = 1.0 E1asticities 3 
D I M M M M M M M M 
nIl =1 n 1 = n 2 = n 1 = n 2 = n 1 = n 2 = n 1 = n 2 = D 
D n33 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 n22 
-1. 2 -1. 00 140.42 146.90 154.38 165.17 
-0.95 116.77 126.17 122.80 135.69 
-0.90 (*) 99.15 ( *) 102.00 
-0.85 ( *) ( *) ( *) ( *) 
-0.80 (*) (*) ( *) ( *) 
-0.75 (*) ( *) (* ) (*) 
-0.70 ( *) (* ) (* ) (* ) 
-0.65 ( *) ( *) ( *) ( *) 
-0.60 (* ) (* ) (* ) ( *) 
-0.55 ( *) (* ) ( *) (*) 
-0.50 ( *) 1 ( *) ( *) ( *) 
-1.8 -1. 00 182.52 187.95 199.80 209.79 
-0.95 181.16 169.27 169.66 181. 66 
-0.90 ( *) 144.77 ( *) 149.47 
-0.85 ( *) (*) ( *) ( *) 
-0.80 ( *) ( *) ( *) ( *) 
-0.75 (* ) (* ) ( * ) ( *) 
-0.70 (*) ( *) ( *) (*) 
-0.65 (*) (*) ( *) ( *) 
-0.60 (*) ( *) ( *) ( *) 
-0.55 (* ) (*) ( *) (*) 
-0.50 ( *) ( *) ( *) (*) 
I 
Source: See Text 
Notes: (*) denotes that the parameters imply aK./aTK 1 . 
1 
< 0, for some i = 1,2,3. 
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TABLE 4-3-2: Sensitivity Analysis of Welfare Cost 
Estimates; New Zealand; Welfare Cost of 
Non-Neutral Taxation ($ Million per 
annum) . 
Sector 3 Elasticity of Substitution (° 3 ) 
Own-Price 0"3 = 0.5 0"3 = 1. 0 
E1asticities 
D D M M M M M M M !-1 ...J nIl = n 1 = n 2 = n 1 = n 2 = n1 = n 2 = n 1 = n 2 ~ n33 
D 
n 22 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 
-1. 20 -1. 00 13.12 10.02 14.31 11. 07 
-0.95 16.11 13.06 17.43 14.20 
-0.90 19.02 16.05 20.55 17.32 
-0.85 21. 79 18.98 23.66 20.44 
-0.80 ( *) 21.77 ( *) 23.55 
-0.75 (*) (*) ( *) (*) 
-0.70 (* ) (*) ( *) (* ) 
-0.65 41. 79 (*) ( *) (* ) 
-0.60 41. 70 40.03 (* ) (* ) 
-0.55 43.90 40.95 44.67 (* ) 
-0.50 46.58 43.36 46.48 43.39 
-1. 80 -1. 00 24.47 21. 66 26.63 23.51 
-0.95 27.11 24.44 29.63 26.55 
-0.90 29.52 27.10 32.60 29.56 
-0.85 31.49 29.52 35.50 32.54 
-0.80 (*) 31.51 (*) 35.46 
-0.75 ( *) ( *) (*) ( *) 
-0.70 (*) ( *) (*) (*) 
-0.65 74.87 (* ) ( *) ( *) 
-0.60 62.47 68.32 (*) ( *) 
-0.55 6l.77 60.62 82.51 (*) 
-0.50 63.l6 60.67 65.68 72.05 
Source: See Text 
Notes: (*) denotes that the parameters imply aK./aTK 1 . 
< 0, for some i = 1,2,3. 1 
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Marshallian equilibrium analysis. The result is, however, 
at variance with every other general equilibrium analysis 
of tax incidence. Hence, values of n~3 which produce this 
result are unsuitable. 
The parameters for which sensitivity analysis has 
D D M M' D been conducted are nIl' n 22 , nI' n 2 , 03' and n 33 • Tables 
4-3-1 and 4-3-2 present the results of some of the analysis. 
The tables present estimates of the welfare cost the 
non-neutral taxation of housing in Australia and New Zealand, 
respectively. Other countries exhibit similar degrees 
(though not necessarily similar patterns) of sensitivity. 
The sensitivity analysis was primarily concerned with an 
D 
examination of the significance of the n33 value. Values 
D 
of n33 -l.OO+(n-l)x, x = .05, n = 1,2, ••• ,11, were tested. 
Wel cost estimates are shown only for cases in which 
oKi/oTK. ~ 0, i=1,2,3 •. Other cases are denoted by (*). 
l-
Of the two sets of results reported in Tables 4-3-1 
and 4-3-2, the New Zealand case is the more sting. 
Changes in the income elasticity of demand for housing do 
not appear to significantly affect the estimated welfare 
cost. The same is true of changes in the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour. However, changes 
in the own-price elasticities of demand for final outputs 
imply quite large changes in estimates of wel cost. 
The estimates are particularly sensitive to the size of 
D D 
nIl = n22 • Ceteris paribus, a larger (in absolute value) 
own-price elasticity of demand for housing implies a large 
estimate of the welfare cost of the non-neutral taxation of 
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housing. This result, which is true for all the countries 
considered in this Chapter, is not surprising. The larger 
is n~l = n~2 (in absolute value), the larger are the 
distortions due to a non-neutral tax policy which favours 
owner-occupied housing over capital employed in other 
sectors. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 4. 
1. IT. is obtained from (3-1-3), (3-1-4), depending upon 
1 
whether the unit of capital is employed in corporate, 
or unincorporated, economic activity. In applying 
the three-sector model developed in Chapter 3, 
corporate and unincorporated enterprises are combined, 
in Sector 3. This procedure essentially ignores an 
interesting aggregation problem. The problem arises 
because of the assumption, made in the development 
of the general equilibrium model, that all of the 
output of a particular sector is produced with a 
particular production function. Since there are 
constant returns to scale, this assumption does not 
restrict the number of separate firms that might be 
combined in any sector, provided each firm faces the 
same factor costs and output prices. But when some 
firms are corporate, and others unincorporated, 
different firms do face different factor costs, even 
though they are producing an identical output, and 
selling that output at an identical price. In parti-
cular, a comparison of (2-2-1) with (3-1-1) reveals 
that the user cost of capital will usually differ 
between corporate and unincorporated enterprises. 
Corporate enterprises will typically face higher 
capital to labour price ratios than unincorporated 
enterprises. If all enterprises employ the same 
linear homogeneous production function, corporate 
enterprises will employ smaller amounts of capital 
per worker, and will have higher average costs. 
2. The united States' case provides an exception. 
3. This is the sense Laidler attaches to the term. 
4. Again, the marginal tax rate relevant here. 
5. AlIen (1972, pp.372-374), for instance. 
6. International Monetary Fund, Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook, Vol. V., 1981, p.126. 
7. united Kingdom, National Income and Expenditure, 
1979, Table 8.3. 
8. Reece (1975, at p.227). 
9. Laidler (1969) offers a similar interpretation of 
the deadweight loss associated with the owner-
occupier subsidy in the United States of America. 
10. i.e., including local, state, and federal. 
11. Australian National Accounts, National Income and 
Expenditure, 1977-78, p.34. 
12. These results have not been presented here. 
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13. Hence, the result illustrates an important advantage 
of the Shoven and Whalley (1972) model of tax 
incidence, which avoids this linearity assumption. 
14. The distortions estimated for other countries appear 
insignificant against the united Kingdom results. 
15. There is more than one set of taxes which will generate 
this result: Any unit tax rate added to the tax rates 
presented in (4-2-37) and (4-2-38) will generate no 
additional distortions. 
16. This is the stock of capital employed in local 
authority housing under present law. 
17. This is clearly not the same as (TK dK l + TK dK 4 + TK dK 3)· 1 4 3 
18. The United Kingdom results show the tax benefits 
and burdens which arise because of a policy which 
replaces the least distortionary feasible tax system 
with present law. 
19. For the United Kingdom, an analogous second-best 
analysis might be to discover those tax rates which 
minimize welfare cost subject to both owner-occupied, 
and local authority, housing being subsidi rela-
tive to capital employed in other industry. That 
analysis has not been pursued here. 
20. This is because of the assumption of a fixed total 
stock of capital, of course. 
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APPENDIX B-4-2: DATA SOURCES AND METHODS: 
This appendix details the derivation of raw data 
and certain parameter values, required in an application 
of the three-sector general equilibrium model. Data 
sources and methods are presented for each of the five 
western countries analysed in Section 4.2. 
Australia 
Data are drawn primarily from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics publication, Australian National Accounts, 
National Income and Expenditure, 1977-78, and are for the 
fiscal year ending 30 June, 1977. Sector 3 comprises 
private non-farm activity, including: Mining: manufac-
turing, electricity, gas and water; community services; 
entertainment and personal services; construction; whole-
sale and retail trade; transport, storage and communication; 
finance and business services. Public enterprise, public 
administration, defence, agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
and hunting, are ignored. 
Gross operating surplus of Sector 3 corporate and 
unincorporated enterprises is $16570 million. Gross 
operating surplus is defined as: "The operating surplus, 
before deduction of depreciation provisions, dividends, 
interest, royalties and land rent, and direct taxes 
bl 111. <d . f paya e.... It provl es an estlmate 0 : 
(B-1) 
(B-2) 
Pi3K3-(m3q3K3+t3q3K3)=(1-u3)rc(1-~3)q3K3 
+rm~3q3K3-e3q3K3+o3q3K3+n3K3=$16570 million. 
Actual gross rents on rented housing are: 
p* K = $2348 million. 
K2 2 
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Imputed gross rents on owner-occupied housing are $5061 
million. This figure is obtained by applying average 
actual rents on tenanted dwellings to numbers of owner-
occupied housing stock. It is an estimate 
(B-3) Pi Kl = $5061 million. 
2 
Comparing (B-3), (B-2) reveals that 
(B-4 ) 
Total rates and insurance on residential property 
are $1231 million. Maintenance expenses are $1030 million. 
Following Reece (1975, pp.223-224), it is supposed that 
This implies that 
(B-5) mlqlKl $965.22 million 
(B-6) m2q 2K2 = $447.9 million 
(B-7) tlqlK l $579.14 million 
(B-8) t 2q 2K2 == $268.74 million 
Total depreciation allowances for residential 
property, reported in the National Accounts, are $549 
million. This estimate seems remarkably small, relative 
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to the estimates of maintenance expenses. Both Reece 
(1975), and Laidler (1969) use values which imply 
(B-9) 
These values produce: 
(B-10) 
(B-ll) 
(B-2) can be expanded to obtain: 
(B-12) 
Corporate activity in housing is negligible. According 
to Australian tax law, income tax liability on rented 
housing is, on using (3-1-4), 
(B-13) 
(B-13), (B-6), (B-8), (B-ll) in (13-12) reveal: 
(B-14) 814.36 l-u2 
on using the capital market equilibrium conditions that 
rc = rm" 
Direct income taxes paid on total household income, 
including income from unincorporated enterprises and 
ownership of dwellings amounted to $11047 million in 
1976-77. This is 16.32 percent of total household 
income, excluding imputed income of owner-occupied housing 
($3315.71 million). Hence, it has been supposed that 
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(B-15) u = u = u = u = .1632 1 2 3 m 
(B-15) in (B-14) reveals: 
(B-16) 
There are no data on expected capital gains. However, 
rates of interest in 1976-77 were approximately three to 
four times the depreciation rate on housing of 0.225, used 
by Reece (1975) and Laidler (1969). If rc = 301' then: 
(B-17) r
c
Q2K2 = $2443.08 million. 
(B-18) A 8 2Q2K2 = $1493.64 million. 
(B-19) rcQ1Kl = $5264.85 million. 
A (B-20) 8 1Q1Kl = $3218.80 million. 
Depreciation allowances on all non-farm, non-
residential business were $4308 million in 1976-77. 
Public enterprise depreciation amounted to $866 million. 
Since public enterprise involvement in agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and hunting is negligible, and is not 
very significant i~ housing,2. all of the $866 million is 
subtracted from $4308 million to obtain depreciation 
allowances for Sector 3. Hence, 
(B-2l) 
Supposing that m3 = .5503' 
(B-22) 
Income taxes on Sector 3 are calculated in the 
following manner: Total direct income taxes on companies 
299 
amounted to $2803 million. It is supposed that all of 
this is due to Sector 3. Then, total income taxes on 
corporate capital in Sector 3 are: 
(B-23) 
Income taxes on unincorporated capital in Sector 3 are; 
u u u u u 3 A u IT3K3 = u3(1-~3)q3K3-(1-u )0 3q 3K3" 3 
(B-24) 
Combining (B-23), (B-24) reveals, if ~~ = ~~, 
(B-25 ) 
It is supposed that one-half of Sector 3 capital gains 
accrue to corporate enterprises, and one-half to indivi-
duals. 3. Then, 
(B-26) 
Additional data are obtained from taxation statis-
tics: Total direct income taxes amounted to (2803 + 11047=) 
$13850 million. Income derived from the agriculture, 
forestry, shing and hunting industry amounted to 
(corporate income and income of public enterprises 
excluded) $3973 million. Applying the individual average 
tax rate reveals income taxes in this industry of $648.39 
million. The rest of total income taxes must be allocated 
among labour and capital in each of the three sectors. 
Income taxes on labour in Sector 3 (it is assumed that 
no labour is employed in Sectors 1 and 2) are estimated 
by multiplying total wages, salaries, and supplements 4 • 
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in Sector 3 industry by .1632, the average individual 
tax rate. The figure obtained is $6920.33 million. Hence: 
According to Australian tax law effective in the 
fiscal year 1976-77, there is a tax rebate of 40 percent 
of property tax payments. The rebate is granted only 
when the total of rates and other concessional deductions 
exceed $1350, and only for the first $300 of rate payments. 
Beginning July 1975, owner-occupiers were permitted to 
deduct a proportion SI of mortgage interest payments. SI 
was equal to one for gross family incomes under $4000. 
From July 1976 this deduction was confined to first-home 
buyers only, and only during the first five years of home-
h . 5. owners lp. An estimate of ITlKl requires an estimate of 
the incidence of the mortgage interest deduction, and the 
property tax rebate, on the representative owner-occupier, 
in the fiscal year 1976-77. Here it has been supposed 
that (the notation is from earlier Sections) 
These assumptions imply total income taxes on owner-
occupied housing of (on using (3-1-4)): 
(B-34) 
301 
(B-13), (B-26), (B-34), in (B-33) reveals: 
(B-35) 
It is assumed that ~l = 0.2. This is the figure obtained 
by the 1962-63 Survey of Consumer Finances (Sydney), 
reported in Reece (1975, at p.225). It is consistent 
with the United States figure. Then, (B-19) in (B-35) 
reveals: 
(B-36) 
Further, from (B-1), 
(B-37) 
Combining (B-36), (B-37), reveals: 
(B-38) 
(B-39) 
Finally, it is assumed that 
(B-40) ~ 5 ~ = 2. 7 . t t ~2 = . ; ~3 0 I t3 = 1 = 2 0 
Estimates of each of the user cost components, for 
each of Sectors 1 to 3, are easily derived from the details 
presented above. These data are presented in Table B-1. 
Total wages, salaries, supplements in Sector 3 
industry amount to $42403.98 million. Hence, 
(B-4l) L3 = 42403.98 
TABLE B-1: User Cost Componentsj Australia; Fiscal ~ear Ending 30 June, 1977. 
($ million) 
r I r i i I 
Sector I (l-u.)r (l--CP-lq·K. (l-u)r CP.q.K·I! (m.+o.)q.K.i e.q.K. TK K.1./ C.K.=PK* K.
2
• PK K.
3
• (PK +8.q.)K. i 1 c 1""l 1 m m 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 . 1 . 1 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 1 1 , 
I 1: 1 1 1 1 
i i i 
I i I (1) awne:-ct:cupied I 3524.5 881.13 2720.17 3218.8 433.4 i 4340.4 1186.83 4405.63 
HOUS1ng ' i
: I 
I: I (2) Rented 1022.18 1022.18 1262.26 i 1493.64 534.98 ! 2347.96 550. 72 2044.36 I 
Housing t t I : I 
I I I 
I : ! 
(3) Other I 21971. 7 I 5492.92 5335.1: 20497.5 9770.94 • 22073.16 6967.12 27464.62 I 
InduStry! I I · 
TOl'AL I 10739.32 I 33914.61 
Notes: 1. 
2. 
3 . 
T K . 
1 
i I I I I 
- IT. + t.q. + u r cp.q. 
111 m m 1 1 
PK* = (l-u.)r (l-CP.)q. + (l-u )r cp.q. + (m.+o.)q. - e.q. + TK . 1 c 1 1 m m 1 1 111 11. 
1 1 
PK = PK* - (m.+o.)q. - TK (l-u.)r (l-CP.)q. + (l-u)r cp.q. - e.q. . . 111 . 1 C 11 mm11 11 
11  
w 
o 
N 
303 
The following e1asticities are chosen, in view of the 
independent estimates of Reid (1962), Muth (1960), Laid1er 
(1960), Lee (1964), De Leeuw (1971): 
A number of different values of n~3 (ranging from -0.5 to 
1) 'd d 9. - were conSl ere . After some experimentation, a 
D 
value of n33 = -·95 was found to be consistent with a 
"reasonable" set of values for each of the other e1asti-
cit These e1asticities are, on using (3-3-62), 
(3_3_55)10. 
ODD 
n 12 = -4629; n 21 = ·8557; n 13 = -·4629; 
o D 
n 31 = -·0142; n 23 
o 
= -·8557; n 32 = -°0192. 
·9834 
The final elasticity to be specified is the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour in Sector 3. 
Results were computed for values of 
The results presented in the text use a value of unity. 
It might be noted that this value has been employed in 
virtually all studies of the incidence of the corporation 
income tax (for instance). There is very little evidence 
to deny it (K1ein (1974), for instance). 
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Canada 
Data are from Appendix A-l-l to Chapter 1, the 
Yearbook of National AccoUnts Statistics, 1979 (~nited 
Nations), the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook tVol. 
V), 1981 (International Monetary Fund), and from the 
International inancial Statistics (Vol. 32, NO. 12), 1979 
(International Monetary Fund). Sector 1 capital is owner-occup~residential assets; Sector 2 capital is rented res~ential assets: and Sector 3 capital is non-residential 
\ 
tangible assets, including non-residential structures, 
equipment, and inventories, employed in public and private, 
corporate and unincorporated, enterprises. All data are 
for 1978. 
From Table A-3 of Appendix A-I-I, 
(B-4 2) 
(B-43) q3K3 = $410080 million. 
The 1971 Census of Population and Dwellings revealed that 
60.3 percent of occupied dwellings were owner-occupied and 
39.7 percent rented (Canada Yearbook, 1976-77). Hence, 
on using these figures in (B-42) (assuming, implicitly, 
(B-44) qlK l = $101949.21 million 
(B-45) q2K2 = $67120.79 million 
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On using the rates of depreciation employed in Appendix 
A-l-l, and the data of Table A-3, depreciation by sector 
is (if 0 = 0 ) 11. 1 2 
(B-46 ) 
(B-47) 
(B-48) 
Further, assuming repairs, maintenance, and casualty 
insurance premiums are one-half of the value of deprecia-
t ' 12. ~on, 
(B-49) 
(B-50) 
(B-5l) 
The rate of opportunity cost is approximated by 
the Government bond yield, which averaged 9.3 percent in 
1978. 13 . Further, assume that14 . 
(B-53) 0.4, tP3 = 0.2 
(B-54) 
" (B-55) 8 l q l Kl $3058.4763 million, 
" (B-56 ) 82q2K2 = $2013.6237 million, 
" (B-57) 83q3K3 = $8201.6 million. 
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According to Canadian tax law, 
(B-58) 
Assuming that one-half of accrued capital gains are 
actually realised, (B-58) produces: 
(B-59) IT2K2 = $270.8324 million 
Further, 
(B-60) 
and assuming all corporate activity belongs to Sector 
3, and that one-half of Sector 3 capital gains accrue to 
corporate enterprises, and one-half to individuals, 
total income taxes in Sector 3 are: 
(B-6l) 
$11385.0504 million 
A one-percent property tax rate (percent of 
capital value) seems consistent with property tax rates 
currently levied ih Canada. Hence, 
Estimates of each of the user cost components, for 
each sector, are presented in Table B-2, on using the data 
derived above. 
TABLE B-2: User Cost Componentsi Canadai Year Ending 31st December, 1978. 
($ million) 
I I I 
(l-u.)r (l-<jl.)q.K. : (l-u)r rp.q.K.1 (m.+O.)q.K./ e.q.K. T K.1. C.K.=P: K.2• P K. 3. Sector 1 C 1111 m m111 1111 111 K. 1 1 1 . 1 K. 1 
I 1 1 1 1 
I I 
i I 
(1) Q.mer-<lccupied I 6068.02 1517 .00 6116.95 3058.48 1398.74 12042.23 4526.23 I Housing 
; 
I 
I (2) Rented 2996.27 1997.51 4027. 2013.62: 1441. 42 : 8448.83 2980.16 
Housing I I I 
I 
I 
i I 
I i I ! 
b2308.35 I 
I 
8201.60:17011.35 ; 78988.18 (3) other 
I 
24407.96 I 6101.99 I 39668.48 I 
Industry I I 
I I I 
! : 
I 
I 
I I 
'IOrAL I .19851.51 1 I 
Notes: 1. TK. - + t.q. + u r rp.q. 11 mm11 1 
2. p* = K. 1 
(l-u.)r (l-rp.)q. + (l-u )r rp.q. + (m.+6.)q. - e.q. + TK 1 c 1 1 m m 1 1 111 11. 
1 
A 
3. PK· = PK* - (m.+6.)q. - TK = (l-u.)r (l-rp.)q. + (l-u )r rp.q. - e.q . . . 111 . 1 C 11 mm11 11 11  
A I (P K +0. q. ) K. I 
.11 1 1 
7585.02 
4993.78 
30509.95 
I 
I 43088.75 I 
w 
o 
--.] 
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Total employee compensation amounted to $131,494 
million in 1978. 16 • Hence 
L3 131494. 
Again, the following elasticities have been chosen: 
D M 
= n 22 = -1.2; n l = 
These values imply: 
D D D 
D 
1.2; n33 = -.95. 
n 12 = .3611; n2l = .5147; n 13 = -.3611; 
D 
-.0112; D -.5147; D -.0153. n 3l = n 23 = n 32 = 
M 
.9764 n3 = 
Finally, a unitary elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour in Sector 3 has been used in obtaining 
the results presented in the text. 
New Zealand 
The principal source of data for the empirical 
assessment of the implications of the nonneutral taxation 
of housing capital in New Zealand is the New Zealand 
Official Yearbook, 1980 (Department of Statistics, 
Wellington). Estimates of the user cost variables are 
presented in Table B-3. All data are for the fiscal 
year to 31 March, 1978,17. the most recent year for 
which suitable data are available. The methods used to 
infer parameter values from official statistics, are 
detailed below. 
309 
In this study, Sector 3 represents an aggregate 
sector, combining all non-residential economic activity; 
corporate and unincorporated enterprises, public and 
private enterprises, are all included. 
Total employee compensation in the fiscal year to 
March 1978 amounted to $8465 million (Yearbook, p.64l). 
Total operating surplus on New Zealand production amounted 
to $4450 million. Expenses of depreciation, repairs and 
maintenance, were estimated to be $1196 million. 18 . 
Operating surplus is defined as "gross output at producer's 
values less the sum of intermediate consumption, compensa-
tion of employees, consumption of fixed capital, and 
indirect taxes net of subsidies. It is approximately 
equal to accounting profit before the deduction of direct 
taxes, dividends, and bad debts and before the deduction 
of interest paid on the addition of interest received.,,19. 
In present notation, the operating surplus in Sector i is: 
(B-62) P.Q'-PL L.-(m.+8.+t.)q.K. = PK* K.-(m.+8.+t.)q.K. 11.111111 .111111 
1 1 
={(l-u.)r (l-<p.)+r <p.-8.}q.K.+ll.K. 
1 c 1 m 1 1 1 1 1 1, 
i=1,2,3. 
Gross domestic product generated by the ownership 
of owner-occupied dwellings sector (Sector 1) was esti~ 
mated to be $58lm. in 1977-78. This was made up of an 
operating surplus of $383m., an estimate of the consumption 
of fixed capital of $99m., and indirect taxes of $99m. 
The estimate of the consumption of fixed capital is an 
estimate of the "value of depreciation at ordinary rates 
Sector 
( 1 ) Owner-0ccupied 
Housing 
(2) Rented 
Housing 
(3) Other 
Industry 
TOrAL 
Notes: I. 
2. 
3. 
TABLE B-3: User Cost Components; New Zealand, Fiscal Year Ending 31 March, 1978. 
($ million) 
A (l-u.)r (1-<P. )q.K. (l-u )r CP.q.K. (m. +8 . )q.K. e.q.K. 1 c _ 1 1 1 m m 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 
I 
517 .05 99 I 718.13 1206.45 I 
I 
! 
r 
369.32 369.32 42.43 307.77 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2345.59 1005.25 1054.57 i 1116.95 
I 
I 
I 
I 
TK. = IT. + t.q. + U r cp.q. 111 m m 1 1 
1 
P* = (l-u.)r (l-cp.)q. + (l-u )r cp.q. +(m.+8.)q. K. 1 C 1 1 m m 1 1 111 
1 
PK. = PK. - (m. +8 . ) q. - TK = (l-u. ) r (I-cp.) q. + 111 . 1 C 1 1 
1 1 1 
T K.l. K. 1 
C K -P* 2. 
. .- K K. 1 1 . 1 
1 1 
443.7 1548.07 
329.69 802.99 
1265.15 4553.61 
I 
: 
2038.54 : 
A 
e.q. + TK 11. 
1 
(l-u )r cp.q. 
m m 1 1 
A 
eiqi 
P K. 3• A (PK +e.q. )K. K. 1 .11 1 
1 1 
1005.37 1723.5 
430.87 738.64 
2233.89 3350.84 
5812.98 
W 
f-' 
o 
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allowed for taxation purposes, plus an estimate for the 
normal rate of accidental damage, based on the insurance 
claims by each industry group. ,,20 Hence, it is supposed 
that 
(B-63) 
Further, the only indirect taxes charged on the output of 
Sector 1 are local authority rates. Accordingly, 
(B-64) 
The estimate of operating surplus in Sector 1 
requires amendment. The value of $581m. is actually an 
estimate of the rental that would be earned if Kl units of 
owner-occupied housing were let in the private rental 
market. If it is assumed that the representative rented 
and owner-occupied dwellings exhibit the same combined 
rates of repairs, maintenance and depreciation, the same 
expected rates of capital gain, and the same property tax 
A A 
rates (i.e., 01 + ml = 02 + m2i 0 1 = 8 2 i tl = t 2 ), then 
the estimate of operating surplus in Sector 1 is actually 
an estimate of 
A (B-65 ) ~{(1-u2)rc(1-~2) + rm~2-02}q2K2 + ~rr2K2· 
where: ~ is the ratio of owner-occupied housing units to 
rented housing units. 
The Yearbook (p.487) reveals that in 1976, 69.7 
t f 11 ' d . d 11' 2l. percen 0 a occup~e permanent pr~vate we ~ngs were 
owner-occupied. No later estimate is available. Here, 
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. 
it is supposed that ~ = .7/.3 = 2.3. Then, 
(B-66) 
112K2 represents total income taxes levied on rented 
housing. According to New Zealand tax legislation in 
force in 1978 (Section 2.2, Chapter 2): 
(B-67) 
on using (4-1-5) • There are no data available concerning 
A 
<P . , 0. , or the tax rates of individual asset owners, u 
1 1 m 
and u .. Here, it is supposed that: 
1 
A A A (i) r = 40 == 40 = 50 3 • c 1 2 
(ii) <PI = .3; <P2 = .5 i <P3 = .3 
(iii) urn U. 
1 
.4, i=1,2,3. 
The implications of (i) might be illustrated with a simple 
example: Hence, if the nominal net rate of return on 
capital is 20% per annum, housing generates expected 
capital gains at a rate of 5% per annum, while assets 
employed in Sector 3 are expected to appreciate at a lower 
rate of 4% per annum. (ii) suggests "reasonable" debt/ 
equity ratios for each asset. And (iii) says that the 
average rate of tax on investment income (excluding 
accrued capital gains) is 40 percent. These assumptions 
imply: 
(B-68) 
(i) to (iii) in (B-66) imply, on using (B-68) and the 
capital market equilibrium condition that r = r : 
c m 
(B-69) rcqlKl = $2872.5 million; 
(B-70) A 8 l q l Kl = $718.13 million. 
(B~7l) TI2K2 = $41. 04 million. 
(B-72) r c q 2K2 = $1231.07 million. 
"-(B-73) 82 q 2K2 = $307.77 million. 
(B-74) rmcJ>lqlKl = $861. 75 million; 
(B-75) rmcJ>2q2K2 :::: $615.54 million; 
(B-76 ) t 2q 2K2 :::: $42.43 million. 
Total rates payments" plus other taxes and fines 
paid to territorial local authorities22 • in the fiscal 
year 1977-78 amounted to $29l.6m. (Yearbook p.702). 
Hence: 
(B-77) t3q3K3 = $(29l.6-99-42.43)m. 
= $150.l7m. 
Furthermore, since °1 + ml = °2 + m2 , by assumption, 
(B-78 ) 
and 
(B-79) (03+m3)q3K3 = $(1196-99-42.43)m. 
:::: $1054.57m. 
Since total operating surplus is $4450m., 
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(B-80) 
= 4450-383-{(1-u2)rc(1-~2)q2K2 + rm~2q2K2 
-8 2q 2K2 + IT 2K2 } 
= $3348.87 million. 
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Total taxes actually collected from incomes amounted 
to $3428.8 million in the fiscal year 1977-78 (Yearbook 
pp.673, 674, 681, 682). These total tax receipts are to 
be allocated among labour and capital in each sector. 
Total income taxes on labour are estimated by taking the 
average rate of income tax on wage and salary earners in 
the year 1975-76, the latest year for which this datum is 
available. Applying this rate to the estimate of total 
employee compensation, total income taxes on labour are 
found to be: 
.205065 x 8465 = $1735.87 million. 
Since there are no income taxes levied on owner-occupied 
housing, taxes are 
(B-81) 
umrm(~lql+~2q2K2+~3q3K3) is total tax payments on mortgage 
interest. (B-81) in CB-80) gives: 
A 
(B-82) (1-u3)rc(1-~3)q3K3 + (1-um)rm~3K3 - 8 3q 3K3 
which, on using (B-74), (B-75), provides, 
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(B-B3) 
Then, 
(B-B4) 
(B-B5) 
(B-B6 ) IT3K3 = $444.Bl million. 
Again, the following elasticities were chosen: 
The values imply23. 
D D D 
n 12 = .2255; n 21 = 434Bi n 13 -.2255; 
D 
-.002B: D -.434B; D -.0135. n 31 = n 23 = n 32 = 
M 
n3 = .9663 
As in the Australian study, a value of cr 3 = 1 has 
been used to obtain the New Zealand estimates presented ' 
in the text. 
The United Kingdom 
Data are for the year ending 31 December, 197B. 
Principal data sources are: uhited Kingdom, National 
Income and Expenditure,1979, United Nations, Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics, 1979, International Monetary 
Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, Vol. V., 
19B1, and C.S.C., Annual Abstract of Statistics, 19BO. 
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Gross domestic product generated by owner-occupied 
housing is 
'" (B-87 ) (1-ul)rc(1-~1)qlKl+rm~lqlKl+olqlKl-8lqlKl+rrlKl 
= £ 5352 million. 24. 
Assuming the same exponential rate of depreciation on 
owner-occupied, and rented, housing, 
(B-88 ) 
At the end of 1978, the net current replacement cost of 
dwellings, excluding local authority dwellings, was 
95200 million. 26 . Of this, the value of owner-occupied 
housing was 
(B-89) qlK l = £ 77112 million. 27. 
The average individual rate of tax on capital income 
is assumed to be 
(B-90) u = u = u = .18 28 • 1 3 m 
According to United Kingdom tax legislation, 
(B-9l) 
(B-88), (B-9l) in (B-87) reveal (if r 
c 
(B-92) 
Assuming an opportunity (equals mortgage) rate of interest 
f 12 t 29. o percen , 
(B-93) 
and 
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" (B-94 ) 01q1K1 = £3390.88 million. 
" (B-94) implies 01 = 4.4 percent per annum. 
As for the other countries, it has been assumed 
that 
(B-95) 1>1 = 0.2 
Thence, 
(B-96 ) 
(B-97) 
(B-98) 
Assuming a property tax rate of 
(B-99) 
(B-101) 
The user cost of local authority housing is 
(B-102 ) 
Income taxes are: 
where: (r
c
-r4 ) (1-1>4)q4K4 is the interest rate subsidy. 
i.e., it is the difference between the return 
on (1-1>4)q4K4 dollars of equity in the market, 
less the return earned by local authorities. 
The user cost, in (B-I02) is met by rental payments of 
£2690 million. 31., Hence, 
A 
(B-I04) r4(1-~4)q4K4+rm~4q4K4+(m4+84)q4K4-e4q4K4 
= £2690 million~ 
Now 
(B-I05) rm~4q4K4 = £ 1880 million 32. 
(B-I06) m4q 4K4 £ 636 million 
33. 
= 
(B-I07) 84q 4K4 £ 700 million 
34. 
= 
(B-I08) q4K4 =-£58700 million 
35. 
rm .12 implies (from (B-I05) f (B-I08» 
(B-I09) ~4 = .26689 
(B-IIO) 
(B-I05), (B-I06) , (B-I07), (B-I09), (B-IIO) in 
(B-I04) imply 
(B-lll) 
(B-112 ) r 4 = .047795 
(B-113 ) 
Now, 
(B-114 ) = -£2768.84 million. 
Further, u 4 0, so that 
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(B-115 ) 
(B-116 ) 
Income taxes on capital employed in Sector 3 
(other industry) are: 
A 
(B-117) 
.5U3(1-.3A3)83Q3K3 
IT3K3 = 3807+u3(1-~3)rcQ3K3- 1-u 
3 
where £3807 million is corporation income taxes,36. and 
it is assumed that one-half of Sector capital gains accrue 
to individuals. 
NOw, 
(B-118) 
(B-119 ) 
Assuming that ~3 = 0.2,39. 
(B-120) 
(B-121) 
Further, assuming that capital gains on non-residential 
property accrue at half the rate at which capital gains 
accrue on residential property (i.e., 03 = .022), and that 
one-half of accrued capital gains are realised 
A 
(B-122) 83q3K3 = £ 7845.2 million 
(B-123) 
And, if t3 = t1 = .01, 
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(B-124) 
Hence 
(B-125) 
= £13830.16 million 
(B-126) 
(B-127) 
Lastly, assuming m3 .58 3 , 
(B-128) 
The estimates derived here are presented in Table 
B-4. 
Labour employment in Sector 3 is 
L = 98423 40 . 3 
Although a signi cant amount of sensitivity analysis 
was performed (see Section 4.3), the estimates presented 
in the text employ the following elasticities: 
h 1 . 1 41. T ese va ues ~mp y: 
D D D 
n12 = .5606; n2 l = 1.3964; n 3l = -.0161; 
D D D 
n1 3 = -.5606; n23 = -1.3964; n32 -.0214; 
M 
n3 = .9875 
Further, it is assumed that 03 = 1. 
TABLE B-4: User Cost Components; United Kingdom; Year Ending 31 December 1978. 
(.£ million) 
--------, 
Sector (l-u.)r (l-ej).)q.K.: (l-u)r ej).q.K. i (m.+6.)q.K'11 e.q.K. TK K,1. _ C.K.=PK* K.2 PK K.
3
• (PK +B.q.)K. 1 c 1 1 11 m m 111 I 1 1 1 1 111 .1; 11 .1 .1 ,11 1 I I 1 1 1 1 
I ' , j(l) CMne::-occupied 6070.26 1517.56 1732.59 3390.881 771.12 6700.65 4196.94 7587.82 
I Housmg 
1(2) Local Authority 5164.03 1541.61 1336.00 2582.80 1-2768.84 2690.00 4122.84· 6705.64 
Housing 
(3) other 
Industry 
'lOTAL 
Notes: 1. 
2. 
3. 
,------- - -
28071.55 , 7017.89 24276.00 7845.20 13830.16, 65350.40 ! 27244.24 - 35089.44 
TK . -
1 
P* = K. 
1 
PK. 
1 
I I 
+ t.q. + u r ej).q. 
1 1 m m 1 1 
! 
11832.44 : 
A 
(l-u.)r (l-ej).)q. + (l-u )r ej).q. + (m.+o.)q. - e.q. + TK 
1 c 1 1 m m 1 1 111 11. 
1 
I 
A 
PK* - (m.+o.)q. - TK (l-u.)r (l-ej).)q. + (l-u )r ej).q. - e.q~ .111. 1 C 1 1 m m 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
I 
1 , 
49382.90 
I 
W 
N 
I-' 
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The United States 
The estimates developed here use data from Rosenberg 
(1969). Data are averages for the period 1953-59. 
Rosenberg (1969) computes estimates of the return 
on equity capital, monetary interest payments, property 
taxes, income taxes, and capital gains, for nine non-
financial industry groups: Farming, agricultural services, 
forestry, and fishing; Mining; Contract construction; 
Manufacturing; Wholesale and retail trade; Real estate; 
Transport; Communications and public utilities; services. 
The estimations reported here ignore farming, agricultural 
services, forestry, and fishing. Real estate comprises 
the rented and owner-occupied housing sectors, while the 
other seven industry groups make up Sector 3, "other 
private non-farm." 
Rosenberg's data are used to obtain estimates for 
A 
r (l-~.)q.K., r ~.q.K., 6.q.K., e.q.K., t.q.K., m.q.K., 
c 111 m 1 1 1 111 111 111 111 
n.K., and TK K., for each sector. 
1 1 . 1 
1 
Estimates of the relevant aggregates are presented 
in Table B-5. The techniques used to obtain these esti-
mates are described below: 
(a) Sectors 1 and 2: Owner-occupied, and Rented, Housing: 
Column 1 of Table 1 of Rosenberg (1969) presents an 
estimate of corporate net profits before corporate profits 
tax and local property tax payments, by industry group. 
Column 7 presents an analogous estimate for unincorporated 
enterprise. The estimates for real ~state reveal: 
TABLE B-5: User Cost Components; United States; Average 1953-59. 
($ million) 
I I i i 1 K -p* K 2. P K. 3• I Sector (l-u.)r (I-CP.) i (l-u)r cp.q.K. : (ro.+o.)q.K. j : T K .• C .. - K . 
I J. c J. m roJ.J.J.: J. J. J.J.I j K. J. J. J. . J. K. J. I 1 I j J. J. J. I I , i 
1 I 
. (1) 
I 
2644.07 i 12984.47 Ovmer--Q:::cupiErl 5940.33 1485.08 5395.03 . 2480.04 4945.37 
Housing ! 
I , ! 
I 
I , I 2794.57 , (2) RentOO 1461. 88 2714.91 I 3034.7 11395.02 8611.04 2781. 77 I I. , 
Housing I , 
I , i I 
i 2613.3 127794.46171567.15 1 ! (3) Other 15178.27 
I 
3794.57 i 27413.15 ~6359.54 1 
Industry : I 
j I ) I 
I i ! I 
'!'OrAL 
, I 
133233.10 I I j 1 I 
I I I I 
Notes: 1. TK. J. 
IT. + t.q. + u r cp.q. J. J. J. m ro J. J. 
A 
2. PK* = (l-u.)r (l-CP.)q. + (l-u )r cp.q. + (m.+o.)q. - e.q. + TK . J. c J. J. ro ro J. J. J. J. J. J. J. . J. J. 
~ 
3. PK . J. 
PK* - (ro.+o.)q. - TK = (l-u.)r (l-~.)q. + (l-u )r ~.q. - e.q. . J. J. J. . J. C J. J. ro ro J. J. J. J. J. J. 
(PK +0.q. )K. . J. J. J. J. 
17929.84 . 
11392.81 
87926.69 
117249.34 
, 
, 
, 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
W 
I\J 
W 
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(B-129) 
column 4 of Table 1 of Rosenberg (1969) reveals: 
(B-130) 
(B-129) can be written 
(B-131) 
" 
+(1-u2)rc(1-$2)Q2K2+t2Q2K2-G2q2K2+IT2K2 
$8157 million. 
Table 11 of Rosenberg (1969) reveals that 
(B-132) 
Column 2 of Table 1 of Rosenberg (1969) presents estimates 
of net realised capital gains by corporate enterprise 
industry. For real estate, this value is $100 million. 
Realised capital gains on housing are estimated to be 
8157 100 x 421 = $1937.53 million. 8157/421 is the ratio 
of total to corporate net income of real estate. Evidence 
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1958 
(p.760) reveals that approximately 64 percent of non-farm 
dwellings were owner-occupied in 1956. Hence (since it 
is assumed that Ql = Q2)' 
(B-133 ) 
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A A 
If it is assumed that 8 1 = 8 2 , realised capital gains by 
residential sector are: 
A 
(B-134) A18 l q l Kl = $1240.02 million. 
A 
(B-135) A282q2K2 = $697.51 million. 
Assuming that one-half of all capital gains are actually 
realised, so that Al = A2 = A3 = .5, permits: 
(B-136) 
A 
(B-137) 82q2K2 = $1395.02 million. 
Furthermore, on using (B-133) in (B-132), 
(B-138) 
(B-139) 
assuming that tl = t 2 • 
(B-136) to (B-139) in (B-13l) reveals 
(B-140) 
IT2K2 represents both corporate and individual taxes on 
the income of Sector 2. i.e., 
(B-14l) 
Rosenberg calculates that corporate income taxes on non-
farm residential dwellings were $218 million. Since all 
corporate housing is rented, total income taxes on corporate 
rented housing are: 
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(B-142) 
According to United States tax legislation, described 
in Section 2.2, income taxes on unincorporated rented 
housing are, on using (3 -4): 
. 
(B-143) 
c u Assuming that 4>2 = 4>2' (B-142), (B-143) in (B-14l) 
reveals: 
(B-144) 
Table 1 of Rosenberg (1969) reveals that 
(B-145) 
= $521 million. 
(B-142) in (B-145) produces: 
(B-146) 
Hence: 
(B-147) 
and 
(B-148 ) 
(B-148) in (B-144) produces: 
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which, on using (B-137), (B-139) reveals: 
(B-l49) 
According to United States tax legislation 
(B-150) 
(B-149), (B-150) in (B-140) reveals: 
(B-15l) 
+ 218 
$7110.06 million. 
It is assumed that 
(B-152) 
On using (B-152) and the capital market equilibrium condi-
tion that r = r , in (B-15l): 
c m 
(B-153) 
+ 79254.57375 
l77l.92+rcqlKl(·5625-.5625~2) 
7659.64025. 
But (B-130) reveals: 
(B-154) 
(B-154 ) 
(B-155) 
reveal 
Hence: 
in (B-153) produces: 
5250(1.3625 -~1-.5625~2) 
~1+·5625~2 
+ 
79254.57375(~1+·5625~2) 
l77l.92(~1+·5625~2)+2953.l25(1-~2) 
7659.64025 
Data presented in Table 8 of Rosenberg 
that 
5333 _ 
7510 - .71 
A 
(1969) 
.29{(1-ul)rc(1-~1)qlKl+tlqlKl lqlKl+ITlKl 
A 
.7l{(1-u2)rc(1-~2)q2K2+t2q2K2 2q 2K2+IT 2K2 I 
which, on using (B-154), (B-136), (B-138), (B-150) 
produces: 
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(B-156) 
5250(-.167375-.29~1+·399375~2) 
~1+·5625~2 
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(B-155) and (B-156) provide two independent equa-
tions with which to determine values for ~l and ~2. 
These equations are approximately satisfied by . 
(B-157) ~l .20 
(B-158) ~2 = .65 
Then, from (B-154), 
(B-159) 
(B-160) 
(B-161) 
(B-162 ) 
(B-163) 
(B-164) 
(B-165) 
(B-166 ) 
(B-167) 
(B-168) 
Hence: 
ITIKl = -$877.2848 million. 
TK Kl = $2644.07 million. 
1 
TK K2 = $2794.57 million. 
2 
(B-169) 
(B-170) 
It is assumed that: 
.375r 
c 
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These values are consistent with those employed by Laid1er 
(1969). They imply: 
(B-171) 
°lq 1K1 = $3480.66 million 
(B-172) 
°2Q2K2 = $1957.87 million 
(B-173) m1Q1K1 = $1914.37 million 
(B-174) m2Q2K2 = $1076.83 million 
(b) Sector 3: "Other Private Non-Farm" 
Data provided by Rosenberg (1960, Table 1). reveal 
that 
(B-175) = $39427 million. 
Mortgage interest payments are: 
(B-176 ) 
Table 14 of Rosenberg (1969) reveals that property taxes 
are: 
(B-177) 
Total income taxes are: 
(B-178) 
Corporate income taxes are $18,024 million. To this 
must be added u3rc(1-~~)q3K~, individual income taxes 
c c 
on corporate equity, to obtain TI3K3" i.e., 
(B-179 ) 
Taxes on unincorporated income in Sector 3 are, on 
using (3-1-4): 
(8-180) 
If it is assumed that ~~ c = ~3' then 
(B-181) 
Capital gains are estimated as for housing. 
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Rosenberg estimates realised capital gains on corporate 
Sector 3 capital to be $1166 million. The estimate for 
total realised capital gains in Sector 3 is 
(B-182 ) 39427 = 1166 x 35183 = $1,306.65 million. 
$39427 million is the total net income of Sector 3, while 
$35183 million is the corporate net income in Sector 3. 
Since it is assumed that one-half of capital gains are 
realised: 
A (B-183) G3q 3K3 = $2613.3 million 
Further, 
(B-184) A u $281. 3 million. G3q 3K3 = 
Hence, 
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(B-185) 
(B-175) can be written: 
(B-186) 
= $39427 million. 
(B-177t, (B-183), (B-l85), in (B-186) reveals: 
(B-187) 
COmbining (B-187), (B-176) reveals that if r = r 
c rn, 
(B-188) 4>3 = 19.93 
This implies a debt/equity ratio of approximately 25 
percent (.1993';'.8007) f practically the same as for owner-
occupied, but smaller than for rented, housing (.65~.35 = 
186 percent). In part this must reflect the wider variety 
of fund sources open to corporate enterprises for invest-
ment purposes. In particular, the role of retained earnings 
in investment funding has received some attention: Coen 
(1971), for instance. 42 • Nevertheless, as Tambini (1969) 
has noted, since the corporation income tax raises the 
cost of equity above the cost of debt, the result is 
peculiar. Tambini's explanation of the remarkably low 
debt/equity ratio appeals to the risk associated with 
debt financing: Differential degrees of risk equate the 
marginal costs of debt and equity, even though average 
costs differ. 
Non-residential assets typically depreciate more 
rapidly than residential assets: The exponential decay 
.: 
factors employed in the Appendix to Chapter 1 imply: 
°3 1.375 < -
- ° 1 
°3 = S :s. 2.875, 
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depending upon the type of non-residential asset. Here, 
it is assumed that ° 3 = 2° 1 = 2° 2 ; m3 = .55° 3 " These 
assumptions imply: 
(B-189) 
(B-190) 
Furthermore: 
(B-191) 
(B-192) 
(B-193) 
(B-194) 
IT3K3 = $21765.82 million 
TK K3 = $27794.46 million. 
3 
As to labour income, Harberger (1962) uses a 
"plausible" value of GK = 0.2. This implies that 3 
L3 = 286268.6 . 
The estimates presented in the text employ the 
following elasticities (employed in the other studies): 
D D M M D 
nIl = n 22 = -1.2; n l = n 2 = 1.2; n33 = -.95 
h 1 . 1 44. T ese va ues lmp y: 
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D 
.6325; D .9537; D -.0171; n 12 = n 21 = n 31 = 
D 0.6325; D -.9537; D -.0198; n13 = n 23 = n 32 = 
M 
.9869 n3 = 
Further, the estimates presented in the text assume 
Footnotes to Appendix B-4-2: 
1. Australian National Accounts, National Income and 
Expenditure, 1976-77, p.86. 
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2. Less than 3 percent of the gross operating surplus 
of ownership of dwellings is obtained by companies 
and public enterprises, combined. 
3. Approximately one-half of Sector 3 gross operating 
surplus comes from companies. 
4. Including employer contributions to insurance schemes. 
5. As Section 2.2 revealed, the deduction has since 
been withdrawn for all owner-occupiers. 
6. Hence, it is supposed that the $300 limit does not 
affect the representative owner-occupier and that 
the total concessional deductions exceed $1350. 
7. These values are consistent with united States 
figures obtained below. 
8. Section 4.3 presents the results of sensitivity 
analysis on these parameters. 
9. See the sensitivity analysis of Section 4.3. 
10. Correct to 4 decimal places. 
11. The United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, 1979 reports a value of $25146 million 
for total depreciation, based on allowances for 
tax purposes. The estimate obtained here is a total 
of $33208.45 million. 
12. This is consistent with figures used by Laidler (1969) 
for the United States, and by Reece (1975) for 
Australia. 
13. International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, December, 1979. 
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14. The values. used here imply a gross value-added due 
to owner-occupied housing of $8983.76 million. This 
compares with the official estimate of $7176 million 
presented in the United Nations, Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics, 1979. The larger estimate 
obtained here is partly explicab in terms of the 
larger depreciation provisions permitted here. 
15. The figure of 6257 is the estimate of corporate 
income taxes presented in the International Monetary 
Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, Vol. V., 
1981, p.125. 
16. United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Stati'stics, 
1979. 
17. This is before the introduction of the mortgage 
interest rebate, examined in Chapter 2. 
18. Casualty insurance premiums form part of user cost 
(see Chapter 2), but are ignored here. 
19. Yearbook, p.640. 
20. Yearbook, p.639. 
21. i.e., excluding hotels, motels, hospitals, and the 
like. 
22. Non-territorial local authorities include drainage 
boards, electric power boards, harbour boards, and 
so on. 
23. Correct to 4 decimal places. 
24. The figure is obtained from United Nations, Yearbook 
of National AccouhtsStatistics, 1979, Vol. 1., p.14lL 
25. United Kingdom, National Income and Expenditure, 
1979, Table 11.9. 
26. ibid., Table 11.11. 
27. King and Atkinson (1980) indicate that approximately 
81 percent of housing other than local authority 
housing was owner-occupied at the end of 1978. 
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28. Individual tax payments as a percentage of total 
individual incomes were .14 in 1978: C.S.C. Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, 1980, p.346 reports total 
individual tax payments of£ 19,672 million, and 
total before tax income of£ 143,213 million. 
29. This is the figure favoured by King and Atktnson 
(1980) • 
30. This is consistent with values employed for other 
countries. 
31. Local Authority tenants pay £1,389 million. Rent 
rebates and explicit excise subsidies add a further 
£1,777 million. £ 431 million is paid for supervision 
and management, and £45 million on other current 
expenditure. The return to capital employed in 
local authority housing is (1389 + 1777 - 431 - 45 =) 
£2690 million. All figures are from United Kingdom, 
National Income and Expenditure, 1979, Table 8.3. 
32. United Kingdom, National Income and Expenditure, 1979, 
Table 8.3. 
33. ibid., Table 8.3. 
34. ibid., Table 11.9. 
35. ibid., Table 11.11. 
36. C.S.O., Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1980, p.347. 
37. United Kingdom, National Income and Expenditure, 
1979, Table 11.11. 
38. ibid., Table 11.9. 
39. This is consistent with values employed for other 
countries. 
40. Compensation of employees is £98,423 million in 1978: 
United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, 1979, Vol. 1., p.14l0. 
41. Correct to 4 decimal places. 
42. Retained earnings are ignored here, however. 
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43. Here, and below, the value of ~3 has been rounded 
to 0.2. 
44. Correct to 4 decimal places. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERMEDIATE-RUN GROWTH 
Previous chapters have explored the comparative 
static implications of the non-neutral taxation of housing 
capital. Comparative statics ignores the process of 
adjustment between equilibria. The process of adjustment 
is of some interest, however. This chapter presents a 
preliminary investigation of this process, in the context 
of tax policy disturbances. 
5.1 RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND INTERMEDIATE-RUN GROWTH 
Denison (1967), (1974), and others, identify a 
large number of factors which contribute to economic 
growth. In general, the studies imply 
( 5-1-1) L'lM (T) M(T-l) = L: A . (T -1) L'I L. (T) /L. (T -1 ) 
· 1 1 1 1 
+ E K. (T -1) L'I K. (T) /K. (T -1) + R (T ) 
· 1 1 1 1 
where: ~~~~i) is the rate of growth of national income 
in year T. 
A. (T-l) :: 
1 
P
L 
(T -1) L. (T -1) 
· 1 1 
M(T-l) is the share of labour 
employed in Sector i in the national 
income of year T-l. 
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l1L. (T) 
J. L. (T-l) is the rate of growth of labour employment 
J. 
(man-hours) in Sector i in year T. 
K. (T-l) _ 
J. M(T-l) is the share of capital 
employed in Sector i in the national 
income of year T-l. 
YK . (T-l) is total income derived from capital 
J. 
employed in Sector i in year T 1. 
l1K. (T) 
J. is the rate of growth of capital employment K.(T-l) 
J. 
in Sector i in year T. 
R(T) is the percentage rate of growth of 
national income which is unexplained by 
changes in labour and capital input. 
Hence, the percentage rate of growth of national income 
is a weighted average of the rates of growth of sectoral 
labour and capital employments, plus an unexplained 
residual. The residual captures the contribution of 
increases in total factor productivity.2. 
The contribution of capital accumulation to growth 
is revealed in (5-1-1). Suppose p for instance, that 
l1Li (T) = R(T) = O. Then (5-1-1) can be written: 
(5-1-2) 
where: 
l1M (T) 
M(T-l) = g( I' ) Er. sa. -<Po • J. J. . 
J. J. 
s is the savings (equals investment) ratio; 
i.e., it is the share of national income 
devoted to savings. 
r~ is the rate of return on Sector i capital, 
1 
gross of taxes. 
A 
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u. is gross investment in Sector i as a percentage 
1 
" O:u. = 1) 
. 1 
of total gross investment. 
1 
~D. is the value of depreciation in Sector i as a 
1 
percentage of national income. 
It is clear from (5-1-2) that (ceteris paribus) 
the rate of growth national income can be increased 
by devoting a larger share of gross investment to a 
sector with a higher gross rate of return. For growth, 
it is not necessary that aggregate net investment exceeds 
zero; i.e., it is not necessary that the aggregate stock 
of capital increases. To see this, an aggregate net 
investment of zero implies 
Then, 
(5 3) 
LS&. 
. 1 
1 
~~D .• 
1 1 
Er~{s&.-$D )~O if r~~r~ for at least one pair 
.11.1] 
1 1 
of i,j. 
(5-1-3) indicates that if gross rates of return differ 
among sectors, a re-allocation of capital among sectors 
can increase output even if there is no change in the 
total stock of capital. This is the result emphasised in 
Chapters 3 and 4. The change in output observed between 
one long-run equilibrium path and another is referred to 
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as intermediate-run growth. In the model of Chapters 3 
and 4, adjustments were assumed to be instantaneous. In 
this case there is an infinite rate of intermediate-run 
growth following a disturbance, but this growth lasts 
only for an instant. In general, however, adjustments 
are not instantaneous. In this (latter) case, a distur-
bance is associated with a whole time path of intermediate-
run adjustments. One source of such growth is related to 
improvements in resource allocation. This Section 
develops a model of intermediate-run adjustments to 
explore the relationship between tax policy disturbances 
and intermediate-run growth. 
The analysis examines the rate of change of 
national income, M, during any discrete time period 
Tk(k=l, ... ,n), associated with a set of non-neutral tax 
disturbances dTK. ,2,3), occurring at the beginning 
~ 
of period Tl . All adjustments occur by the end of period 
T. The total change in national income, after all adjust~ 
n 
ments have occurred, is the aggregate welfare loss: 
n 
(5-1-4) -b.W ::; dM ::: E M (l k) 
k=l 
where: M(T k) is the time rate of change of 1)1. during 
period lko 
The percentage rate of change of national income (rate 
of growth) in period lk is 
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where: M{T k _ l ) is understood to be national income at 
the end of period Tk - l " 
In Chapter 3 it was shown that 
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(5-l-6) dM = 1: d { (PK +8. q . ) K . } + 1: d ( TK K .. ) + L: d (PL L.). i=l ill 1 i 1 i=l i 1 
S . . . 11 3 • h th 1 d . b uppose, lnltla y, t at e non-neutra tax lstur ance 
is a tax change dTK., with tax rates on capital in the 
1 
other two sectors (j~i) remaining at the pre-disturbance 
neutral tax rate. It is assumed throughout the analysis 
which follows that price adjustments are instantaneous 
(i.e., they occur at the beginning of period Tl ) but that 
quantity adjustments are sluggish (i.e., there are 
quantity lags only). The assumption on price adjustments 
is unrealistic: a more general analysis would permit 
lagged adjustment both quantities and prices. The 
convenience of the assumption on price adjustments is 
that it implies a unique post-disturbance set of commodity 
and factor prices. In addition, the separation of price 
and quantity adjustments permits easy examination of 
"real" changes in output, which is the object of the 
present analysis. 
Figure 5 1 illustrates the impact of a non-neutral 
tax disturbance of the sort considered here. In particular, 
Figure 5-1-1 supposes that there are only two sectors,4. 
N that each sector is initially taxed at the rate TK, and 
that the non-neutral tax disturbance is an increase, 
= TK - T~, in the tax rate on Sector 1. 
1 
TK 
1 
N 
TK 
-dPK 
dK1 
KN 
1 
n 
V1IJ.PI~ 
'-I 
L K ( 
k=l 1 
ITKill r 
n 
= - L: K k=l 2(T k ) 
K2 
'MP' 
K 
w 
..,. 
..,. 
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As Figure 5-1-1 illustrates, following a non-neutral 
tax disturbance dTK., the change in the net income of J. 
capital in that Sector i is 
(5-1-7) d{ (PK -tG.q.)K.} . J. J. J. J. 
=(PK -to .q. )dK. +~dPK . J. J. J. J.. 
J. dT =0 J. dT =0 
K. K. 
J J (jri ) (jri ) 
Since price adjustments are assumed instantaneous, (5-1-7) 
can be written 
(5-1-8) 
where: 
n 
d{(PK -tG.q.)K.} =~dPK +(PK +0.q.) E K .. (Tk) . J. J. J. J.. . J. J. k=1 J.,J. -
J. dT =0 J. dT =0 J. -
K. K. 
n 
E K .. (T k ) == k=l J.,J. 
J J (jri ) (jri ) 
aK. J. 
= dTK . {i=1,2,3}, J. 
and in general: 
n 
EK . . (T k ) k=l J.,J 
aK. 
= dTJ. .dTK. (i,j K. J 
J 
,2,3). 
In addition to the changes sQmmarized in (5-1-7) 
and (5-1-8), the tax disturbance dTK. induces a set of J. 
changes in net capital incomes in other sectors: 
(5-1-9) d{(PK +0.q.}K.} =~dPK 
. J J J J. 
J dT =0 J K. 
J (jri ) 
n 
+(PT? -tG.q.) L: K .. (Tk), ~'". J J k=l J,J. 
dT =0 J K. 
J (jri ) 
The total change (i.e., across all sectors) in net capital 
income following a tax disturbance dTK. > 0 (dTK. = 0, jri) J. J 
is, from (5 8) and {5-1-9}: 
CS-I-IQ) 
A A 
d{(J'K +0. q.JK.} + r d{ (PK +€l.q'> K.} ',il 1 . ...,1.. •• JJ J 
1 dT =0 Jrl J dT =0 
K. K. 
J J 
(jf~) (jfi ) 
3 oK. oK. 
=dP 
K dT =0 K. 
E K. + "ITl .dTK + E "IT) .dTK 
. 1 1 0 K . '-1.. 0 K ' 1= i 1 Jrl i 1 
J (jfi) 
3 
= dP E K. , 
K dT =0' i=ll K. 
J (jfi ) 
on using the condition that dPK . = dPK ( 1,2,3), the 
A 1 
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normalization that (PK + e.q.) = 1 (i=1,2,3), and equation .11 
1 
(3-3-43), which derives from the assumption of fixed 
factor supplies. 
Figure 5-1-2 illustrates the adjustment paths of 
A A. (PK +e.q.}K. and E (PK +e.q.)K., In the special case of i 1 1 1 jfi j ) J J 
a linear lag operator on K., K., extending three periods 
1 J . 
(i. e., n 3). Given that the stock of capital is in fixed 
total supply the rate at which the net income of capital 
falls in Sector i identical to the (negative of the) 
sum of the rates of change of net capital income in Sectors 
jfi. 
In the case of a whole set of tax disturbances 
dTK,fO (i=1,2,3) the change in aggregate net capital income 
1 
is, more generally: 
(5-1-11) A A d{(PK +8.Q.)K.}+ E d{ (PK +8.Q.)K.} . 1 1 1 .~. . J J J 1 Jr1 J 
3 3 oK. 3 aIC 
= dPK• E K. + E '"IT1 .dTK + E E "IT
J 
.dTK. 
. 1 1 • la K .. ~. a 1= J= . J Jr1 K. 1 J 1 
3 3 3 oK. 
1 
= dPK• E Ki +. E . E arr=-.dTK . i=l 1=1 J=l K. J 
3 
= dPKo L: K. 
. 1 1 1= 
J 
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In general, the assumption of instantaneous price adjust-
ments implies no change in the aggregate net income of 
capital during periods L1 to Ln' There is, however, 
a continual redistribution of net income among sectors 
during this time period. 
The of a tax disturbance dTK. on tax 
1 
revenue derived from Sector i capital is 
(5-1-12) d (TK K.) . 1 
1 
N 
=K .. dTK +TK .dK. 1 . . 1 
dT =0 1 1 
K. dT =0 K. 
J ( jfi) J (jfi) 
N n . 
=K .. dTK +TK . E K .. (Tk) 1 i i k=l 1,1 
In addition, the change in tax revenue derived from capital 
in Sectors jfi is: 
(5-1-13) = TK .dK. d(TK K.) . J 
J . J dT =0 J K. 
J (jfi) 
=T K. 
dT =0 J K. 
J (jfi) 
n 
E K .. (Lk ), jfi. k=1 J,l 
(PK +8. q . ) K . .11 1 
1 
,-
I 
--.------11 K~ dPKJ 
1 n 
Z K .. (L k )= L: L: K .. (Lk)l· 1,1 j~i k=l J,l 
L1 L2 L =L n 3 
L: (PK + 8.q.) K • -J' • J J Jr1 J 
L: KN j~i j dPK 
K. . (L k ) 1,1 
l4 L1 l2 l =L n 3 
I-l:j 
H 
G) 
C 
:;0 
trl 
Ul 
I 
IV 
~ L: K j~i j,i (Lk ) == 
,-K. . (Lk ) ~~ 1,1 
Lk 
w 
.;... 
co 
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The total change in tax revenue following a tax disturbance 
dTK. > 0 (dTK . = 0, j~i) is, from (5-1-12) and (5-l-l3) J. J 
(5-1-14) 
dT =0 K, 
J 
(j~i) 
+ E d (TK K.) j~i j J dT =0 K, 
J 
(j~i) 
n n 
KNJ..dTK.+TK. E i .. (Tk )+ E TK E i. LtTk ' J. J. k=l J.,J. j~i j k=l J,J. 
The time rate of change of tax revenue is, from (5-1-14), 
(5-1-15) = TK K. . h k ) + E TK K. . h k ) • . J.,J. '-/." J,J. J. JrJ. J 
The fixity of factor supplies implies 
(5-1-16 ) 
but it is clear that the time rate of change of tax revenue 
from capital is non-zero (in fact, strictly negative in 
this case) because of differences in unit tax rates, 
Figure 3 illustrates the adjustment paths of 
TK K. 
. J. J. 
and E TK K., assuming a linear lag operator on 
j j J 
K. , K., J. J extending three periods. At the beginning of 
period T l , the tax revenue from capital in Sector i 
increases by K~dTK (i.e., capital in Sector i bears the J. . J. 
full burden of the tax, initially.) Over time, some of 
the burden of the tax is shifted onto capital in other 
sectors, as capital moves from Sector i to Sectors j~i. 
n 
TK K. 
. 1 
1 
TK 2: K. . (Tk ) i k==l 1,1 
~dTKi 
T1 
(K.Ki~i 
1 
T2 T =T n 3 
2: TK K. 
'../.. . J J1"l J 
n 
2: TK 2: K. ,( Tk ) . J,l J 
::>-
Tk T1 T2 T =T n 3 
I':rj 
H 
GJ 
c:: 
:;0 
t.:rJ 
U1 
I 
w 
2: T K jri Kj j,i (T k ) 
Tk w 
U1 
o 
In the case of a whole set of tax disturbances 
dTK.IO (i=1,2,3) the change in total tax revenue from 
1 
capital is 
(5-1-17) d (TK K.) + E d <. TK K.) i 1 . jli j J 
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3 N 3 n 3 n 
= l: K1.dTK +TK. E E K .. (T k )+ E TK E E K .. (Tk ) i=l i 1 j=l k=l 1,J jli j i=l k=l J,l 
The time rate of change of tax revenue from capital is 
(5-1-18) 
3 3 
E TK E:K.. (T k ) i=l i j=l 1,J 
5. 
Again, this is generally non-zero. 
Recalling Figure 5-1-1, a non-neutral tax distur-
bance dTK. causes a change in labour income in Sector i 
1 
of (this measure is a rough approximation only) 
(5-1-19) 
dT =0 K. 
= -Ki(dTK.+dPK 
1 
J ( jli) 
+ ~dK. 
1 
(dTK +dPK dTK.=O i 
J ( jli) 
= -Ki (dTK.+dPK 
1 dT =0 K. 
J (jli) 
n 
dT =0 K. 
J ( jli) 
) 
dT =0 K. 
J (jli) 
) E K .. h k ) k=l 1,1 
dT =0 K. 
J ( jll) 
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The associated change in labour income in Sectors 
j~i is (approximately) 
(5-1-20) d(PL L.) . J J 
= -If..dP 
J K dT =0 K. 
J 
(j~i) 
n 
.dK. 
J dT =0 K. 
J 
(j~l) 
-!;z dP • E K. . (Tk ) K dTK.=O k=l J,l 
J 
(j~i) 
The total change in labour income following a tax 
disturbance dTK.> O,dTK . = 0, j~i) is, from (5-1-19) and 
(5-1-20) , 
(5-1-21) 
1 J 
d{PL L.) • 1 
1 
+ E d{P
L 
L.) 
j~i j J dT =0 K. 
J 
(j~i) 
3 N 
= - E K .• dPK i=l 1 dT =0 K. 
J 
(j~l) 
3 
( E 
dT =0 j=l K. 
J 
(j~i) 
3 N 
= - E K .• dPK . i=l 1 dT =0 K. 
J ( j~l) 
n 
dT =0 K. 
J ( j~l) 
E K .. (T k )) k=l J,l 
N n 
-K,dTK -~dTK E K .. (T k ) 1 i i k=l 1,1 
The time rate of change of labour income is 
(5-l-22) 
dT =0 K. 
J 
(j~i) 
= -~dTK K. . (Tk ) . 1,1 
1 
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Figure 5-1-4 illustrates the dynamic adjustments in labour 
income. The initial impact of the tax disturbance dTK. > 0 
1 
is to increase labour income in Sectors j~i by - E K~dPK. 
j~i 1 
Over time, labour income in Sector i falls as labour income 
in Sectors j1i increases. 
The change in labour income resulting from a whole 
set of tax disturbances dTK. 1 0 (i=1,2,3) is 
1 
(5-1-23) 3 3 N 3 N d E PL L.=-dPK E K.- E K.dTK i=l i 1 i=l 1 1 1 i 
3 3 n 
-~ E dT E E:K.. (T. ) 
i=l Ki j=l k=l 1,J K 
3 N 3 N 3 3 n 
=-dPK E K.- E K.dT -~ L: TEE K .. (T k ) i=l 1 i=l 1 KL i=l Ki j=l k=l 1,J 
The time rate of change of aggregate labour income is 
3 3 
(5-1-24) = -~ E T E K. . (T k ) i=l Ki j=l 1,J 
which is generally non-zero. 
On combining (5-1-18) and (5-1-24), the time rate 
of change of national income is 
(5-1-25) 
3 3 
= ~ E T L: K. . (T k ) i=l Ki j=l 1,J 
3 
L: K. . (T k ) is the time rate of change of j=l 1,J 
capital in Sector i (in period Tk ) 
following a set of tax changes 
dTK.10 (j=1,2,3). 
J 
~~ 
,~ 
PL L. . 1 
1 
n 
~ (dTK +dPK) 1: K. . (Tk ) i 1<.=1 1,1 
f 111-
-Ki (dT1\. +dP K) I 1 
I 
t \l __ _ 
T1 T2 
1: P L. 
jt1 L j J 
~(dTK.~K)Ki,i(Tk) 
J 
T=r 
n 3 
~ K .. (Tkll-
,_ J,l 
- 1: ~ jti jdPK 
Tk T1 T2 
I 1{, . (T
k
) 
K J,l 
t-:rj 
H 
o 
C 
:;0 
t?;j 
U1 
I 
I-' 
I 
.r:::. 
T=T Tk W 
n 3 U1 
~ 
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The particular way in which the Ki (T k ) are related 
to the dK. depends upon the particular lag pattern assumed. 
]. 
The flexible accelerator model of investment, originated by 
Chenery (1952) and Koyck (1954), proposes that changes 
in desired (optimal) capital stocks are transformed into 
actual changes by a geometric distributed lag function. 6 . 
In particular, suppose that actual capital stocks in Sector 
i may be expressed as a weighted average of all past 
optimal capital stocks in that sector: 
(5-1-26) 00 >I, * = (I-A.) E A.K.(Tk>l,) ]. >1,=0 ]. ].. -
* 
A.E(O,l) 
]. 
where: Ki(Tk_>I,) is the optimal stock of Sector i capital 
at the end of period Tk_.l/,. 
Ki(T k ) is the actual stock of Sector i capital at 
the end of period Tk . 
The particular form of the flexible accelerator in (5-1-26) 
is often referred to as a distributed lag function. It is 
widely used in econometric analyses of investment 
b h · 7. e av].our. 
(5-1-26) reveals: 
(5-1-27) 00 .l/, . * = (I-A.) E A.K hk n) ]. .l/,=O ]. -x, 
00 
= ( 1-A .) E A ~ dK, (T k n) 8. , ]. .l/,=O]. ]. -x, AE(O,l) • 
Hence, if there is a unique change in optimal capital stocks 
dK. h ) (i=1,2,3), (5-1-27) can be written: ]. s 
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(5-1-28) • (k-s) KJ.,(T k ) = (l-A,)A, dK,(T), J. J. J. S 
with the restriction that 
00 
(5-1-29) 2: Ki(T k ) = dK, (T ) 9. k=s J. s 
(5-1-28) and (5-1-29) imply: 
(5-1-30) 
00 
2: (I-A,) A ,(k-s) = l. 
k=s J. J. 
(5-1-28) in (5-1-25) reveals: 
(5-1-31) 
3 
= ~ 2: TK ( 1-A , ) A ~ k - s) dK, (T ) 
. l' J. J. J. S J.= J. 
Hence, the time rate of change of national income during 
any arbitrary period Tk depends upon the change in the 
optimal allocation of capital in some previous period T , 
s 
due to a set of tax disturbances occurring at the beginning 
of period T , and upon the shapes of the distributed lag 
s 
functions relating changes in optimal capital stocks to 
changes in actual stocks, in each sector. 
The requirement that the total stock of capital be 
in fixed supply at all times restricts the diversity of 
lag distributions in the economy. Hence, since 
3 
2: K.(T k ) = 0 = i=l J. 
3 
2: dK. (T ) 
. 1 J. S J.= 
(5-1-28) reveals that (l_A.)A~k-s) has the same value for J. J. 
all i. Denote this value by (I-A) A (k-s). 
(5-1-31) can be used to show the rate of increase 
in national income due to improvements in resource alloca-
tion. Hence, suppose the government initiates a neutral 
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tax policy at the beginning o;f; period ls. The increase in 
national income following this policy initiative, in any 
period lk' is simply the negative of the right-hand-side of 
(5-1-31) • 
5.2 SIMULATED DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENTS TO CHANGES IN TAX POLICY. 
This section extends the analy sis of Sect;i:.on 5.1 by 
presenting some simulations of potential growth rates 
following a tax policy disturbance. In particular the 
simulations are performed for a neutral tax policy distur-
bance, which equalises tax rates among sectors. Simulations 
are performed for Australia only, although similar calcula-
tions can be performed for each of the other countries 
considered in Chapter 4. 
The equations of change derived in Section 5.l 
describe the consequences of the imposition of a set of 
non-neutral tax disturbances on an initial neutral tax 
system. The simulations presented in this section are 
concerned with the imposition of a neutral tax policy on 
an initial non-neutral tax system. This requires reversing 
the sign on each of the equations of change presented in 
Section 5.1. Table 5-2-1 presents the equations of change 
for the first five years following a neutral tax policy 
disturbance. In that table, the TK. are tax rates under 
1 
present law; dPK is the change in the net rental price of 
capital due to the present non-neutral tax system; the 
dK. are the distortions in capital allocation due to the 
1 
I 
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TABLE 5-2-1: Equations of Change Describing the Time 
Profile of Adjustments to Neutral Tax 
Policy. I. 
Year Change in National Incane Components During Year. 
Labour2 • 
3 
dPz:r8 
Ki =l 1 
3 
+ z: If.dTK I 
· 1 1 . 1= 1 
3 
~ z: TK (l-A)dK. 
i=l i 1 
3 
~ z: TK (I-A) AdK . 
· 1 . 1 1= 1 
3 ~ z: TK (I-A) A2dK./ 
i=l i 1, 
3 ~ z: TK (1-A)A3dK. 
i=l i 1 
3 ~ z: TK (1-A)A4dK. 
· 1 . 1 1= 1 
capita13• 
3 
-dP z: If. 
K. 1 1 1= 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Taxes on 
capita14. 
3 
- z: K~dTK 
. 1 1 . 1= 1 
3 
- z: T (l-A)dK . 
. 1 K. 1 1= 1 
3 
- z: TK (l-A)AdK. 
i=l i 1 
13 2 
- z: TK (1-A)/': dK. 
i=l i 1 
3 3 
- z: TK (l-A)A dK. 
i=l i 1 
3 4 
- z: TIC (l-A)A dKi i=l 1 
'Ibta15• 
3 
~ z: TK (l-A)dK. 
. l' 1 1= 1 
3 
~ z: TK (I-A) AC$.. 
i=l i 1 
Notes: 1. Tax policy is initiated at beginning of Year 
Tl° 
2. The equation of change is obtained by using 
(5-1-28) in (5-1-23), (5-1-24), and changing 
sign. 
3. The equation of change is obtained by using 
(5-1-28) in (5-1-11), and changing sign. 
4. The equation of change is obtained by using 
(5-1-28) in (5-1-17), (5-1-18), and changing 
sign. 
5. The equation of change is obtained by using 
(5-1-28) in (5-1-25), and changing sign. 
Year 1. labour Capital 
($ Million) 
1978 -417.06 570.57 
1979 -23.03 0 
1980 -5.76 0 
1981 -1.44 0 
1982 -0.36 0 
'IOl'AIS -447.65 570.57 
TABLE 5-2-2: Illustrative Calculations of Time Profile of.Adjustments 
A = .25 
Capital 
Taxes 
-61.40 
46.06 
11.52 
2.88 
.72 
-.22 
to Neutral Tax PolicYi Different Geometric Lag Distributionj 
Australia. 
Potential Additional Change in National Inca:ne: canponents 
I A = .5 i A = .75 I 
'! I 
Capital Capital 
'Ibtal I labour Capital Taxes Total labour Capital Taxes 'Ibtal 
($m. ) I %2. ($ Million) ($m. ) %2. ($ Million) ($m. ) 
92.11 .11 -386.36 570.57 -122.80 61.41 .07 -355.66 570.57 -184.20 30.71 
23.03 .03 -30.70 0 61.40 30.70 .04 -23.03 0 46.06 23.03 
5.76 .0 -15.35 0 30.70 15.35 .02 -17.27 0 34.54 17.27 
1.44 .0 -7.68 0 15.36 7.68 .01 -12.95 0 25.90 12.95 
I 
.36 .0 I -3.84 0 7.68 3.84 .0 -9.71 0 19.42 9.71 
, 
122.70 , -443.93 570.57 -7.66 118.98 -418.62 570. -58.28 93.67 
Notes: 1. Fiscal year ending 30th June in calendar year shown. 
2. The figure is the change in national income during the year as a percentage of 
national income at the beginning of the year. 
%2. 
.04 
.03 
.02 
.01 
.01 
! 
w 
lJl 
1.0 
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present non-neutral tax system; and the dTK. are taxes under 
. 1 
present law less taxes under neutrality. 
Table 5-2-2 presents illustrative calculations of 
the time profile of adjustments to an equal-yield neutral 
tax policy in Australia. The tax policy is initiated on 
1st July 1977, the beginning of the 1977-78 fiscal year. 
Three different geometric lag distributions are explored. 
The closer is A to unity, the slower the process of 
adjustment. The neutral tax policy produces an increase in 
national income of $122.80 million annually once allmjust-
ments have taken place. If A = .25, national income 
increases by $92.11 million in the first year following the 
tax disturbance. In the second year, national income 
increases by a further $2"3.03 million. Hence, national 
income in the second year is $115.14 million (=$92.llm.+ 
$23.03m.) larger than it would have been in the absence 
the tax disturbance. National income in the fifth year 
(the 1981-82 fiscal year) is $122.70 million larger than 
it would have been. Over the five years the total flow of 
national income is $573.19 million larger than it would 
have been in the absence of the tax policy disturbance • 
If A . 5, national income in the fiscal year 
1981-82 is $118.98 million larger than it would have been 
if the tax policy disturbance had not been initiated at 
the beginning of the 1977-78 fiscal year. Once all adjust-
ments have occurred, national income is $122.8 million 
larger. Hence, in some sense, approximately 96.89 percent 
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percent (=118.98 7 122.8) of adjustments take place by the 
end of the fifth year. If A = .25, the figure is 99.92 
percent, and if A = .75, the figure is 76.28 percent. 
Table 5-2-2 also presents the growth rates in 
national income in each year following an equal-yield 
neutral tax policy disturbance. The figure is the change 
in national income during the year as a percentage of 
national income at the beginning of the year. The figures 
are quite small, which is not very surprising. The figures 
should not be taken as the maximum potential rates of 
growth that would be stimulated by an equal-yield neutral 
tax policy disturbance. One reason for this is that the 
simulations assume a constant total stock of capital over 
the five years. More realistically, improvements in 
resource allocation due to the tax disturbance increase 
national income, and so increase the flow of savings 
available to finance capital accumulation; the larger 
capital stock adds more to output growth in later periods. 
This chapter has attempted to indicate the potential 
time rate of change of national income, over a specific 
number of periods, following a neutral tax policy distur-
bance. The power of the analysis is limited by its assump-
tion that the total stock of capital is in fixed supply_ 
The investigation of a similar question in the context of 
variable factor supplies is deserving of investigation. 
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Footnotes to Chapter Five 
1. This is derived in Chapter 3: see equation (3-1-9). 
2. Most studies of the sources of growth attribute 
most of the causation to changes in total factor 
productivity. Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, at 
p.249) challenge this finding with the hypothesis 
that " ... if quantities of output and input are 
measured accurately, growth in total output is 
largely explained by growth in total input." 
3. The more general case is developed below. 
4. The third sector can be added, but only complicates 
matters. 
5. Note that 
3 
L K. . Cr k ) = 0, but in general 1 l,J 
6. This proposition is one of the least contentions of 
all issues in the investment literature. Jorgenson 
(1971) emphasises this point. 
7. See Jorgenson (1971) for references. 
8. The assumption of a fixed total stock of capital 
implies gross investment sufficient to off-set 
depreciation only. 
9. i.e., n = 00 
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CHAPTER SIX 
HOUSING POLICY IN THE LONG-RUN 
Chapter 5 considered the time-path of intermediate-
run adjustments to the removal of the owner-occupier 
subsidy. This is not the only dynamic issue of interest 
in an analysis of housing policy. This chapter presents 
a preliminary examination of some of the long-run 
implications of the favourable tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing. Section 6.1 explores the dynamic 
incidence of the owner-occupier subsidy in a modified 
neoclassical growth model. Section 6.2 extends the 
analysis of Section 6.1 .to a consideration of the optimal 
taxation of housing in the long-run. 
6.1 THE DYNAMIC INCIDENCE OF THE OWNER-OCCUPIER SUBSIDY 
The dynamic incidence of taxes on capital has been 
the subject of considerable recent interest. Diamond 
(1970) concludes that a reduction in capital taxes increases 
the per capita rewards of both capital and labour. 
Grierson (1975) examines the rate of capital taxation 
that will maximize wages, under a variety of assumptions 
about government expenditures. He emphasises that the rate 
of capital taxation which maximizes labour's total earnings 
depends upon labour's ownership of capital, and the 
consumption discount rate. Feldstein (1974) I Krzyzaniak 
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(1967), and Sato (1967) are concerned with related problems. 
These analyses have all been in terms of two-factor 
growth models. To examine the incidence of the owner-
occupier subsidy a third factor (residential, as distinct 
from non-residential, capital) is required. l • 
Suppose that there are three factors of production. 
Kl denotes the physical stock of residential capital; 
K2 denotes the physical stock of non-residential capital; 
and L denotes the labour stock. Production is described 
by a linear homogeneous production function which is, in 
per capita terms: 
(6-l-l) 
where: k. _ K./L is the stock of type i capital, per 
1 1 
worker. 
f. is the marginal physical product of type i 
1 
capital. 
All factor incomes are subject to taxation. The subsidy 
to housing implies a lower rate of income tax on the 
earnings of residential capital. The competitive market 
conditions are summarized by 
(6-l-2) 
(6-1-3) 
(6-1-4) 
where: 
w 
r i is the after-tax rate of return to capital of 
type i. 
w is the after-tax real wage rate. 
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Total taxes are a proportion t* of national income. 
Le. , 
(6-1-5) 
Grierson (1975) assumes that t* is a constant. Here it 
is variable, but t is constant. 3 • 
(6-1-5) implies 
(6-1-6) t* = t 8 + t (1-8 ) = t - (t-t )8 1 K1 Kl 1 Kl 
where: 8 
K1 
is the gross-of-tax share of capital in output. 
(t-t1 ) is the rate of subsidy to housing. 
Assuming that the Government balances its budget, 
per capita 
( 6-1-7) 
savings out of total income are 
sf (l-t*) = sf{ (l-t l ) - (t-t ) (1-8 )} 1 K1 
where: s is the private marginal propensity to save out 
f . 4. o lncome. 
The labour force grows exponentia11y according to 
(6-1-8 ) L(T) 
where: n is the growth rate. 
The time rates of change of k1 and k2 are given by 
0 
K. 
(6-1-9) . 1 K. = - nk. 
1 1 
,2. 
With no depreciation, 
K. 
(6-1-10) 1 = g. L 1 ,2 
where: g. is gross investment in capital of type i, 
1 
per worker. 
Macroeconomic equilibrium requires 
(6-1-11) gl + g2 = sf(l-t*) 
A long-run balanced growth path is characterised 
by 
(6-1-12) o. 
This implies, on using (6-1-9), (6-1-10), (6-1-11), 
(6-1-13 ) 
The incidence of the owner-occupier subsidy is 
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investigated by varying t 1 , and observing the effect on 
r 1 ,r2 , and w. From (6-1-13) 
(6-1-14) 
dkl dk2 
n(dt
1 
+ dtl) = 
dk dk2 
(l-t*) s (f1 1 + f2 dt )-s 1 
since t,s, are constants. dki/dt1 is the change in the 
long-run equilibrium value of k i due to a tax change dtl" 
d8K Idt1 can be evaluated: 1 
(6-1-15) 
where: E. •• = 
1J 
If .. k. is the (cross-price) elasticity of 
J1 1 
demand for type i capital with respect to 
the gross-of-tax price of type j capital. 
In addition, it can be shown that 
(6-1-16) 
(6-1-16) in (6-1-15) produces 
( 6-1-17) 
Now from (6-1-14), (6-1-16), (6-1-17) 
(6-1-18) 
(6-1-19) 
where: 
= 
D2 
dk2 _ -8K1E21k2 
dt1 - D2 
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3n general, (6-1-18), (6-1-19) cannot be signed. 
However, it can be shown that local stability requires that5 . 
(6-1-20) 
and clearly, 
(6-1-21) 
(K . -8 ) > 0 ]. K. 
]. 
To investigate the incidence of the subsidy to 
housing, observe that, from (6-1-2), (6-1-18) 
1,2, 
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(6-1-22) 
= 
Further, from (6-1-3), (6-1-19) 
(6-1-23) 
dr 2 dk2 
dt1 
= (l-t) f22 dt 
1 
E 
-(1-t)f 2 ( 21/E 22 )8 K 1 
= 
D2 
(6-1-24) dw f1~ dk1 
f dk 
dt1 
= - (l-t) { ( 1) - + ( 2/E22)_2} dt 1 dt1 
f(1-t)8 K {8K +(E21/E 22 )8K } 11  
= 
D2 
The incidence equations (6-1-18), (6-1-19), (6-1-22), 
(6-1-23), (6-1-24) cannot be signed unambiguously. The 
sign of each of these equations depends upon relative 
factor shares, and upon the degree of substitution among 
f . d' 6. h h l' 1 actors ln pro uctlon. It appears t at t e re atlve y 
simple incidence equations obtained in the usual one-sector 
models (Grierson (1975, pp.78-79), for instance) become 
quite complex when more than two factors are permitted. 
Equations (6-1-22) to (6-1-24) emphasise that this is so: 
In the present model there is no distinction between 
worker and capitalist savings rates, which is the principal 
source of interest in the two-factor incidence equations. 
6.2 THE OPTIMAL TAXATION OF HOUSING CAPITAL IN THE 
LONG-RUN. 
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The static general equilibrium analysis of Chapters 
3 and 4 emphasised the distortions created by policies 
which tax housing incomes favourably relative to income 
earned by capital in other uses. Optimal taxation has 
been interpreted as the tax system which maximizes 
national income. In a world of fixed factor endowments, 
it was shown that optima1ity requires equality of tax 
rates on sectora1 capital incomes. There is an important 
reason why equality of tax rates might not be an "optima1" 
tax policy, in general, however. This is that maximisation 
of national income might not be an appropriate objective;7. 
in particular, this objective ignores the social arguments 
for housing, discussed in Chapter 1. This section 
explores optimal tax policies in long-run growth. B• 
Aaron (1972) suggests that the social arguments for 
housing rest on allegations of positive externalities 
associated with quality housing. 9 . To capture the social 
importance of housing, suppose that the utility of the 
representative individual is represented by 
(6-2-1) u = u(C,k1 ),10. 
which assumed concave with respect to both arguments. 
Economic planners maximize (6-2-1) subject to 
(6-2-2) c = f{l-s(l-t*)} = f{l-s( 
and the balanced growth condition that 
.,i. 
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(6-2-3) 
First-order necessary conditions include: 
(6-2-4) 
Uk f = n- l/U 1 c 
where: Uk dU/dkl is the marginal utility of housing. 1 
U 
-
dU/dc is the marginal utility of consumption. 
c 
(6-2-5) f2 = n. 
(6-2-4), (6-2-5) are the modified « Phelps (1961)-
Swan (1956)-Solow (1956) golden-rule of accumulation. 
Hence, (6-2-4), (6-2-5) in (6-2-3) imply the optimal 
rate of private saving: 
(6-2-6) 
Uk 
s(l-t*) = 8 + 8 + ( l/UC)kl/f 
Kl K2 
U 
The term ( kl/Uc)k l is the utility value of kl units of 
housing, in terms of the consumption good. Given a private 
savings ratio, s, (6-2-6) implies a relationship between 
the optimal value of the tax rate, t*, and output. In 
particular, 
(l-t*) = 
s sf 
which, on using (6-1-6) reveals, 
(6-2-7) 
= 
(l-t) 
8 
Kl 
f(8Kl+8K2)+(Ukl/UC)kl-Sf(1-t) 
sf8 
Kl 
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> Uk > 
< 0 as fee +8 ) + k l { l/Uc ) sf{l-t} kl k2 < 
It is clear from (6-2-7) that, given a chosen value of t, 
the optimal size of the subsidy to housing increases with 
increases in the utility value of the stock of housing. 
When Uk = 0, housing is subsidized under optimal tax 1 
policy only if total capital income exceeds what would 
be saved if there were no subsidy to housing. The 
ambiguity of (6-2-7) provides scope for additional 
theoretical and empirical research. 
372 
FootIlotestb Chapter Six. 
1. Much of the literature on growth theory focuses on 
models with a single capital good: Solow (1956), 
for instance. Hahn (1966) appears to be the first 
serious attempt to generalise over the nurnoer of 
capital goods. 
2. Shell and Stiglitz (1967) have investigated the 
dynamic properties of a one-sector growing economy 
with two capital goods. In particular, they question 
Hahn's (1966) findings that in an economy with 
heterogeneous capital goods, the growth path may 
be indeterminate, and not all paths of accumulation 
will converge to balanced growth. Shell and Stiglitz 
find that whenever momentary equilibrium is not 
unique, there is a unique allocation of investment 
which is consistent with balanced growth. Further, 
paths which do not tend to balanced growth are 
shown to be intertemporally inefficient (Shell and 
Stiglitz (1967, p.592». 
3. Hence, the effect of imposing a subsidy to housing 
can be investigated by decreasing t l " 
4. A distinction can be made between different classes 
of private savers (workers and capitalists, for 
instance), but such a distinction is not very 
interesting here. 
5. The equation of motion for capital of type i is 
,. = sf(l-t*) - g.~. - nk .. 
1 Jr1 1 
Local stability at the point where ,. = 0 requires 
1 
that ak./ak. < O. Le., < n/s(1-t*). Multiplying 
1 1 
by k./f reveals the condition that eR < nk./s(l-t*)f. 1 . 1· 
• 1 
But at the point where k i = 0, s(l-t*)f = n(kl +k 2). 
Hence, local stability requires eR. < Ki,which is 
the inequality (6-1-20). 1 
6. Clearly, more investigation is needed, at both the 
theoretical, and empirical levels. 
7. Of course, this is also true of the static analyses. 
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8. Auerbach (1979) also considers the optimal taxation 
of heterogeneous capital. Auerbach's model builds on 
that developed by Diamond (1965). The economy is 
characterized by a single production sector, employing 
two distinct capital goods, and by overlapping 
generations of individuals who live for two periods. 
9. These arguments are analysed in Chapter 1. 
10. Arrow and Kurz (1970) employ a similar individual 
utility function. There, individual utility depends 
upon per capita consumption, and upon the per capita 
stock of "social" capital. Manning (1976) also 
employs a similar utility function. There, social 
welfare is a quasi-strictly-concave function of per 
capita consumption, and the level of skill (the 
ratio of skilled workers to the total population), 
reflecting the view that education might be desirable 
in itself. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUDING Cm1MENTS 
This thesis has presented a theoretical and empirical 
exploration of the economic implications of housing policies 
pursued by Western governments. Attention has focused on 
those policies which provide differential tax treatment 
for owner-occupied housing relative to rented housing, and 
to non-residential capital. 
The author's original interest in the economic con-
sequences of housing policy was stimulated by the thought 
that large investments in residential capital have important 
dynamic implications, which have so far received scant 
attention. Some of these dynamic implications have been 
explored in this thesis, but it is clear that there is 
room for further analysis. The reason the dynamic issues 
in housing policy have not been more fully explored here 
is the author's dissatisfaction with the previous treatment 
of some of the static questions. In particular, the 
static general equilibrium implications of the preferential 
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing seemed to warrant 
considerable theoretical and empirical evaluation. 
The three~sector general equilibrium model developed 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis is not restricted to an analysis 
of housing policy, of course. It has potential value in 
the analysis of a large number of other specific tax incen-
tive measures. This is interesting, given the popular 
political judgement that such measures are a suitable means 
of achieving economic objectives. 
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